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People . . . talk about "traumatic experiences" all the time. 
I wish they would quit it. 
When they use that rubbery, nerveless expression, they cheat 
us out of what our language should make us feel about gruesome 
events . They should talk about wounding experiences and painful 
experiences and shocking experiences and crippling experiences 
and murderous experiences and so on, instead. 
I have looked up the meaning of the word "traumatic" in a 
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dictionary, and its origins and meanings. I still think it was 
invented by a manufacturer of self-sealing gas tanks. If a bullet 
traumatizes such a gas tank, no harm is done. 
Kurt Vonnegut , Jr., 
Letter to the Editor, 
New York Times 
(April 27 , 1975) 
Thou shalt not sit with statisticians nor commit a social 
science. 
W.H. Auden , 
Under Which Lyre-A re-
actionary tract for the 
times ( 1946) 
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For hundreds of years , the Anglo-American legal system has been devel-
oping special rules for dealing with problems caused by the inherently 
perplexing phenomenon of mentally disordered behavior . 1 In almost every 
area of civil and criminal law, from rules concerning preventive detention to 
rules concerning criminal responsibility, mentally disordered persons are 
treated differently from non-mentally disordered persons. 
The purpose of this Article is to analyze in detail the social, moral, 
logical, and scientific bases of mental health law . The goals are to clarify the 
issues raised by mental health laws and to suggest how they ought to be 
understood and resolved. The first section introduces mental health law 
by exploring generally and briefly its nature and assumptions. The second 
section is the theoretical core of the Article . It examines in detail the three 
basic questions adjudicated by mental health law: Is the person normal?; 
Could the person have behaved otherwise?; and How will the person behave 
in the future ? The first and second questions are demonstrated to be primari-
ly social and moral. In addition, the discussion of the second question shows 
that craziness is only one cause of behavior among many and that it is a 
1. Throughout this Article , the term " be ha vio r " w ill re fe r to thoughts , feelings, a nd 
actions a nd will not be limited to externally pe rceiv abl e ac tio ns. The prefe rence for the gene ric 
te rm behav ior s ho uld not be interpreted to mean tha t the writer is an ad herent ex c lu s ivel y of 
be havioral ps yc hology . 
As explored in greater detail bel ow, me ntall y disorde red be havi o r refe rs to thoughts , 
fee lings, a nd ac tion s tha t wo uld be de sc ribed by the wo rd " c razy" or so me s imilar te rm . The 
word " crazy" is used beca use in th e auth o r' s opinion it is , for lega l purpose s, the least 
quest io n-begging a nd most accura te word to desc ribe the be havio r regulated by me nt a l hea lth 
laws . N o disres pect or flippa ncy to ward s disord ered persons or those individu a ls trying to help 
the m is implied. See tex t acc ompa nying note s 26-57 infra . 
Le ga l problems c reated by me ntal re ta rdati o n are relat ed to th ose created by ment a l illness, 
but the y are di stinct and will not be considered in thi s Artic le. 
1.· 
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much less powerful cause of legally relevant behavior than other factor s, 
such as poverty, which are not usuall y considered legall y relevant. The 
discussion of the third question, which concerns the prediction of future 
behavior, points out that data does not itself decide legal and moral ques-
tions and that, in any case, there is very little data or expertise with which to 
predict accurately future behav ior . 
The third section applies the theoretical and empirical arguments of the 
second section to an analysis of the proper role of expertise in mental health 
law decisionmaking and substantive mental health laws. It argues first that 
if the law continues to treat disordered persons specially , the role of 
experts should be limited. The present use of expertise obfuscates moral 
issues and promotes the mistaken view that the issues that concern the law 
are primarily scientific in nature . These issues in fact are primarily social 
and moral, and mental heal th professionals have little expertise in resolving 
social and moral questions. The third section then suggests that the law 
should not treat mentally disordered persons significantly differently from 
nondisordered ones because there is little persuasive scientific evidence that 
the former have significantly less control over the ir legally relevant behavior 
or are more predictable than the latter . 
I. THE NATURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW 
The legal system and mental health science are both concerned with under-
standing and controlling human behavior . In polar terms, the legal system 
approaches human behavior in terms of moral evaluation and the imposition 
of values, whereas mental health science approaches human behavior in 
terms of scientific, value-neutral, empirical investigation. Further, the legal 
model of behavior holds that persons have free will: persons choose their 
behavior and are thus morally and legally responsible for it. By contrast, the 
scientific model is deterministic : behavior , like all phenomena , is caused by 
its antecedents, and questions of moral and legal responsibility are Ir-
relevant . 2 
In most instances, the differing approaches of the legal system and 
mental health science cause few difficulties. It is generally believed that the 
fund amental assumptions of the legal system adequately interpret and deal 
with the problems of normal behavior. The problems associated with mental 
disorder, however, cause a very different reaction . Society and the legal 
system have always been confused and often fri ghtened by mental disorder. 3 
2. See notes 58-70 and acco mpa nying text infra. 
3. Rabkin , Opinions About Mental Illness: A Review of the Literature, 77 P SYCHO LOGI-
CAL BuLL. 153 (1972) and so urces cited therein ; Sarbin & Mancuso, Failure of a M oral 
Enterprise: Attitudes of the Public Toward Mental Illness , 35 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL 
-
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Special legal rules seem compelled in response to problems created by 
disordered behavior because it intuitively see ms that disordered persons are 
significantl y different from most persons in fund amental ways. Most per-
sons assume that almost everybody in their culture plays by the same 
behavioral and social rules they do , but that mentally ill persons do not. 
When the behavior of a no rmal individual causes a legal problem, it is 
believed that the same legal rules applicable to everyone else can be fairl y 
applied to that person. Because the rules of di sordered persons are not 
understood , however, soc ie ty assumes that they must be different. 4 While 
soc iety assumes that most persons have free cho ice concern ing the ir behav-
ior , di sordered persons are viewed as hav ing little or no choice. 5 Observers 
believe that persons who are normal would not freely choose to behave in a 
mentally di sordered fashion. Consequently, when a disordered person en-
gages in legally rel evant behavior, the lega l system must dec ide if it can 
properly apply the same generally applicable lega l rules to pe rsons who 
appear to be fundamentally different and to lack normal ability to control 
their behavior. The explanations of disordered behavior have changed over 
the centuries , but special legal treatment of disordered persons always has 
been bottomed upon the assumption of their fundamental difference from 
normal persons. 
Applying special rules to the problems created by me ntal disorder 
raises fundamental moral and political issues. The special treatment au-
thorized by mental health laws is usually based on the premises that the 
PsYCHOLOGY 159 (1970); see Kirk, The Psychiatric Sick Role and R ejection , 16 1 J. N ERVOUS & 
MENTAL DISEASE 318 , 318 , 324 ( 1975) (ascribing of psychiatric sickness to deviant behavior 
increases soc ial rejection). 
For various his tor ical approaches from di ffering po ints of view, see F . A LEXANDER & S. 
SELESN ICK, THE HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY ( 1968); M. FOUCAULT, M ADNESS & Ci VI LI ZATION 
( 197 1); G. ROSE!':, MADNESS IN SOCIETY (1969); D. ROTHMAN , THE DI SCOVERY OF TH E ASYLl.il\1 
( 1971); T. SZ.-\SZ, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS ( 1970); White , The Forms of Wildn ess: 
Archaeology of an Idea, in THE Wi LD M AN WITHI N: AN IMAGE IN WESTERN TH OUG HT FROM THE 
RFSAISSANC E TO R0.\1ANTICIS \1 3-38 (E. Dudley & M. Novak eds. 1972) ; Kenny, Mental Health 
in Plato's Republic, 55 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 229 (1969); Scull, From Madness to Menta/Illness , 
16 EuROPEAN J. Soc. 218 (1975). See generally Mora , Historiography of Psychiatry and Its 
Development: A Re-evaluation , 1 J . H JST. B EHAVIORAL SCI. 43 (1965) . 
.f. See , e.g. , Edgerton, On the " R ecognition" of Mental Til ness, in CHANGING PERSPEC-
TIVF:s IN M ENTAL ILLN ESS 49-72 (S. Plog & R. Edgerton eds. 1969); M echanic, S ome Fa ctors in 
fden tif.yi ng and Defining Mental Jlln ess, in TH E M AKING OF A M ENTA l. PATIENT 19 (R. Pri ce & B . 
Denner cds. 1973). 
5. G ross, Mental Abnormality as a Criminal Excuse , in PHI LOSOPHY OF L Aw 466-76 (J. 
Fe inberg & H. Gross eds. 1975). For a recent psychiatr ic op in ion to this effec t , see Chodoff , 
Th e Case fo r In voluntary Hospitalization of the Mentally f/1 , 133 A.Vl. J. PSYCHIATRY 49fi ( 1976). 
A ft er describing the crazy behav ior of some persons, Chodoff notes that " they are incapable 
by an effort of wi ll of stopping or changing their destruc ti ve behav ior . . [ l] t mu st also be 
acknowledged that these severely ill people are not capable at a conscious level of decid ing 
what is best for themselves .. . . " !d. at 498 (emphasis added). But see tex t accompany ing 
notes 58- 112 infra (analysis of the assumption that crazy persons have no free choice). 
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mentall y disordered person is abnormal and less responsible causally , and 
thus legally, for his behavior than other persons . Application of mental 
health laws to a person, therefore, tends to deprive the actor of some form 
of liberty , autonomy , or dignity by confining him or by negating the usual 
legal s ignificance of hi s actions. For example, mental health laws authorize 
preventive detention by civil commi tment even though the person is not 
suspected of criminal behavior . 6 Mental health laws also authorize a de-
fense, in some instances, to the enforcement of contracts. 7 The law's 
decision to treat a mentally disordered person specially , on the bas is that 
there is something uncontroll ab ly wrong with the actor's mind , is thus a 
decision fraught with soc ial and moral implications. 
The law recognizes these implications and generally presumes first, 
that persons are no t mentall y di sordered and have control over their behavior 
and second , that persons should not be treated specially unless di sorder and 
lack of control can be affirmatively shown. 8 On the one hand, to treat 
disordered persons like everyone else seems counterintuitive and morally 
improper. On the other hand, to treat disordered persons differently, usually 
to their disadvantage in terms of freedom and autonomy, is equally morally 
improper unless there is a powerful justification for doing so. 
Proponents of mental health laws claim that such laws are humane and 
that they enhance both the dignity of disordered persons and the moral 
climate of the society . They argue that it is unjust to treat persons who are 
incapable9 of behaving like everyone else as if they were so capable. 10 
Critics of these laws, however, believe that they diminish the dignity of 
6. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & IN ST. CoDE§§ 5150 , 5250 (West 1972 & Supp. 1978). See 
generally Developments in rhe Law-Civil Commirmenr of rhe Menially Ill, R7 H ARV. L. RFv. 
1190 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; Note, "Who Says I'm Crazy?"-A Proposal 
for Mandatory Judicial Review of Emergency Detention in California, 51 S. CAL. L. R Ev . 695 
( 1978). 
7. Ortelere v . Teac hers · Retireme nt Bd., 25 N.Y.2d 196 , 250 N.E.2d 460 , 303 N.Y.S.2d 
362 (1969) ; J. MU RRAY, MURR.W ON CONTRACTS§ 14 (2d rev. ed. 1974). Of course , me nta lly 
disordered persons are not the only group protected from the enforceme nt of their contracts. 
Minors too, for example, enjoy special trea tment. It is inte res ting to note tha t the justifi catio n is 
similar in both cases-me mbers of the protected groups a re considered incapable of prot ec ting 
their right s. 
8. 31 A C.J .S. E vidence § 147 ( 1964) ( " It is to be presumed th a t a perso n is me nta ll y 
sound . . " ). For exa mple, the crimina l law pres um es that all defendants are sane. P.::opl e 
v. Silver , 33 N.Y.2d 475 , 310 N.E .2d 520, 354 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1974). Modern case law has 
recogni zed the social and moral implica tions of mental hea lth laws; when ac tors may be legally 
disabled o n the basis of a ll eged insanity , the burden of persuas ion for proving mental hea lth law 
criteria has been raised in a rea s such as ci vil commitme nt a nd quasi-criminal confin ement fro m 
a " preponde ra nce'" to "clea r and convincing" or " be yond a reasonab le doubt. " Stachu la k v. 
Coughlin , 520 F.2d 931, 937 (7 th Cir. 1975) , cert. denied , 424 U.S. 947 ( 1976); In re Ba ll ay, 482 
F.2d 648, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F . Supp. 378, 393-94 (M.D. Ala . 1974). 
9. See note 5 and accompanying text supra. 
I 0. Chodoff, supra note 5 ; see A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY D EFENSE 9-22 , 21 1-26 
(1967); A. STONE, MENTA L H EA LTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 43-82 (1972) ; American 
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disordered perso ns. 11 Although disordered persons may indeed behave dif-
ferently from most persons, critics claim that in many and perhaps most 
cases there is good reason to believe that mentally disordered persons are 
sufficiently like most people to be treated like all other persons and held 
responsible for their behavior. Thus, it erodes the moral climate of society 
and infringes on the rights of mentally disordered persons to subject them to 
special laws that deny their responsibility and consequently reduce their 
dignity. The choice between these two alternative views of the relevance of 
mental disorder to law clearly presents a difficult moral, social, political , 
and legal dilemma. 
The difficulty in part explains the readin..::;s of the legal system to turn 
to mental health experts-tile professionals charged in our culture with the 
task of understanding , treating, and controlling mentally disordered behav-
ior. 12 Confronted with problems caused by mystifying behavior, the legal 
Psyc hiatri c Assoc iat io n , Position Statement on Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally l/1 
(re vised) , 130 A~t. J. PsYCHIATRY 392 ( 1973) ; Slove nko, Civil Commitment in Perspective , 20 J. 
PUB. L. 3 (197 1) ; Treffe rt , The Practical Limits of Patients' Rights. 5 PSYCHIATRIC A NN. 158 
( 1975); Note , Testamentary Capacity in a Nutshell: A Psychiatric Reevaluation, 18 STAN. L. 
RE V. 1119 , 1125-26 (1966). See generally A. STON E, supra. 
It should be not e d that the vas t majority of commentary on mental hea lth la ws, both pro 
a nd con, dea ls with th e in sanity d e fense and c ivil commitme nt. Therefore , most examples in 
thi s Article will be drawn from o r refer to these aspects of mental health la w. 
II. R. LF.IFER, IN THF. NAME OF MENTAL HEALTH (1969); K. MILLER, MANAGING MAD-
NESS: THE CASE AG AIC: ST CIVIL COMMITMENT (1976); T. S ZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY & PSYCHIAT RY 
(1963) ; Alexander & Szasz , From Contract to Status via Psychiatry, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 537 
( 1973) ; Alexa nder & Szasz, Mental Illness as an Excuse for Civil Wrongs, 43 NOTR E DAME 
LAW. 24 (1967); Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways, 
TRIAL , Feb ./Mar. 1968, at 29. See generally N. KrTTRlE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971). 
12 . The profes s ional s who have the most contact with and influence on the ment a l health 
legal system are psychiatrist s, psychoanalysts , a nd psychologists. These professional s are 
believed to have special experti se concerning the description, causes, and treatment of disor-
de red behavior. Because they pl a y such a crucial role in the mental health legal system, it will 
be useful to have a brief de scription of their training. 
The psychiatrist is a physician who specializes in the treatment of mental and emotional 
disorders. Although a ny physician may call himself a psychiatri s t, the usual course of psychia t-
ric training is for a new physician to enter postgraduate training, termed a psychiatric "residen-
cy ." Residencies are three- or four-year programs in psychiatric settings approved by the 
Council on Medical Education of the American Medical Association. A psychiatric residency is 
similar to other medical residencies; re s idents are trained largely by being responsible for much 
of the day-to-day patient care in the institution. Ps ychiatric residency training varies widely in 
quality , but usually includes experience with patients in various types of treatment settings, 
supervised training in methods of treatment, a nd some academic training in the theory and 
practice of p sychi a try. Ps ychiatric training ra rely involves much emphasis on normal psycholo-
gy, other behavioral sciences , or behavioral science methodology ; it is u sually more clinica l in 
orientation. After finishing th e residency the psychia trist may recei ve certifica tion by passing 
an e xamination in psychiatry given by the America n Boa rd of Psychiatry and Neurology. If he 
or she is eligible to take the exam inat ion but ha s not passed, the psychiatrist is said to be 
"Board eligible. " If he or she pa sses, the psychiatrist is said to be "Board certified . " 
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sys tem naturally turned to scientific experts for explanations and under-
s tanding . Much of the moral difficulty e ngendered by the issue o f special 
treatment seems to be rendered moot if the question of how to treat disor-
dered persons can be redefined from a legal question to essentially a medical 
Psychoa nal ys is is o ne theory of hum an behav io r a nd one form of psyc ho th e rapy , firs t devel -
llpc d by Sigmu nd Freud a nd th en mod ified by later writ ers and pract itione rs. Psyc hoana lytic 
trai ning and ce rtification is usua ll y co nducted by pri va te as soci a ti ons of a na lysts. The re is 
nu thing to pre vent a ny psychoth e rZlpi st from terming him se lf R psychoZJnaly s t , hut the ap pell a-
tio n is usua ll y re se rved fo r graduates o f psyc hoa nalyt ic in s titu te s . Al th ough psyc hoanalys is is 
llnly o ne th eo ry and meth od, tra ined psychoa nal ysts de serve se parate a ttenti o n beca use in th e 
U nirc:cl S ta tes ps ychoa na lys is and psyc hoanalys ts have en jo yed s ingul ar in fl ue nce co mpa red to 
th e other sc hools and pract itioners of me nta l health science . In this co untr y the p syc hoana lyti c 
in s titutes have large ly re se rved their tra ining for ph ys icians, espec ial ly ps ych ia tri s ts . Rece ntl y, 
in c re as ing numbe rs o f no nph ysicians arc being tra ined , a nd suc h ps yc hoanal ys ts are call ed " lay 
analy sts." Psyc hoa na lyti c training usu a lly in volves three phases: First. the candida te und e rgoes 
a pe rso nal psyc hoana lys is; second , he engages in acade mic coursewo rk co ncerned w ith the 
th eor y a nd practice of psychoanalysi s; and third, he psy choana ly zes a s mall numbe r of pa tient s 
under the c lose supe rvisio n of se nio r me mbe rs o f his in st itut e. Psyc hoana ly ti c tra ining does no t 
l-e quire the candida te ' s full time (at most it requi res a few hou rs a day), b ut becaus e o f the 
le ngth y nature of ps yc hoa na ly ti c treatmen ts (th e candidate' s own a na lys is a nd th ose he 
co ndu c ts unde r supe rvision), th e training usually takes ove r fiv e yea rs befo re th e candid a te is 
"graduated" as a psychoanaly st. 
The psychologist has earned th e Ph.D. degree in psyc hol ogy . (Pe rson s with bac he lo r's or 
ma stcr·s degrees in psychology a re ca ll ed psyc hol ogists in some conte xts , but the psycho log ist s 
involved with the lega l system nearl y a lways have doctora te s.) There a rc ma ny spec ialt y areas 
of psy chology, but most psychologist s who work in the mental health field are clini ca l psychol-
ogists,and , the refore, thi s discuss ion sha ll foc us on these psyc hologi sts. Tra ining in psyc hology 
usuall y begins with two years of postgraduate course work that emphasizes the spec ialty branch 
for w hich the stude nt is trai ning . Clinical psychologists take course s dealing with norma l and 
abnormal psyc hol ogy, human development, treatment me thod s, psychodiagnostics (in c ludin~ 
psychological testing) , research methodology, and stati stics . After completion of course work, 
c lini ca l psychology training requires the student to co mpl ete a year-l ong clinical inte rn ship in a 
program approved by the American Psychologica l Associa ti o n. These program s a re usuall y 
based in psyc hi a tric hospi tals (including community menta l hea lth centers) a nd offer th e trainee 
supervi sed clinical experi ence in diagnosi s , espec ia lly psychological diagn os tic testing, and 
psyc ho logical treatment meth ods. Like psyc hia tric re s idencies, psyc hology int e rn ship s va ry 
widely in th e ir qu a lity. They usually offe r th e trainee supe rvised experience with a wid e va riety 
of pa tients , treatme nt se ttings , and treatmen t me thod s . .Afte r co mpl e ting the int e rn ship , the 
psyc hologi st must write a doctoral di ssertat ion that is typically a major, e mpiri cal research 
effort. .After finishing their dissertations and earning their doc to rates , man y clinical psyc holo-
gis ts, es peci all y those who wi sh to pract ice as we ll as to teac h and do research, the n e nter 
postdoc tora l progra ms of one to two yea rs where th ey rece ive further cli ni ca l training. The vas t 
majorit y of s ta te s now require that psychologists who prac ti ce with patients or cons ult in th e 
community (as opposed to tho se who mainl y teach and do re sea rch) be lic e nsed. A lth oug h th e 
licensing requ irements vary fro m state to sta re , most s tates requi re the candid a te to hav e 
completed one or two years of approved postdoctoral experience , and to pass an examina tion . 
In add ition to licens ing by the variou s states, psyc hologists with conside rabl y more experie nce 
may qualify for a ce rtifi cation in clinical psyc hol ogy gi ve n by the American Boa rd of Profes-
s iona l Psyc hology . If the psychologi st meet s the requireme nt s o f the .ABPP, he is the n said to be 
a "Diplomate in Cli nical Psychology." 
In additi o n to psychi atrists , psychoanalys ts, and psyc hol ogis ts , the re a re other profess ion-
a ls such as psychi a tric soc ial workers and psy chi a tric nurses w hose primary re sponsibility is 
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or scientific question. 13 
The legal system , then, has come to rely primarily on the medical 
model of mental disorder that teaches , in part, that disordered behavior is a 
symptom of an underl ying illness , a state that is not under the person's 
control. 14 This assumption implies that the actor is not causally responsible 
fo r hi s disordered behavior. The situation is analogized to that of a person 
with an infection who is not held responsible for a consequent fever. If 
legally relevant behavior is the prod uct of illness or di sease rather than of 
free choice, a special legal response seems justified. Then, rather than 
having to rely on a di scomfortin g , intuitive justification for the different 
legal treatment of disordered persons, the legal system is comforted by the 
allegedly scientific justification offered by mental health science . 
It is therefore not surpri sing that mental health science has had an 
enormous influence on mental health law. Much of the legal doctrine and 
operation of the mental health legal system depends on the assumptions 
and learning of mental health science. Most lawyers regard mental disorders 
as arcane and disturbing phenomena that are beyond their comprehension 
working wi th mentall y di sordered perso ns . Only the first three groups , however , hav e signifi-
cant contact with the mental health legal system. 
13. Bazelon, Can Psychiatry Humanize the Law 7 , 7 PsYCHIATRIC ANN . 292, 295 (1977); 
Hardisty, Mental Illness : A Legal Fiction , 48 WASH. L. RE V. 735 (1973) ; Horstma n, Protective 
Services for the Elderly: Th e Limits of Parens Patriae , 40 Mo. L. REv. 215 , 225-29 (1975); 
Suarez, A Critique of the Psychiatrist's Role as Expert Witness, 12 J. FORENSI C SCI . 172 ( 1967); 
Szasz, Psychiatric Expert Testimony-Its Covert Meaning and Social Function, 20 PSYCHIATRY 
313, 315-16 (1957). 
14. See Kety, From Rationalization to Reason, 131 AM. J. PSYCHI ATRY 957 , 959(1974). 
Although the " medical model " is a complex construct that is often oversimplified and mis-
understood , the statement in th e tex t is one fundamental tenet of the model. Generall y , the 
"sick" role in our society includes the assumption that the person 's illness or consequent 
incapacity is not his voluntary act and he is therefore not responsible for it. T. PA RSONS , 
Definitions of Health and Illness in the Light of Amen" can Values and Social Structure, in 
SOCIAL STR UCTURE AN D PERSONALITY 257 , 274 ( 1970); Kirk, supra note 3, a t 318-1 9, 323-24 ; 
Siegler & Osmond , The 'Sick Role' Revisited , I HASTINGS CENTER STUD. 41 , 46 (1973). 
There is currentl y enormous debate concerning the propriety of applying the medical 
model to psychiatric disorders, a debate that has also generated other competing models. See T. 
SCHEFF, BEING MENTA LLY ILL (1966); M. SIEGLER & H. OSMO ND, MODELS OF MADNESS, 
MODELS OF MEDICINE (1974) ; T. SZASZ , TH E MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961); T . SZASZ, 
SCHIZOPHRENIA (1976); E. TORR EY, TH E DEATH OF PSYCHIATRY (1974); Ullmann & Krasner, 
Introdu ction , in CASE STUDI ES IN BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 2-15 (L. Ullmann & L. Kras ner eds. 
1965); Blaney, Implications of the Medical Model and Its Alternatives, 132 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 
911 (1975); Lazare, Hidden Con ceptual Models in Clinical Psychiatry, 288 NEw ENG. J. MED. 
345 (1973); Rot h, Schizophrenia and the Theories of Thomas Szasz , 129 BRIT . J. PSYCHIATRY 
317 (1976); Sarasen & Ganzer , Concerning the Medical Model , 23 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 507 
(1968); Sarbin , On the Futility of the Proposition that Some People Be Labeled "Mentally Ill," 
31 J . CONSULTING PsYCHOLOGY 447 (1967); Taylor , The Medical Model of the Disease Concept, 
128 BRIT. J. PSYCH IATR Y 588 (1976) . Se f. generally LABELI NG MADNESS (T. Scheff ed. 1975); R. 
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and are understood by only a few highly trained experts. 15 They view the 
response to problems created by mental disorder as primarily the concern of 
mental health professionals. Lawyers therefore tend to defer to mental 
health experts, and mental health law decisions at all levels , especially if the 
proceedings are not truly adversary, are often based more on psychiatric 
reasoning and conclus ions than on legal reasoning. 16 
!n addition to claiming that there is scientific justification for treating 
the mentally ill differently, some advocates of this strong influence also 
argue that decis ions about the competence, freedom, and responsibility of 
Critique, in THE LABELLING OF D EVIANCE 38-81 (W . Gove ed. 1975); Eisenberg, Psychiatry and 
Society, 296 NEW ENG. J. MED. 903 (1977); Engel, The Need for a New Medical Model: A 
Challenge for Biomedicine, 196 SCI. 129 (1977); Imershein & Simons, Rules and Examples in 
Lay and Professional Psychiatry: An Ethnomethodological Comment on the S cheff-Gove 
Controversy, 41 AM. Soc. R Ev. 559 (1 976); Sa rbin & Mancuso , supra no te 3 , a t 159 ; Scheff, 
Reply 10 Chauncey and Cove, 40 A~!. So c. R Ev . 252 (1975). The mos t forceful and well-
reasoned c riti q ue of the " myth of mental illness .. position is se t forth in Moore, Some Myths of 
"Mental l/lness ," 32 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 1483 ( 1975) . See note 25 infra. 
For an account of the medical model o f psychiatry in law (t he following of which is 
confined la rge ly to the U.S. Court of Appeals fo1· the District of Columbia), see Wales, The 
Rise, The Fall , and the Resurrection of the Medica l Model, 63 GEO. L.J. 87 (1974) . 
This Article will not attempt to re solve the dispute about whether a medical or illness model 
of disordered behavior is usefu l. The position taken here is that the illnes s model may or may 
not be useful depending on the context in which one is co nsidering the behav ior that might be 
labeled as ill. Thus, whereas an illnes s model might be use ful for clinica l or research purposes, 
it might not be for legal purposes. It will be argued that uncriti cal acceptance of a ll possible 
implic at ions of a medical or illness model o f disordered behavior is mistaken when legal 
decisionmaking is invol ved. See note 43 infra. 
15. See Cohen , The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally J/1 , 44 
T EX . L. R EV . 424,449-50 (1966). See generally A. BROOKS , L AW, PSYCH IATRY AND TH E M ENTAL 
HEALTH SYSTEM 80 1-02 (1974). 
16. Hall , Science, Common Sense, and Crimina l Law Reform, 49 IOWA L. REV. 1044, 
I 066 ( 1964). The most noteworthy discussion of expert dominance in legal proceedi ngs was 
provided by Chief Judge Bazelon in Washington v. United Sta te s, 390 F.:!d 444, 446-47,451-57 
(D C. Cir 1967). 
This point has been demonstrated empirically in numerou s s tudie s of civil commitment 
(proceedings that are rarely truly adversary) in which the legal clecisionmaking is almost 
co mpl etel y perfunctory and in which th e concordance rate between psychiatric opinion and 
ul timate legal disposition is extraordinarily high. Cohe n , supra note 15, at 427-31 (in a sam ple of 
40 commitment cases observed, all defendant s were committed in accordance with psychiatric 
recommendation a t perfunctory hearings); F e in & Miller , Legal Processes and Adjudication in 
Mental Incompetency Proceedings, 20 Soc. PROB. 57, 58, 60 n.2 (1972) (in a sample of 756 
commitment cases, there was pe rfunctory adjudication in concorda nce with expert recom-
mendation of examining committee composed of two physicians a nd one layman in all but two 
cases; in the two cases of court di sagreement with th e committee recommendation, there were 
unu sual c ircumstances that indicated that the judge did no t necessarily disagree w ith the 
experts); Mai sel , Decision-Making in Commitment Court , 33 PSYCHIATRY 352 (I 970) (in a 
sample of approximately 50 commitment hearings, no exact figures given , but by implicat ion it 
seems clear that expe rt recommendations were perfunctorily followed in all cases, including 
tho~;e in which the re was no tangible evidence of mental illness); Miller & Schwartz, County 
Lunacy Commission Hearings: Some Observations of Commitments to a State Mental Hospi-
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ta l, 14 Soc. PRO B. 26, 27-28, 34 (1966) (in a s:~mple of 58 commit me nt hearings , med ical 
reco m me ndation fo llowed 75% of time by judge ; de mea no r o f pa tie nt pl ayed cruci a l rol e in 
co mmitme nt de c isi o n); Scheff, Social Conditions for Rationality : How Urban and Rural Courts 
Deal with the Mentally II/, A\-1. BEHA VIORAL SCIENTI ST. Ma r .. ! 964, at 21 (in a sa mple of 
43 co m mi tme nt hearings, psychiatrists recommended co mm itment in all case;; , a nd a ll de fe n-
dants were commit ted a fter a perfunctory hea ring eve n though there wa s no evidence of 
c raziness in some); Sc heff , The Societal Reaction to De viance: A scriptil'e Elements in th e 
Psychiatric Screening of Mental Patients in a Mid western Stare, II Soc. PRO B. 401, 405 ( 196"1 ) 
(in a sample o f 11 6 ju d ic ia l commi tme nt hearings , psychiatrist s recomme nd ed co m mitme nt in 
all case;; desp it e Jac k of evi dence in ma ny ; in in formal d is cu ssi o ns, judges a nd o ther court 
of fic ials noted that they w ould ra rely rel ease a pe rson again st the ad v ice o f the ex perts) ; 
Wen ger & Fletcher , The Effect of Legal Counsel on Admissions to a S tate Mental H ospital, A 
Confro ntation of Professions , 10 J. H EALTH & H UMAN BE H.W IOR 66 (1969) ( in a sampl e of 81 
com mi tme nt cases, 80% of defe nd a nt s were co mm itted a nd 20% re leased , a// in acco rdan ce 
with ex pe rt reco mme nd a tion; legal deci s io nma king was large ly perfunctory; ext remel y hi gh 
stat is t ica l associat io n [Q = .942] was no ted be twe en re presen tati o n by a tt o rney itn d de c isi o n no t 
to hospitalize); Wex le r , Spec ial Projec t , The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and 
Practice in Arizona , 13 ARIZ . L. R Ev. I , 60 & n . 195 ( 1971 ) (in sa mples o f 196 commitme nt cases 
in one count y and 367 in a no ther , phy sicia ns ' recomme nd a tio ns perfunc to rily follo wed in 97 .9% 
a nd 96. 1o/c of cases, respectively; whe re physi c ian ' s reco mmendat io n no t fo ll owed , th e judge 
was us ually precluded fr o m do ing so because the recomme nda ti o n was no t provided fo r by 
statut e) . 
Even under '" re fo rmed " procedures in whic h de fe ndant-pa tie nts ha ve grea te r due process 
protec tions, the conco rda nce rate is still extremel y high. Hid ay , Reformed Commitment Proce-
dures: An Empirical Study in the Courtroom , 11 L AW & So c' y RE V. 651 , 660-64 (1977) (77% 
concorda nce; in 15 .6% o f contested cases, judge committed pati ent in concord ance with 
ps yc hi at ric recommendatio n de spite lack of evidence of sta tutoril y required da nge r; but hear-
ings we re longer tha n those repo rted in previous studies a nd deci sionmaking w as cons id era bly 
Jess perfunctory) . A recent , fascinating study examined the differential nature of commitme nt 
hearings in tw o counti t:s in Wisconsin , one of which followed the stringe nt due process 
requi re me nt s of Lessa rd v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp . 1078 (E . D. Wi s . 1972), a nd o ne of whi c h did 
not. In the la tt e r. tria ls a veragt:d 13 minute s , dec is io nma king was pe rfunctory , a nd the court 
follow t: d psychiatric ad vice in most cases . In the former , tria ls a veraged 2 1/2 hours , thert: was 
tru e adjudi ca ti o n o f the iss ue s, a nd the court made a n ind epende nt determination of whether 
the statuto ry crite ria we re met. Zander , Civil Commitment in Wisconsin: The Impact of 
L essard v. Schmidt, 1976 Wts. L. R EV. 503 , 552. 
Numt: ro us a ppe llate deci sio ns , both old and ne w , al so confirm the truth of the s tatement in 
the te xt. E.g., In re Oa kes, in 8 THE LAW R EPORTER 122 (P. Cha ndler ed. 1846) . " Dr. F o x [the 
e xpe rt w itn ess] te stifi es that he has no doubt that Mr. Oakes is in sane . His opinio n mu st have 
great weight in thi s ca se , fro m his s kill and e xperi e nce in the treatment o f in sanit y. . . If we 
ca nn o t rel y upo n the o pinion o f those who have charge o f the in stituti o n , and there is no law ro 
re strain the persons confined, we must se t all the in sa ne a t large w ho a rc confined in th e 
Mc Lea n Asylum. " Id . ; see Sas v . Ma ryland , 334 F. 2d 506 , 511 (4th Cir. !964) (e xpert findi ngs 
and conc lu sions a re to be gi ven serious considera tio n a nd must be relied on to a con-
s ide rable degree in de fec ti ve delinquent proceedings); L ogan v. Arafch , 346 F. Supp. 1265 , 
!267-70 (D. Conn . 1972) (denied due proce ss cha llenge to length of pretrial hea ring o n civil 
co mmi<ment ; deci sion based on testimony of expert witnesses), aff'd sub nom. Briggs v. 
Ara fe h , 41 1 U .S . 911 (1 973 ); Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass . 8 10, 323 N. E .2d 294, 298 
( 1 975) (de fe nd a nt convicted by jury of fir s t degree murde r; prosec utio n relied o n presump-
ti o n of sa nit y a nd defense introduced psychiatric te stimo ny about defenda nt 's in sa nity; he ld , 
verdi c t against th e weight of the e vidence); People ex ref. Roge rs v . S ta nl ey, 17 N .Y .2d 256 , 
260-61 , 262-64 , 217 N.E.2d 636,637-39,270 N .Y.S.2d 573,574-75 , 576-78 ( 1966) (Be rgan , J , 
di ssenting) (right to counsel in c iv il co mmitment shou ld be de nied because it wi ll interfere with 
prope r medical trea tmen t) . 
~ 
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the allegedly disordered person should be made primarily by experts. 17 
Mentally disordered persons are allegedly so abnormal that legal decision-
making about them is largely irrelevant. The legal factfinders and law-
appliers must, of course, "make" the final decision; but , it is argued, the 
major influence on these decisions should be the experts who understand the 
behav ior. The essential moral and legal nature of questions of freedom , 
competence, and responsibility then come to be seen as proper questions for 
largely expert determination. Some proponents of this view believe that 
Numerous commentators have also not ed the legal abdication to psychiatric experts. See 
sources in note 13 supra ; L."'w R EFORM CoM~!!SSJON OF C,\N ADA, FITNESS TO STAND TRI AL 7 
(1973); Bazelo n, Institutional Psychiatry- ;'The Self Inflicted Wound, " 23 CATH. U .L. REv. 
643 ( 1974); Dershowitz, supra not e I I; Ha lleck, The Psychiatrist and the Lega l Process, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY , Feb., 1969. at 25 . 
In recent years, there has been increa s ing judicial recognition of the fac t th at the issues 
involved in me ntal health cases are fundamentally legal and that overreliance on experts is a 
danger. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 509-10 (1972); United States v. Brawner , 471 
F.2d 969, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1972); W ashington v. United States, 390 F.2d a t 446; Lessard v. 
Schmidt, 349 F.Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wi s. 1972) , vacated and remanded on procedural grounds , 414 
U.S. 473, new judgment entered, 379 F. Supp. 1376, 1378 (E.D. Wis. 1974) , vacated and 
remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975) (for reconsideration in light of Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 
U.S. 592 (1975)), reaff'd, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). For an interesting case tha t 
upheld allowing a criminal prosecution to go to the jury although expert testimony that the 
defendant was insane was unanimous and rebutted only by cross-examination and lay evidence, 
see United States v. Dube , 520 F.2d 250 , 251 (1st Cir. 1975). 
Of course , where proceedings are truly adversary and each side has psychiatric as well as 
legal representation, there cannot be simple judicial concordance with one expert. Still , as 
Washington and Brawner discuss , experts often dominate the proceedings and the issues a re 
defined as scientific. See notes 12-16 and accompanying text supra. 
17. See H. DAVIDSON , FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 237,271-74 (1965). See generally S. BRAKE L 
& R . ROCK , THE MENTA LLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 59-61 (rev. ed. \971); L. KOLB , MODERN 
CLINICAL PSYCHIATR Y 656-59 (8th ed. 1973); T. SZASZ , supra note 11, at 41-45; Wexler, supra 
note 16, at 69-73. 
More recentl y, medically oriented writers have taken note of the changing legal climate 
exemplified by Lessard, and have argued that significant due process rights must be granted to 
civilly committed. American Psychiatric Association , supra note \0. A fair reading of many 
current writers is tha t the decision st ill ought to be largely medical even if much due process is 
granted. Chodoff, supra note 5; Treffert, supra note 10; Psychiatric News , Aug. 5, 1977, a t 5, 
col. 1 (a code of ethical guidelines to be considered for adoption by the World Psychiatric 
Association). 
Whenever there is compulsory treatment or detention of a person on psychiatric 
grounds, that person must have available an appeal, with legal aid , to a panel of 
psychiatrists . . 
!d. at 5 (emphasis added). The draft of ethical guidelines finally adopted in principle by the 
entire World Psychiatric Assoc iation provided: 
Whenever there is compulsory treatment or detention there must be an independent 
and neutral body of appeal for regular inquiry into these cases. 
Psychiatric News, Oct. 7, 1977, at 23, col. I. The American Psychiatric Association criticized 
the W.P.A. draft because it was " vague" and "subject to broad interpretation," and because it 
"did not mandate a psychiatrically knowledgeable panel." The A.P.A. continues to prefer 
appeal , with legal aid , to a panel of psychiatrists. Id. at 22. See generally Blomquist , From the 
Oath of Hippocrates to the Declaration of Hawaii, 4 ETHICS SCI. & MED. 139 (1977). 
-----........ZJ 
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these issues are resolved by the legal system only because of an historical 
precedent based on America's perhaps overzealous guarding of liberty. 1x 
To explore the tension between legal and scientific decisionmaking 
further, Section II analyzes the social, moral, logical, and scientific bases of 
mental health law. 
IT. MORALS AND SCIENCE IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The structure of all mental health laws is fund amentally the same: all require 
findings of (I) a mental disorder; (2) a behavioral component; and (3) a 
causal connection between the mental disorder and the behavioral compo-
nent (at least in principle). 19 For instance, civil commitment is usually based 
on findings that the person is: (I) mentally ill ; (2) dangerous to se lf or 
to others, or gravely disabled ; and (3) that the dangerousness or grave 
disablement is a product or result of the mental disorder or defect. 20 A 
person is incompetent to stand trial if he is mentally ill and therefore unable 
to understand the charges against him or to assist counseP 1 Guardianship or 
conservatorship may be imposed upon an individual if he is mentally ill and 
therefore unable to care for himself or his property. 22 
!8. A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY i LL. IN A:V! ER ICA 418-4 1 (2d ed. 1949); J. K ATZ, J. 
GOLDSTEIN , & A. D ERS HOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYS IS, PSYCH IATRY AND LAW 462-63 (1967) (state-
ment of W. Overholser, Sup't of St. Elizabeth's Hospital); T. Szasz, supra note II, at 57-62. 
See generally Dershowitz , The Origins of Preventive Confinement in Anglo-American Law-
Part II: The American Experience , 43 U. CIN. L. R Ev . 781 (1974). 
19. E.g. , CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250 (West 1972) (" [T]he person is, as a result of 
mental disorder . . . " ); Weihofen, The Definition of Menta! I// ness, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. I ( 1960). 
The causal connecti o n criterio n is o f ten not recogni zed or stated e xplicitly by commentators 
(incl uding Weihofen) and mental health statutes. The causal cr iter ion is always implicit , how-
eve r , and in probably the subs tan!ia l ma jority of sta tute s it is included by term s such as, "as a 
result of" or "because of." The causal co nnec ti on crite rion is a reflection of the crit ical 
rationale of mental health law-that the lega ll y re levant behavior of mentally di sordered 
persons is a product of their mental di sorder and not of their free c hoice. See text accompan y-
ing notes 58-112 infra. 
20. E.g., CAL. WELF. & l NST. CoDE §§ 5 150, 5250 (West 1972 & Supp. 1978); Devel-
opments, supra note 6 , at 120 1-07. 
21. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 ( 1960) 
(per curiam); CAL. P ENAL CODE § 1367 (West Supp. 1977). Although some statutes and cases do 
not make specific reference to mental disorder as the ca use of th e incompetence, it is nearly 
always the case that incompetence will be found only if a mental disorder or de fect is present. 
Stilten & Tu lli s , Mental Competency in Criminal Proceedings , 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1053, 1053-54 
(1977); see HOME OFFIC E, DEPARTMENT OF H EA LTH AND SOCIAL SECU RITY, REPORT OF THE 
COMMITrEE ON MENTALLY ABNORMAL OFFENDERS 143 (1975). 
22. C\L .. PROB . CODE§ 1460 (We st Supp. 1977); C AL. WEL.F. & INST. CODE§ 5350 (West 
Supp. 1978). See generally Horstman, Protective Services for the Elderly: The Limits of Parens 
Patriae , 40 Mo. L. R EV. 2 15, 2 17-22, 225-30 ( 1975). On the di s tin ct ion between involuntary civil 
commitment and guardianship or conservatorship, see id. at 224-25. 
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Two points concerning the behavioral component of me ntal health laws 
must be noted. First, in all cases the behavioral component of the law is the 
primary impetus for legal regulation. 23 What disturbs society, for example, 
is an individual's dangerousness, grave disablement, inability to assi st 
counsel, or inability to manage hi s financial affairs . In other words, society 
believes that it must protect itself from dangerous persons, that it must 
protect disabled persons from themsel ves , that a criminal trial is unfair 
unless certain conditions are met , and that it is inhumane to let an incompe-
tent person mismanage his property. Second , the behavioral standards 
alone , such as dangerousness or various incompetencies , also appear in the 
conduct of normal persons . The behavior is neither necessarily rel ated to 
mental health problems nor is it exclusively or especially within the prov-
ince of mental health science. 
Mental illness alone does not warrant special legal intervention: a 
person who is simply mentally ill is left alone unless he behaves in one of 
the legally relevant ways described by the behavioral components. But when 
mentally disordered persons behave in legally relevant ways, such as 
dangerously or incompetently, special rules apply to these individuals that 
do not apply to "normal" dangerous or incompetent persons. For example, 
extremely dangerous but nonmentally disordered persons, even those who 
might be "reformed," are not preventively confinable by civil commitment 
upon the basis of dangerousness alone. 
It is noteworthy that the special legal treatment of disordered persons is 
authorized even though the vast majority of mentally disordered persons do 
not meet the behavioral components of the mental health law standards and 
many normal persons do meet these behavioral standards. ln other words , 
the mentally ill, as a class, are not especially dangerous or incompetent. 24 
23. This Article will refer to the various behavioral components of the standards as 
"legally relevant behavior." 
24. See Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness , 123 U. PA. L. REv. 439 , 
447-50 (1974); Greenberg, Involuntary Psychiatric Commitmer.ts to Prevent Suicide, 49 N.Y . U. 
L. REV. 227, 233-36 , 259-63 (1974); Steadman, Cocozza, & Melick , Explaining the Increased 
Arrest Rate Among Mental Patients: The Changing Clientele of State Hospitals , 135 AM. J. 
PsYCHIATRY 816, 819-20 (1978) ; Psychiatric News, Nov. 18, 1977, at 42, col. I. See also Zitrin , 
Hardesty, Burdock, & Drossman, Crime and Violence Among Mental Patients, 133 AM. J . 
PsYCHIATRY 147 (1976) (arrest rates for mentally ill persons are quite low , albeit somewhat 
higher than for normals). Many studies seem to show the mental patients are less dangerous 
than the population at large. But see Sosowsky, Crime and Violence Among Jl.fental Patients 
Reconsidered in View of the New Legal Relationship Between the State and the Mentally Ill, 135 
A\!. J. PSYCHIATRY 33 , 40-42 (1978) (higher arrest rates for patients; conviction ra tes not given 
and no control for prior arre sts and social class). See generally THE CLI NICA L EVA LUATION OF 
THE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL (J. Rappe ported. 1967). Indeed, even persons who 
are considered criminally insane and highl y dangerous often ex hibit low rates of violence if , for 
some reason, the y are released prior to being considered cured. R. STEADMA ~ & 1. CocozzA, 
CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE 137-39, 183-89 (1974); Monahan , Th e Prediction of Vio-
lence, in VIOLENC E AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 15, 19-20 (D. Chappell & J. Monahan eds. 1975). 
--
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But , despi te the over- and under-inclusive nature of me ntal disorder as 
grounds for furthering the social goals that a rc explicitly or implicitly 
ide ntified by the behavioral component of mental health laws, the law is 
clearly instilled with the idea that me ntal disorder should authorize spec ial 
treatment. 
Mental hea lth law standards are the refore lega l rules that have been 
created to further the social goals ide ntified above. As discussed in Part I , 
mentally disorde red pe rsons have been s ingled out for special legal treat-
me nt because it is believed that it is morally and socially inappropriate to 
treat them like everyone else. The moral and legal basi s for this special 
treatment depends on three factu a l assumptions co nce rning me ntally 
disordered persons : (1) They are significantly different from most persons 
because they arc ill ; (2) their legally relevant behavior is the product of the ir 
illness and not of their free, rational choice; and (3) the ir future behavior is 
predictable. The validity of these assumptions, especially the fir st two, is 
the foundation of mental health law. Only if a person is abnormal, non-
responsible, and in some cases predictable sho uld he or she be accorded 
special legal treatment . 
Flowing from the st ructure and assumptions of mental health law, three 
general questions must be decided: 
1. Is the person normal? That is , is the actor suffering fro m a 
mental disease, illness, or disorder? 
..., Could the person have behaved otherwise') Is the legally rele-
vant behavior the product of free choice , or is it the product of 
a disordered mind over which the person has no control') That 
is , is the person causally responsible for the behavior') 
3. How will the person behave in the future ') For ins tance , will 
the person be a danger to self or to others') 
This sec tion analyzes in detail the soc ial, moral, logical , and scientific bases 
On th e issue of incompetence. see, e.g., Vecc hione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 136 1, 
1367-69 (E 0. Pa. 1974); R . ALI .E:-.J, E . FERSTER , & H. WEtHOFE:-.J, MENTAL IMPAIRMENT .'\NO 
LH; .-\ 1. I NCOMPf'TFNCY 46-61\ (1968) ; Buttiglieri, Woodson . Guenette, & Th ompsun, Driver 
A ccidents and the Neuropsychiatric Patient, 33 ] . CONSULTING & C t.i :-> ICA I. PSYCHOLOGY 38 I 
( 1969) (neurops yc hiatric patient s had more traffic violation s th an normals but a comparable 
accident rate; psychiatric variables accou nted for only a small percentage of difference in 
acci dent in volvement; diagnosis of schi zophrenic reaction seemed associated with a lower 
acc iden t rate than rates associa ted with other , less se rious di agnoses); Howard , The Ex-Mental 
Parient as an Employee: An On-the-Joh Evaluation , 45 AM. J. 0RTHOPSYCHI.·\TRY 497 ( 1975) ; 
T olor , K ell y, & Stehbins, Altruism in Psychiatric Patien ts.· How Sociallv Concerned Are the 
Emotionally Disturbed:> , 44 ] . CONSULTING & CLINICAl_ PSYCHOWC;Y 503 ( 1976) (psychiatric 
patient s compared to normals on a paper and pencil te st and in a devi sed " real wor ld"" situation 
that both measured alt ruism ; no differences found on paper and pencil tes t ; patien ts demon -
strated significantly more altruism in the devisee! situation). See generally L.A. Times, Oc t. 30, 
1975. pt. I , at I, col. I ("" I in 5 Adults Lack Basic Li vi ng Skill s. Stud y Finds ·"). 
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of mental hea lth law by cxammmg the three questions. 25 
The thes is of this Artic le is that th ese questi ons are fundamentally 
soc ial, mo ral, and legal quest ions, not scientific ones. Although they appear 
to ca ll for sc ie ntifi c answers, in fact they can be answered best on the basis 
of commonsense observat ions and social , moral, and commonsense eval u-
ations of behavior. Further , many commonl y believed assumpt ions about 
mentally d isordered persons that are used to answer these questions are not 
sc ientifica ll y proven. Experts may be useful in providing certain fac tu:::tl 
information, but the primary iss ues are not sc ienti fic . Hard mora! issues 
raised by me ntal di so rder should not be avoided by relying upon experts and 
allowing the questions to be "'medicalized ." 
B. Is THE PERSON NORl\1AL? 
The first quest ion asked by mental health law is whether the ~t c tor is 
normal, i. e. , whether he or she suffe rs from a mental disorder. It must be 
remembered that the legal sys tem does not ask thi s question primarily fo r 
scientific or clinical reasons. Rather, the law asks this quest ion in order to 
identify a c lass of persons who seem so inexplicably different from ordinary 
people that, on moral and soc ial grounds, ge nerally applicable legal rules 
cannot apply to them. 
25. A subs ta nt ia l po rtion of the a rgume nt in thi s sec tio n and the remainder of the Article 
depends heavily o n th e findings of me ntal health science a nd the wri ter ·s assess ment of those 
findings. It is, of course, imposs ible to know or to cite eve ry study that may be relev a nt to the 
b road state me nts th at are made here in about mental di sorder. Broad sta teme nt s w il l the.refore 
be supported e ither by reference to a uthorities w ho agree o r to representative s tu die s that 
support the position taken. At pre se nt, th ere ca n be few correct a nswers-the men ta l health 
fi eld is too vast a nd is beset by too man y methodological a nd substantiv e a mbi guities and 
uncertaintie s . Be for e beginning th e analys is, therefore , it wi ll be he lpful to se t forth a brief 
statement of why knowledge is so hard to ac hieve in mental health science. 
Research o n menta l disorder. w hich invo lves primarily re sea rch on human behavior. is at 
bes t difficult to perform- few ce rtain conclus ions can be reached. Although there are many 
reaso ns fo r the lac k of ce rtaint y , two dese rve spec ia l notice here : the imprec is ion in defin in g 
a nd categorizing mental disorder, a nd the d iffic ult y in dev ising adequate tools for measuring 
human behavior. Chapma n , Schizomimetic Conditions and Schizophrenia, 33 J. CON SU L.TINC & 
CLINICAL Ps YCHOLOGY 646, 648 ( I 969); see Sp it zer , E ndicott , & Robins , Clinica l Criteria for 
Psychiatric Diagnosis and DSM-lll , 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 11 87 (1975) . It is indeed difficul t to 
reac h firm concl usion s abo ut a ny aspect of mental di sorder wh e n the re is littl e agreement abo ut 
the boundarie s o f the cond ition bei ng studied a nd when there are few reliable a nd va iid tools 
w ith which to pe rform the s tudi es. Progress is being made in these regards, but the essential 
problems remain. See, e.g., H e lzer, Robin s, Taibleson , Woodruff , Reich, & Wish. Refiahility of 
Psychiatric Diagnosis: f. A Meth odological R eview , 34 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PS YCHI ATR Y 1 ~9 
( !977); te xt accom panying note s 26 , 29-30 , 54, 161-77 infra. 
For di sc ussions of these de fi niti o nal difficultie s in the contex t of the condit ions most 
relevant to legal issues , see Kendell, Th e Class ification of Depressions: A R eview of Contempo-
rary Confusion, 129 BRIT. J. PsYCH IATRY 15 ( 1976); van Praag, About the Impossible Concept of 
Schizophrenia. 17 CoMPR EH ENSIVE PSYCH I,\ TRY 481 ( ! 976); Treves-Brow n . Who is the 
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Whar , therefore, is mental di sorder and how is it to be di scerned? This 
section will demonstrate that mental disorder is crazy behavior , and th at it s 
definition is primarily a function of social expectations and context. The 
secti on will then argue that for lega l purposes determinations of who is crazy 
can , and shoul d be. viewed as soc ial and moral determinations that general-
ly can be made by anyone. 
l . What is tvfemal Disorder ? 
Mental disorder is abnormal behavior-abnormal thoughts, fee lings, and 
actions. 26 Although the terms " mental disorde r" or " menta l illness" 
con note that someth ing more th an abnormal behavior is wrong with the 
person, it rnust be emphas ized that a di agnos is o r label of me ntal di sorder 
means pr imar il y that a person behaves abnormally . "Mental di sorder" does 
not impl y any necessary, sc ientifica ll y proven fi ndin gs about recognized 
underlying causati ve abnormalities of the person's brain , nervous system , 
heredity , diet. hormonal balance, past history , sexual conflicts, social en vi-
Psychopath 1 • 17 M m. SCI. & L. 56 ( 1977); Letter from J.E. Cooper to edito rs , 127 BRIT . .l . 
PSYCHIATR Y 19 1 ( 1975). 
On th e difficulties of psychiatric and behavioral c lass ification and measurement, see 
generally T. BARBER, PITfALLS IN H UMAN RESEARCH (1976); G. FR ANK, PSYCHIATRIC DIAG-
NOS IS: A REVI EW OF RES EARCH ( 1975); R. K ENDELL, TH E ROLE OF DIAGNOSIS IN PSYCHI ATRY 
( 1975); Berman & Kenn y, Correlational Bias in Observer Ratings , 34 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOLOG Y 263 ( 1976); Blashfield & Draguns, Evaluative Criteria for Psychiatric Classifica-
tion, 85 J . ABNORMAl. PSYCHOLOGY 140 ( 1976) [hereinafter cited as Evaluative Criteria]; 
Blashfield & Draguns, To ward A Taxonomy of Psychopathology: Th e Purpose of Psychiatric 
Classification, 129 B RIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 574 (1976); K azdin , Artifact, Bias, and Complexity of 
Assessment: The ABCs of Reliability , 10 1. APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 141 (1977); note 54 
infra. For a penet rat ing methodological guide to the analys is of behav ioral sc ience for purposes 
of appl y ing it to legal problems , see Meehl , Law and the Fireside Inductions: Reflections of a 
Clinical Psychologist , 27 J. Soc . IssuEs 65 (1 971). 
A s we have seen , more over , note 14 supra , there is enormous debate about the entire 
enterpri se of cons idering abnormal behaviors as illness. Many writers feel that stud y ing abnor-
mal behavior on thi s basi s is theoret ically and morally mi sconce ived and that knowledge about 
di so rd ered behavior will inevitably be flawed. 
The two most complete , albeit highl y critical , re v iews of mental health science literature 
pertaining to legal questions are .f. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOG ICAL 
T ESTI MONY (2d ed. 1975) and Enni s & Litwack , Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: 
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv . 693 ( 1974). 
Finally, nearl y all referen ces are to the l i terature o f ad ult mental health sc ience. It should 
be noted , however, that the concl usions of thi s A rtic le appl y to child and adolescent mental 
health sc ience as well. M orse, Psychological and Psychiatric Issues, in J. WILSON, TH E RIG HTS 
OF A DOLESCENTS IN THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 81-122 (1978). 
26. In re Ba llay. 4R2 F.2d M R. 665 (D.C Cir. 1973); J. ORfORD. T HF. SOCIAL PSYCHOt.oc ;y 
OF MENTAL DISORDER 124 ( 1976); Spitzer & Wil son , Nosology and the Official Psychiatric 
Nomenclature , in C0\1PREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY-II 826, 827 (2d ed . A. Freedman, 
H. Kaplan. & B. Sadod eel s. 197)). 
Rather than c iting authoriti es to demonstrate the tru th of th e statement in the 1ext. 
however, it is better simpl y to consult !he American Psychiatric Association's DI ACNOSTIC .-\ND 
STATI STIC AL MANU.-\! . II ( 1968) [hereinafter c ited as DSM-1!]. In DSM-1! the cr iteria for all 
disorders. inc ludi ng th ose allegedl y assoc iated with ph ys ica l pathology, are abnormalthoughl s, 
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fe e lings. and actions. If a ph ysica l diso rder is not acco mpan ied b y behavinral abnorma lity , 
men ta l d is ord e r is not co ns idered present. lf the abnormal be havior is pre sent. however. m e nt al 
di sorder is diagnosed w hether or no t physica l pathology is alleged ly a ssocia ted with it . Fo r 
ins tan ce, co ns ider the generic def initiu n o f "ps yc hosi s ... gener~lily th e mo s t seve re c lass of 
me nt a l di sorders : 
Pa tients arc de scribed a s psyc hcnic \v hcn their mental functiuning is suffi ci entl y 
impaired to interfere gms sly with th eir capaci ty tu meet the urdi na ry de mands o f life. 
The impa ir me nt may res ult fwm :t "::r io us cl isturtiun in th e ir ca pac ity to rec og niz e 
rea li ty. Hallu c ina ti o ns and delu s ic> rls . fcl r e :\arnple. ma y distort the ir perc eptions 
.-\Iteratio ns of mood ma y be ''' r•ru fu und that the p:ttient' s ca pac it y tc' re,;po nd 
apprupriate ly is grossly im p;,ired . Def ici t ,; in percept ion , language and memory ma y be 
,;o severe that the pat ient ' s ct p:tci ty for mcntal grasp t>f hi s situzttion is effe ctivel y lost. 
fll . at ~ 3. 
The only possible e:\ceptit.lll tu th e ge ne r;tl rule is th e class nf disord e rs terme d 
· ·psyc hoph ys inlog ical di sorders .·· The,; e di sorder s are cha ra ct e ri zed by ph ys ic :tl sy mptom s a nd 
are diagno sed by th e pre se nce uf st tch sy mptom s . They ;He co nsidere d menta l cborders 
bec ause th ey are "presumably" t.lf psychugenic c>r ig in fd . at 4fi. 
The American P s ychi at ri c Asst,ci;,titm is c urre ntl y test ing ;t new diagnost ic nurnenc lat urc: . 
Di-\C~OSTIC ~ t'D S L-\TI STIC\ 1 i\h i\ 11 ·\1 Iii (D raft uf 4/ 15/77) [he reinafter cited as DSM -111 ]. 
Altho ugh DSM -IIT has not yet bee n acklp ted. it has me t with initial fav tnabk reac tion by its 
prel imin a r y use rs. Psychiatri c News. Se pt. lfi. 1977 , at I. col. 4. But see Golema n . Who 's 
Mentally II/ ?, PSYC HOLOGY T ODAY, Jan. , 1978 , at 34 (co nsiderable dispute about scientific 
validity, overinclusivcness and usefulness of DSM-lll categories). It appe ars likely to be 
adopte d in a form substantially s imilar to the presen t draft. Like DSM-!1, DSM-111 incl ud es 
categories wherein abnormal behavior is assoc iated , for example , with transi e nt or perma nent 
dy sfunction of the brain (e.g., "Organic Mental Diso rders"), but abnormal be havio r is s till th e 
touchs tone of diagnosis in a ll categor ie s. For example , consider the DSM-111 generic de finition 
of "schi zop hre ni c disorders'' (a subset of di so rders considered to be ps ychoses by DSM-11): 
A group of disorders c harac teri zed by a di sorga ni zation of a pre vious level of func-
tioning in volv ing multiple aspects of psyc hologi cal functioning. . As defined he re , 
at some time during the illness a Schi zophrenic Di sorder a lways involves at leas t one 
of the following: delusions, hallucinati o ns, or formal thought disorder. . [U] s ua ll y 
there are several c haracter is ti c di s turbances in the form a nd content of thinking, 
perceptions. affect. th e se nse of self, volit ion , relationship to the exte rnal world, a nd 
motor behavior. 
D S M-11 [, supra, at C: I. As is appare nt, " S c hi zophrenic Di sorders .. refers to abnorma l 
tho ughts, fee lings, and actio ns. DSM-Ill used the following crite ria for characteri z ing behav-
ior a s a me ntal disorder: 
By and la rge , a ll of the cond itio ns included in DSM-111 as mental disorders sha re 
the foll owing feature s: in th e ir extreme or fully developed form , they are directly 
a ssociated with either di stress. di sability, or. in the a bsence of e ithe r of these, 
dis adv a ntage in co ping with un avoi dable aspec ts of the en viro nment. Furthermore , 
the y are no t quickl y ameliorated b y simple nontechnica l e i~vironm e ntal maneuvers or 
info rmative procedures and do not have w id espread socia l s upport. Becau se of these 
featur es , there is a n implicit assumption that so mething is w rong with the hurnan 
orga ni s m and the re is a ca ll to the profess ion to deve lop and off e r preventive or 
therapeutic measures. (This doe s not imply exc lusive respons ibilit y on th e part of the 
psychiatric profession to deal with th ese conditions). 
Three examples of the a pplica tion of these principle s in defining mental di sorder 
follow. Persona lit y disorders arc included in DSM-I!I as mental di sorders and a re 
distinguished from personality traits (which are not inc luded ) on the basis of the 
pre sence of e ither subjective dist ress or impairment in socia l functioning. S imple 
bereaveme nt is not cons ide red a ment a l disorde r . even tho ugh the clinica l. features a re 
very si milar to those seen in depre ss ive d isorders. becau se it is an ex pe cted a nd 
socially su pported reaction. Finally. antisocial be havior is not by it se lf cn ns iclered 
sufficient evidence for th e e x ist e nce of a mental di so rder. The diagnos is o f Antisocial 
Personality Disorder in DSM-111 not on ly requires pe rsi stent a nti soc ia l behav ior but 
also persi s tent irnpai rrnent in social and occupational functioning. 
Spit zer , Sheehy. & Endicott, DSM-1//: Guiding Principles, in PsYCHIATRIC DI AGNOSI S I , 3-4 (V. 
R akoff , H. Stancer, & H. Kedward eels. 1977) . 
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ronment , or other variables. 27 Statements that re late such variables to ab nor-
mal behavior pro perly should be considered hypotheses about which varying 
amounts of suppo rting evidence have accumulated and that need further 
testing 28 Eventually, research may establish definite, necessary links be-
?. 7. Th e term " necessary ' ' in th is se ntence mean s tha t menta ll y abno rm al be hav ior can 
occu r in the abse nce of a n y demo nst rabl y s ignif ica nt abn o rm ality in any of these factors. eit her 
take n a lo ne or in sets. See te x t accompanyi ng note s ?.8, 71-83 infra. 
?. 8. E.g .. Rose nbe rg, Th e Crisis in Psychiatn·c L egirima cy: Reflectinns an Psychiatry, 
/vfedicine. and P11blic Policy , in AI-1ERICAN PSYCH IATRY: P.-\ST, PRESE~T , AND FUTURE 134 (G . 
K riegm,tn . R . Gardner , & D. A bse eds. 1975). 
We st ill d e bate th e fu ndamental bas is of the mos t com mon psyc hi at ric diagnoses a nd 
the ir re la t ion s hi p to be li e f sys tem s a nd the realitie s of social struc tu re . The contrast 
with most somat ic ill s is c lear enough; if t he re are indeed biologica l mec ha ni s ms 
un cle l'l y ing e ven the mos t ma rked psych ia tric sy ndro me s we cannot a s ye t define 
the m ; if there 'ne not , we are e qua ll y unab le to dem o nstrate their absence; if their 
et iology should depend o n some particular interaction of co nst itu tiona l endowment 
and e nviro nme ntal s t ress we can not defi ne that relatio nship in mo re tha n th e vague s t 
Ll f term s . E ve ry aspec t o f psyc hia try , f rom its most general socia l co nd ition s to the 
leve l of in d ividual interac tion be twee n phys ic ia n and patient , is inev itably shaped by 
e .xtramedica l facto rs-with comparat ive ly fe w de finin g te c hn o logica l boundarie s . 
fd a t 137. 
By a nd large , the research literature o n retrospect ive data fo r perso ns wh o have 
be come menta ll y ill s hows o nly ra ther weak (a nd frequent ly in co ns is tent) s tati s tica l 
re lations between purportedl y pa thogenic background facto rs and me nta l ill ness 
. Eve n thos e a ntecedent conditions w hi c h do show some associ a tion are ambig-
uous co nce rning causal interpretati o n ... 
P . M EE HL, Why [ Dn Not Attend Case Conferences , in PSYCHODI AGNOSIS : SELECTED PAPERS 
?.25, ?.46 ( 1973). 
Bioch e mi c al s tud ie s of psychiatric pa tient s hav e revea led many a bno rma liti es, b ut 
have fa iled to identify spec ific biochemical changes linked to the pathophysiology o f 
the illne sses . Unfortunately, the search fo r a rel a tionship between biochemica l 
ab no rma liti es and me ntal illness ha s bee n disappo inting. Man y abnormalities ha ve 
bee n fo und in different groups of patients, but a lm os t a ll o f these have occurred in 
pati e nts with very different clinical sy ndro mes and e ven in some c linicall y normal 
pe opl e. 
Blas s & Milne , Newer Concepts of Psychiatric Diagnosis and Biochemical Research on Mental 
Illness, The La nce t , Apr il 2, 1977, at 738. 
The very multiplicit y of the se conditions tha t prod uce behavio r a t le as t supe rfi cia ll y 
akin to schizo phreni c sy mptoms cas ts doubt on the v<tlidity of the argume nt for a ny 
o ne of th e m. Th e following is a t leas t a pa rtia l lis t of these a ll eged ly schizomimetic 
condi tions that have been invoked as evide nce for a pa rticu lar th eory of schizo-
phrenia : I. LSD, mescaline, a nd other drugs .. . 2. Sensory deprivation. . 3. S le ep 
depriva tion ... 4. H yp nosis .. . 5. Speeded performa nce ... 6. Di s trac tion. . 7. 
Relaxed Attention ... 8. Di sruption of perception . 9 . An o xia . 10. Brain 
damage . 11 . Ch ildhood . 12. " Primiti ve" racial developm e nt . 13. Drea ms 
a nd s leep . 
Chapman , supra note 25, a t 647-48 . 
More optimi st ic s ta te ments to the contra ry can, of course, be fo und. F or e xa mple s of 
opt im is ti c sta te ment s by a world-fa mou s researc her co ncerning the alleged biologica l causes o f 
so me mental di sorde rs , see Kety, Th e Biological Roots of Schizophrenia , HARV. MAG. , Ma y 
1976, a t ?.0 ; K e ty, supra note 14. Dr. Ket y's optimism s tem s from a very pe rsuas ive program of 
r e ~ e etrch perform ed b y him se lf and o thers that link s sc hi zophre ni a to a genetic predi spos ition. 
Ind eed , this int e rest ing example of the state of th e a rt is probably the strongest evidenc e in 
menta l health sc ie nce of a linkage between an orga ni c background fac to r a nd psychi a tric 
ab norma lit y. The researc h demo ns tra tes, however , tha t a ge net ic predisposi ti on is ne ithe r 
necessary nor sufficie nt to produ ce the abnormal be ha vior labe led schizophre nia . See, e.g. , 
Wender, Rose nthal , Ra in er , Greenhill, & Sarlin, S chizophrenics' Adopting Parents: Psychiatric 
Status , 34 ARCHIV ES OF GENERAL PSYCHI ATRY 777 , 784 (!977). Further, if schizophre ni c 
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tween some abnormal behavior and given variables, but such findings are 
not at hand ; mental health science does not know yet what the criti cal causal 
var iables are or how powerfully they operate. 
Mental d isorder is thus diagnosed by obse rving the person· s behav-
ior. 29 There are no phys ica l tests for the presence or absence of mental 
d isorde r30 Statements about underlying disease processes, whe ther based 
upo n interviews, psychological tests (which are simply more or le ss struc-
tured behavior samples) , or other obse rvations are theoreti ca l speculations . 
Behavior is the only data in mental health diagnosis that all diagnosticians 
vvould agree is re levant. 
Since abnorm al beh av ior is the bedrock of mental hea lth d iagnosis, the 
inquiry in thi s section must ask what it means to say that behavior is 
abnormal and what kind s of abnormal or deviant behavior compel the label 
behavior doe s have a ge netic causal com pone nt , the mec hani sm of tra nsmis s ion is not known 
nor ha s an abn or malit y in the ge ne tic material o f schi zophreni c s been discovered. See generally 
D. ROSENTHAl. , GE NETICS OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 59- 11 6 ( 197 1 ). For a c ritica l ap prai sa l of the 
research linking schizophrenia to a genetic predi spos ition, see Lid z , Commentary on "A 
Critical Review of R ecent Adoption, Twin, and Family Studies of Schizophrenia: Behavioral 
Genetics Perspectives ," 2 SCHI ZOPHRENIA B ULL. 402 ( 1976). 
It is often be lieved that because a particular form of int e rve ntion is some times successf ul 
in changing abnormal behavior, the cause of the abnormal behavior must he related to the 
treatment method. Thu s, for exa mple, if c hemica l agent s or ps yc ho log ie<d metho ds are succe ss-
ful, it is believed that the source of ab no rmal behavior must be bioc hem ical or psychological. 
Th is is a commo n mi sco nce ptio n know n as the treatme nt-etiol ogy fa ll acy . A tre a tme nt method 
might very well change behavior without ha ving much o r anything to do w ith the prima ry cau se 
of th e behavior. Durell, Introdu ction , in BIOLOGICAL PSYC HI ATRY 4-5 (J. Mende is ed. 1973). For 
exa mple , imagine the case of a pe rso n w ho becomes depres se d after hea ring so me ve ry bad 
news. T he cause of th e depres sed mood is quite clearly the bad new s, a primarily psychological 
eve nt , yet the perso n m ight fe el much better after ingest ing a biochemical agent s uch a s a lcoho l. 
The efficacy of the a lco hol in improving mood wou ld no t indicate tha t the primary cau se of the 
behavi o r was b ioc hemi cal. 
For a discu s s ion of some o f the reaso ns why knowledge of et iology is hard tu a c hieve. sec 
note 25 supra. 
29. Becau se th e to uchs to ne of diagnoses o f di sorder is be havior . diagno ses can be mad e 
o nl y b y observ ing overt actions incl uding speec h , or by making infere nces about coven 
thoug ht s or feelings derived from observations of overt ac ti o ns (e .g., speech , pos tu re , facial 
ex pressions, and other ac tion s). Menta l health diagnoses can be made by observi ng th e person' s 
eve ryda y behavior, behavior in c lin ica l interviews , be havior on va ri ou s tests , and the li ke. See 
R. W OODRUFF, D. G OODW I0i , & 5. GU ZE , PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOS IS 31 ( 1974). 
30. See, e.g., AM ERIC AN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT MEDICAL INFO RM ATION AND 
TERM INO LOGY 366-67 (4 th ed. 1971). In spec tion of the li s tings for the va rio us mental disorders 
de mon stra te s that th ere are no la boratory tests or ot he r phys ical procedures for id e ntifying 
mental di so rders . See also note s 54, 168-71 a nd accompanying text infra. Of c o urse , the re are 
s uch tes ts for d iag no s ing th e va ri o us phys ica l disorders that a re a ssoci a ted w ith some me n ta ! 
d isord ers. It must be remembered, however, that a diagnosi s of mental di so rd er is made 
primaril y on th e bas is of observa tions of abnorma l behavior , whe ther o r not ph ys ical di sorder is 
a lso present. See note 26 supra. In ge ne ra l, ph ys ical pat hology is neithe r 11ece s sa ry no r 
s uffi cient to ju s tify a diagnosis of meni a l diso rder. Where ph ys ical di sorde r mu st be as soc iated 
. l 
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"mental disorder" as opposed to some other labe1. 31 This discussion must 
consider whether it is possible to determine the normality of behavior 
without reference to social and moral va lue preferences and expectaTions. If 
it is not possible , then it should be recognized that the determination of 
normality is largely a moral and social determination, and not primarily a 
scientific conclus ion based on the measurement of objective criteria. 
One meaning of abnormal is that the actor's behavior is statistica lly 
abnormal: it is behavior that occurs very infrequently. Being an exception-
ally fast or slow reader or runner are examp les of statistically abnormal 
behavior. Violent criminal behavior is also statist ically abnormal. Of 
course, deciding how infrequent a behavior must be before it is labeled 
"abnormal" is not a scientific decis ion; rather, it is a decision based on 
value preferences . A social consensus about normality may depend to some 
extent on accurate knowledge of the frequen cy w ith which particular behav-
ior occurs in soc iety. Many actions that might be labeled "abnormal" in the 
absence of data about frequency might be redefined as "normal" by layper-
sons if they were aware that a large portion of their friends and neighbors 
engaged in such behavior. Thus, large-scale studies that investigate the 
prevalence of particu lar behavior in a population might be useful. 32 
Data about frequency might influence values and judgments , but the 
question of whether behavior-whatever its frequency-is abnormal wou ld 
still be a question of social values , rules, and expectations. Let us take I.Q. 
as an example. T he I.Q. scales were constructed so that a simple calculation 
can determine how many persons in our society have a given I.Q. or how 
many have an I. Q. score above or below that point. 33 Suppose soc iety 
wishes to develop special programs to meet the needs of exceptional chi l-
dren-those who are abnormally bright or abnormally slow (in both a 
wi th abnormal behavior in order to make a particular diagnosis , e.g. , "organic mental disor-
ders·· in DSM-IIl , then , of course , lab tests will be necessary but not sufficient. One may 
ques tio n whether it is useful to consider abnormal behavior clearly caused primarily by physical 
disease to be mental disorder. See text accompanying notes 74-83 infra . 
31. Examples o f other common labels for deviant behav io r are "sin fu l," "immoral ,·· and 
" criminal. .. See H. STEADMAN & J . COCOZZA, supra note 24 , at 140-42 ; MORALITY AND MENTAL 
HEALTH 177-78 , 270-75 (0. Mowrer ed. 1967); Aubert & Mess inger, The Criminal and the Sick, 
I INQU IRY 137 , 141 (1958); Shah, Crime and Men tal Jl/n ess: Some Problems in Defining and 
Labeling Deviant Behavior , 53 MENTAL HYGIEN E 21 , 21-25 (1969). 
32 . Of course, such studies and studies on any other point will only be useful if they are 
re liable and val id. See sources cited in note 25 supra, and text accompanying note s 16 1-77 
infra. 
33. D. WECHSLER , THE MEASUREMENT AND APPRAISAL OF ADULT INTELLIGENCE (4th 
ed. !958). Thi s Article is not the appropriate forum to argue the merits of I.Q . testing. The 
skeptical reader is asked to assume only for the purpose of disc uss ion that I.Q . tests do measure 
intelligence a nd that intelligence measured by the tests is related to performance on intellectual 
tasks. 
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commonsense and a statistical sense). The issue would be where to put the 
cutting point for determining who is an abnormally bright or an abnormally 
slow child. 
Drawing this line is a clear example of a social determination with 
respect to abnormality. The cutting point of abnormality on a frequency 
distribution is not dictated by scientific data. Where the line will be drawn 
depends on the social purposes and preferences for which it is being drawn. 
Objective statistical statements are those that simply state the frequency (or 
probability of occurrence) of the behavior without evaluating that frequen-
cy; the evaluation is a social judgment. 
A second meaning of abnormal refers to behavior that is dysfunction-
al-behavior that seems poorly suited to achieve the goals the person sets 
for himself or are set for him by social expectations. The professional writer 
who cannot write because he has writer's cramp is behaving abnormally in 
this sense, as is the family wage earner who cannot work because he or she 
feels too ''down.'' Whether a particular behavior is considered dysfunction-
al and the extent to which it must be dysfunctional in order to be considered 
abnormal depends on personal and social expectations and preferences, 
and not simply on the nature of the behavior itself. 34 A person with an 
abnormally short attention span, for example, may be unable to function as a 
radar operator but might do very well at tasks that require less concentration. 
A third meaning of abnormal refers to behavior that causes the actor to 
suffer psychologically. A person who is uncomfortably anxious can be said 
to behave abnormally in this sense. Whether a person suffers psychologi-
cally, however, again is dependent in part on social circumstances. A gay 
person may suffer a great deal in a society that despises homosexuality, but 
in a sexually tolerant society the person might feel very comfortable. 
Similarly, a person who hears voices may suffer terribly in a society that 
considers such behavior disturbingly aberrant, but in another society where 
such occurrences are treated as a matter of course, the person may not suffer 
at all. Whether particular behavior causes a person to suffer and what type 
and how much suffering is necessary to be considered abnormal, depends in 
large measure on personal and social expectations and norms. 
A fourth meaning of abnormal is that the behavior is irrational, weird, 
crazy, or the like. Truly believing that one is invisible or waving one's arms 
34. A related point is that dysfunction can increase as a result of societal response to an 
abnormal behavior or condition. Mechanic , Jllness Behavior, Social Adaptation, and the 
Management of Illness: A Comparison of Educational and Medical Models, 165 J. NERVOUS & 
MENTAL DISEASE 79 (I 977). See generally Kendell, The Concept of Disease and Its Implications 
for Psychiatry, 127 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 305 (1975). 
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wildly for no apparent reason are examples in our culture of abnormal 
behavior in this sense. It is an intuitive or commonsense meaning of 
abnormal that reflects social evaluations and values. Again, however, be-
havior is not irrational or weird per se; it is crazy or not depending on its 
context and on social expectations and evaulations. Suppose, for example, 
that a man takes to bed during his wife's confinement, and out of sympathy 
for his wife complains of severe physical pains in his pelvic region. In our 
culture the person would be considered quite crazy, whereas in some 
primitive tribes such behavior is ritualized and considered quite normaJ.35 
Simply observing the behavior would not answer the question of whether the 
man was crazy; we would have to know the soc ial context. 
Any theory of abnormal behavior in the four senses discussed cannot be 
evaluated without regard to its social context. We are concerned here, 
however, with the question of whether a person demonstrates a particular 
type of behavioral abnormality-mental disorder. Which of the above four 
meanings of abnormal-statistical infrequency, dysfunction, suffering, or 
craziness-is most useful when asking whether an actor is normal in the 
mental health sense? It is impossible to delineate a precise, operational 
definition of mental disorder, but depending on the individual case , it 
clearly involves varying combinations of all four meanings of abnormality 
dis cussed above. 36 
Although the first three meanings cover some of the cases with which 
mental health science and mental health law are concerned, these meanings 
are vastly over- and under-inclusive. Much behavior that is statistically 
infrequent , dysfunctional, or causes suffering has little or nothing to do with 
anyone's definition of mental disorder. 37 Moreover, much behavior that 
would be considered mental disorder according to current definitions is 
frequent, not particularly dysfunctional, and does not cause unusual suf-
fering. 38 
35. W. LABARRE, THE HUMAN ANit-.L-\L 113-14 (rev. ed. 1960). 
36. P. MEEHL , supra note 28, at 245; see Livermore, Malmqui st, & Meehl, On the 
Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. R Ev . 75, 78 n. II & sources cited therein 
(1968) [he reinafter cited as Justifications]. See generally Spitzer, Sheehy, & Endicott, supra 
note 26, at 3-4; Spitzer & Wilson, supra note 26, at 827. Note, too, that an assumption of 
behavioral abnormality does not necessarily mean that there is a nything wrong with the actor's 
brain, nervous system, or other bodily systems. 
37 . This point is simply a matter of logic a nd everyday experience, co ns idered in the light 
o f present psychiatric categories. For example, extremely high intelligence is s tatisticall y 
infrequent but not a mental disorder. Swallowing one ' s words when speaking may be dysfunc-
tional , especially for lawyers, but it is hardly per se mental disorder. Finally, many people 
suffer because of their theological, moral, or po litic a l beliefs; these beliefs have littl e to do with 
mental disorder. For definitions of behavior that are associated with particular mental disor-
ders, see DSM-II , supra note 26. 
38. Epidemiological studies of mental di sorder show rates as high as 80% in the popula-
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Careful mapping of the coQcept of mental disorde r, howeve r, will 
demonstrate that its borders most closely approximate those of inexplicable 
craziness, m aking this meaning the crucial one for both mental health 
scientists and the legal system. 39 This is the on ly meaning of mental disorder 
that covers all or nearly all of the cases with which the mental health legal 
system is, or should be, concerned. To state the definition somewhat 
differently, mentaiiy disordered persons are those who deviate significantly 
from a culture's norms for intrapersonal and interpersona l behavior , in a 
crazy fashion. 40 Mental disorder is behavior that makes little or no sense, 
leading to the assumption that there must be something wrong with the 
person. 
Some examples from the behavioral realms of action, feeling, and 
thought will help clarify this definition. Mutilating oneself for no apparent 
tion at large an d even higher rates in particular age groups within a population. B.P. DOHREN-
WEND & B.S. DOHR ENWEND, SOCI AL STATUS AND PSYCHO LOGI CAL DISORDER: A CAUSAL 
INQ UIRY 9-31 ( 1969); D. MECHANIC, M ENTAL HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLI CY 65-67 (1969) . Accord-
ing to so me theoretical views, all human beings are suffering from some form of mental 
disorde r to so me extent a t all times . L. KUBIE , PRACTICAL A:-ID THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF 
PsYCHOANALYSIS 17-20 (1950). It should be noted , however , that absolute estimates of the 
prevalence of disorder in a population may be highly unreliable. 
Mental disorder does not necessarily cause an individual significa nt living problems. Many 
of th e milder forms of mental disorder do not significantly interfere with a person 's general 
functi o ning, and indeed , even severe mental disorder may not do so. See sources cited in note 
24 supra. Moreover, it is a matter of common clinical knowledge that many mentally disordered 
people, inc luding those who behave in ways considered the most abno rmal, do not suffer 
unduly (although many others certainly do). Indeed, so me mental disorders seem to relieve 
suffering, e.g., "!a belle indifference" of a person who claims to be paralyzed in the absence of 
a ph ys ical cause and is said to have a "conversion hysteria." The degree to which crazy 
behav ior may lead to dysfunction or suffering is quite dependent on soc ial response to the 
behavior- response s that differ across cultures. See, e.g., Al-Issa , Social and Cultural Aspects 
of Hallucinations, 84 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 570, 571-77 ( 1977); Waxler, Culture and Mental 
Illness: A Social Labeling Perspective , 1591. NERVOU S & MENTAL DI SEASE 379,380 (1974); cf. 
Mechanic, supra note 34, at 82 (dysfunction as a result of physical disorder and related 
psychological stress is dependent on both psychological status of patient and responses from 
family, friends , and employers). 
For a thoughtful reaction to the arguably overexpansive definitio ns of mental disorder 
currently dominating western and especially America n psychiatry, see Kendell, supra note 34. 
39. Other writers have recognized that craziness is the core of mental disorder; specifical-
ly, craziness is associated with individual s who are inexplicably irrat iona l. J. FEINB ERG, What 
Js So Special About Mental J/lness? , in DOI NG AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN TH E TH EORY OF 
RESPON SIBILITY 272 , 284-89 (1970); H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIM INA L INSANITY 174-
203 ( 1972); Fingarette, Disabilities of Mind and Criminal Responsibility-A Unitary Doctn"ne, 
76 Cou.: M. L. REv. 236, 246-48 (1976); Moore, supra note 14, at 1485-87 . For a critique of the 
irration al ity definiti o n , see Morris, Criminal Insanity , 17 INQUIRY 345 ( 1974). For an emprical 
s tud y bearing on the definit ion of mental disorder as craz iness or the like, see Mechanic , supra 
note 4, at 195-203. 
40 Although few writers attempt to delineate precisely the definition of menta l disorder , 
but see Spitzer, Sheehy, & Endicott, supra note 26, at 4, 15-16, it is widely recogni zed that the 
definition of what behavior constitutes disorder is culturally and temporally relative. For 
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th eoreti ca l v iews, sec , e.g. , J. COULTER, APPRO.-\CH ES TO I NSANITY 145-5 1 ( 1973); A. FJ.E W, 
C I ~ I~ I E OR DI SL \SE'.' ~8 - 3 1 (1973) ; Kleinman, Depression, S omatizat ion and th e "New Cross-
Cultura l Psvchiacry," II Soc. SCI. & MED. 3 ( 1977). See generally R. COAN, HERO. A RTIST, 
SAGE. OR S.AINT'' (1977); K . E RIKSON . WAYWARD PURITANS 1-~9 (1966); M. FOUCAULT, ME~; TA I. 
l i.i .NFSS & PSYCIIOI.OGY 64-75 (A. Sheridan trans . 1976) : A. KI EV, TR .AO.:SCULTl.I RAl. PS YC HI ATRY 
! I CJ7 2J: W. L\BARR E, supra no te 35. at ~33-66: D. OFFF.f{ & M. SABSH IN, NORM.A I.ITY : T HEORET-
ICAL .·\ ND CLI NICAL Co NCE I'TS OF M ENTA L H EALTH 67-82 (rev . ed. 1974); Sedgwick, 11/ness-
i>fental and Otherwise, I H.ASTINGS C ENTER STUD. 19 ( 1973); Shands, Myth or !llness: On th e 
Fun ction of Con sensus , !2 Co:-<TE\I P. PsYCHO.-\NAL YSIS 6! ( !975). 
For part icu lar stud ies, see, e.g., CuLTURE AND iv! ENT.A L H EALTH (M . Opler ed. 1959) ; A l-
h s ~t. supra nute 38; Townse nd , Cultural Conceptions and Mell{al Illness: A Controlled 
Com{'arisnn of German y and Amen·ca , 160 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISFASE 409 ( 1975) : Waxl er. 
Sllf'rri note .>8. For a rece m rev iew o f the cultural influences on psychopathology, see Dohren· 
we nd & Dnhren wend , Social and Cultural Influences on Psy choparhology , 25 i \NN. RE v . 
PSYCHOLOGY 4 17 (197-l ) 
For~· gene ral argument against cultural relativi sm , see Dixon. Js Cultural Relarivis m S i'lf-
Refwing:' , 28 BRIT. J. Soc. 75 (1977). For a generally negative view of cultural relati v ism based 
un ~· review of empiri cal stud ies , see Dunham , Society, Culture. and tlvfental Disorder . .33 
i\RCH JVFS OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 147 , 152-56 (1976). A spec ific argument that a th eory of 
mental disease can and should be as value-free as possible is prese nted in Boorse, What a 
Theory of Mental Health Should Be , 6 J. TH EORY Soc. B EHAViOUR 61 ( 1976). 
In a thoughtful arti cle that rev iews th e history of the disease concept , K endell , supra not e 
:l .J. at 306-10. Dr . K endell offers a limiting and universal set of criteria for mental di sorder th at 
are based on a biological teleology. These criteria are decreased fertility and increased 
mortalit y , bo th of whi ch are arguably associated with some mental di so rders. In any case, the 
data c ited in su pport of his argument is admittedly inconclu sive. See, e. g., Rimmer & Jacobsen, 
Dtfferential Fertility of Adopted Schizophrenics and their Half-Siblings , 54 A CTA PSYCHIATRIC-\ 
SC\N DINAVICA 161 (1976); Singer, Garfinkel, Cohen, & Srole, Mortality and Mental Health: 
Evidence from the Midtown Manhattan Restudy, 10 Soc. SCI. MED. 517, 5~3 (1976). 
For examples of cros s-temporal and cross-cultural differences in psychiatric pract ice, see 
Kendell, Cooper , Gourlay, Copeland , Sharpe , & Gurland , Diagnostic Criteria of American and 
British Psychiatrists , 25 ARCHI VES OF GENERAL PSYCHI ATRY 123 (1971) ; Kuriansky, Deming, & 
Gurland , On Trends in the Diagnosis of Schizophrenia , 131 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 402 (1974); 
Morrison , Changes in Subtype Diagnosis of Schizophrenia: 1920-1%6, 131 Ai\t. J. PSYCHI ATRY 
674 ( 1974) ; Piggott & Simson, Changing Diagnosis of Childhood Psychosis, 5 J. A UTISM & 
CH ILDHOOD SCHI ZOPHRENI A 239 (1975); Sartorius, Classification: An International Perspective, 
6 PSYCHIATRI C ANe~. 8, 9-10 (1976); Stromgren, Uses and Abuses of Concepts in Psychiatry , 126 
AM. J. PS YC HI ATRY 45 ( 1969). 
Perhaps c laims about the cultural definitions of normality and craziness should be qual-
ified. First, there is a body o f cross-cultural evidence that would suggest th at in all cultures 
there are persons who evidence similarl y disorganized behavioral processes that, in their 
soc iety, render them exceptionally incompetent and th at cause them to be labeled crazy or the 
equi valent. The substance or content of the crazy behavior of such persons might differ from 
culture to culture, but th e form of the abnormal behavioral process se ems to be similar. 
Murphy, Psychiatric Labeling in Cross-Cultural Perspective, 191 SCI. I 01 9 ( 1976) . But see 
Stillings, Letter to the Editor , 196 SCI . 481 (1976); Townsend , Letter to the Ed'tor, 196 Sci. 480 
( 1976). See also T orrey, Js Schizophrenia Universal ? An Open Question, 7 SCHIZOPHRE CII.A 
Ruu . . 53 (1973). N o one knows the cause of extreme crazi ness . The significance o f it s 
ex istence, however, is th at there may be a type of behav ior that is simpl y incompatible w ith 
being cons idered a normal human being in any culture at any time. The class of persons who 
display such behav ior is ex tremely small , however , and person s i11 it tend to be the cra ziest 
per·sons in I heir societ y, readil y identifiable by laypersons and ex perts (e.g. , psychiatrist s, 
med icine men) alike. 
Second , there are enough cross-cultural similarities in the forms of behavior, if not th e 
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reason is a classic example. 41 We assume there must be something wrong 
with someone who does such a thing. Another example has to do with 
mood. Most persons recognize that some shift in a person's mood is quite 
normal in our society; sometimes one feels "up" and at other times 
"down." \Ve learn, however, that there are normal limits (albeit the normal 
range is wide) regarding how fast the moods ought to shift, or how extreme 
the moods "ought" to be. Most persons take it for granted that feeling 
depressed some of the time is normal. If the feeling of depression, however, 
becomes so extreme that one loses all his energy and capacity for experienc-
ing pleasure and can barely function, we recognize that the rule of how 
much depression is normal has been violated. We then think that there is 
something wrong with the individual; his behavior (i.e., mood) is crazy. 
A final example deals primarily with thoughts, rather than with actions 
or feelings. Nearly everyone fantasizes or daydreams on occasion. Often 
these fantasies or daydreams are quite unrealistic and pleasurable wish 
fulfillments. If asked, however, the daydreamer would admit that his fan-
tasy about being invisible, for example, is indeed a fantasy. In our culture 
we take it for granted that persons will fantasize unrealistic things and also 
that they will recognize that the fantasy is a fantasy. But suppose a person 
truly believed that he could become invisible by chanting a magic incanta-
tion. We should then say that there is something crazy about this person 
because he has violated the rules that govern the extent to which persons 
usually maintain contact with reality. 
An extremely important aspect of mental disorder or crazy behavior is 
that it is inexplicable and unsettling. Mentally disordered persons are per-
ceived as different and, often, frightening. This reaction is quite understand-
content, so that western diagnostic categories may be applicable in doing cross-cultural re-
search. Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, supra at 431. Of course, this only means that similar 
behavior exists crossculturally-not that such behavior bears the same evaluation in all cul-
tures. Davis, Disease and its Treatment: Values in Afedicine and Psychiatry, 18 COMPREHENSIVE 
PSYCHIATRY 231, 232 ( 1977); Murphy, supra at 1027. Further, the usefulness of those 
categories, especially in the context of legal proceedings, is doubtful. For a discussion of the 
inadequacies of psychiatric diagnostic categories, see notes 161-77 and accompanying text 
infra. 
41. Another example is provided by Professor Scheff, who considers mental disorder to 
be primarily the violation of "residual rules"-implicit behavioral norms that are generally 
taken for granted. Scheff suggests that his readers try the experiment of staring fixedly at a 
conversational partner's ear while engaging in a conversation. Of course, in our culture we 
generally look at a person ·s eyes or mouth while conversing with him. We do not look fixedly at 
his ear because to do so would violate an implicit norm of social interaction. The partner 
probably would become quite uncomfortable and would feel that there is something odd or 
wrong with the person who fixedly looks at his ear. Rarely are we expressly taught not to stare 
at a person's ear, but most of us know not to do it and abide by this behavioral norm or 
residual rule. If a person persisted in looking at his partner's ear, the partner might very well 
believe his companion was acting crazily. T. SCHEFF, LABELING MADNESS 5-8 (1975). 
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able. The functioning of any soc iety or subculture requires general adher-
e nce to an understood and shared se t of rule s or expectations of behavior. 
Naturally, there is a di stribution of behav ior around the norm for all 
behavioral rules, but reasonable deviation is itself normal and makes fe w 
persons unduly uncomfortable . Most behavior seems based on the shared 
rules and ex pectations that most persons accept and adhere to. Crazy 
behavior makes most people uncomfortable because it seems baseless or 
based on inexplicable rules or premises . 
Tt is not clear how crazil y one mus t behave before earning the label 
" mentally disordered." At some po int along the crazy behav ior continuum, 
howe ver, we are likely to say, "he's crazy," rather than "that's crazy" o r 
" what a crazy thing to do (way to behave) . " This point may be reached if a 
person is mildly crazy in many ways or if the crazy behaviors are few but 
ex tre mely crazy. At some point , we stop feelill.g that the actor is an 
essentially normal person who has done some crazy things. Rather, we fe el 
that he or she is a crazy person-a person who seems to have little choice 
about whether or not to behave crazily .42 
In summary, to define mental disorder for the purposes of mental 
health law, the best one can do is to state definitionally and tautologically 
that abnormal persons in the mental health sense are those who behave 
inordinately crazily. These are the people for whom special legal rules seem 
appropriate . If the definition of mental disorder as crazy behavior seems 
ambiguous, this is quite proper because there is no scientifically agreed on 
definition of mental disorder. 43 Attempts at more specific definitions are 
only theoretical. Experts agree only on the observation that in (probably) 
every society there are persons who behave in ways that society labels 
mentally ill, mentally disordered , crazy, or some equivalent term . 
42. Genera lly , a person will be co nsidered truly crazy o nly if it is believed tha t the actor 
has had little or no c hoice about whe ther to behave craz il y. E ven if a n ac tor seems to behave 
ve ry crazily, he is unlikely to be co ns idered crazy in the me nta l health se nse if a rational motive 
fo r the craz iness ca n be d iscern<:d or if it is be lieved that th e perso n really is choosing fr ee ly, 
eve n if inex plicably, to beha ve crazily. The re is a n intui t ion that tru e crazines s is uncontrollable 
craz iness. Thi s Art ic le di sc usses the questi o n o f whether crazine ss is unco ntroll a bl e a t tex t 
accompan ying notes 58- 112 infra. 
43. Spi tzer & Wilson , supra note 26, at 827. See also note 14 sup ra (sources conce rni ng 
the medical model in psychiatry). 
Unlike Szasz a nd others, this author has no major theoretical objection s to the use of 
illnes s langu age in genera l in di scussion of crazy behavior. If it is useful for clinicians, 
re searchers , a nd othe rs, there is no ha rm in em pl oy ing it. Wha tever conceRl!.Jal models are 
useful fo r different purposes should be employed. The ma jor difficulty , however, is th a t illness 
language carries w ith it ma ny unproven assumpti o ns about crazy be ha vi o r that may ha ve 
profound impl ica tio ns in no n-m e nt al health cont ex ts such as lega l deci s ionm a king. See note 14 
supra . For in stance, it is assumed that me ntally ill persons lack co ntrol over the ir c razy 
be hav ior an d its co nseq ue nces much in th e sa me way that physicall y ill pe rsons are assumed to 
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Of course, in o ur society crazy behavior is usuall y cons idered medical-
ly abnormal rather than, for example, morally abnormal. Bu t the med ical 
analogy is presently little more than an an alogy; all that is known is that 
some people behave ve ry crazily, and it is these people wh o are considered 
to be mentally di so rde red. Hereafte r , the te rms mental di sorder, me ntal 
ill ness, and crazy behavior \vi ii be used intercha ngeably to ensure that the 
. l f h h . . . I clA essentw natme o. t. e p .. enomenon m question 1s not .ost. 
' J ¥'\l ho is Crazy ? 
T he pre vious section examined in some deta il the na ture of the question , '' Is 
the person normal in the mental heal th sense?" It should now be recognized 
that for mental hea lth law this quest ion really should mean, in operational 
terms , "Does thi s pe rson behave sufficiently craz il y to warran t spec ia l lega l 
trea tment on moral and soc ia l gro unds 7 " Once the nature o f the ques ti o n is 
c lear, one can analy ze how it should properly be answered. The majo r thes is 
of this sec tion is th at the question, "Who is suffi c iently crazy?" is a soc ial 
q uesti on , and that for legal purposes it can and should be ans\vered by 
lRypersons . 
The number of persons who may be labe led "mentally disordered" 
according to current di agnostic categories is much larger than the number of 
persons who are clearly crazy45 and thus arguably warrant special legal 
treatment on both moral and social grounds. Because there is no underlying, 
lack control ove r their illnesses and symptoms. As is s how n at text accompanyi ng not es 58 to 
! 12 infra , h•Jwe ver, thi s ass umption about mentally ill pe rso ns is not prove n. Unfortun a te ly , 
w hen illness language is used to characterize behavior in the legal con tex t , it reinfo rce' the 
unprove n assumption tha t the c razy pe rson is not respons ibl e fo r hi s be hav ior. Cf. F a rina , 
F isher . Getler, & Fi sc he r , Some Consequences of Changing People's Views Rega rding the 
N ature of Mental Illness, 87 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 272,277-79 (1978) (subjects who were 
told that a behavioral prob le m was a product o f social learn ing were compa re d to subj ects w ho 
vvere told th a t the be ha v ioml problem was a disease; th e la tt er were more lik e ly to fee l he lp less 
a nd less li kely to believe they had co ntro l over the problem ). Thi s point i' recog ni zed by 
so ph is ticated lawye rs a nd me nt a l hea lth pro fess io na ls . Unt il nr:a rl y al l peop le w ho work in the 
area of menta l health law recognize thi s, the use of illness la ngu age may have the undesirable 
effect o f begg ing the qu est io n o f legal respo ns ibility. 
44. Ja rgon terms have question-begging connotatio ns a bout the ca u,es o r nature o f the 
phenomenon. Thus , thi s Article uses a nonjargon term interc ha ngeably w ith th e domina nt 
ja rgo n term s. It is diffi c ult , however , to fi nd a nonj a rgo n term that both desc ri bes the behavior 
cons idered me nt a l di sorde r a nd avo id s un wa nte d co nnota t ion s. N o te rm is per fe c t , but .. c razy" 
seems to avoi d bot h legal a nd mental hea lth sc ience connotations whil e preserv ing a se nse of 
seriou s abnormality. The a uthor owes hi s prefe rence for the te rm .. crazy" to his form er teac h-
cr. Professor Alan Stone o f Harvard Law School. In Pro fessor Stone's cou rse s o n m e nt a l 
l1ea!th law, it was a term ofte n used and this writer has had a n affect ion fo r it ever s in ce. It is 
aiso w ide ly used by me nt a l hea lth professiona ls , in di sc ussio n bot h a mo ng the ms e lve s and wi th 
p;; tie'lt S. Fo r a s imilar a ttempt to find a pro pe r word, see Ro sen han, Th e Contextual i'lature of 
Psychictnc Diagnosis, 84 J. ABNORM AL PSYCHOLOGY 462, 465 n.2 ( 1975). 
c>:). See r.ote s 37-38 St!pra. See generally DSM-II , supra note 26. 
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independently verifiable criterion other than behavior with which to deter-
mine if an actor is mentally disordered, it is especially hard to determine if 
the actor is "normal" in those cases where most observers would not agree 
that the actor is crazy. Mental health professionals can make such determi-
nations by fiat, but these are not scientific decisions. 46 At the farthest 
extremes, it is relatively easy for anyone to differentiate a very crazy 
individual from a normal person, and we are not made uncomfortable by 
terming the person ''crazy'' although the conclusion of craziness in even the 
clearest cases is culturally rel ative to some degree. But the dividing line , 
near which most cases fall, is elusiveY 
Let us consider some examples to analyze further the question of ''who 
is crazy'?" and how it should be answered. Suppose an adult walks down the 
street, accosting passersby and loudly uttering strange epithets. Asked why 
he is engaging in this behavior, he sincerely replies that electrochemical rays 
shot at him by supernatural beings are forcing him to behave in this way. 
This person clearly has a mental disorder according to the American Psychi-
atric Association, 48 but do we need an expert to tell us that he is crazy? 
Clearly not. Nor can an expert or anyone else tell us with any degree of 
certainty why this person behaves this way. All that is known, and this is 
clear to anyone in our culture-experts and laypersons alike-is that the 
actor is very crazy. 
Let us now consider a much harder example: a man who is extremely 
neat, punctual, and precise. Indeed, he spends so much time ensuring that 
he is neat , punctual, and precise that he often accomplishes considerably 
less in his love life and work life than he might like, a fact that makes him 
unhappy . Despite his discontent, he finds that for some reason he feels that 
he just has to be that way, and in any case, he gets along all right with his 
family and his job . This person suffers from a mental disorder according to 
46. Of course, mental hea lth professionals can define for their own purposes whatever 
behavior the y wish as abnormal , but unle ss the behavior so categorized is crazy or arguably so , 
society and the legal system would not accept special treatment of the persons so categorized-
th ey would not seem sufficiently abnormal a nd different. 
47. Edgerton, supra note 4, at 5 I. When menta l health professionals attempt to break 
crazy behavior into "disease" categories or clusters, agreement tha t the person fits into a 
category is not high, eve n for those categories that map the c raz iest be hav ior. See Helzer , 
Clayton, Pambakian, Reich , Woodruff , & Reveley, Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis: II. The 
Test/Retest Reliability of Diagnostic Classification, 34 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 136 
(1977); Spitzer & Fleiss, A Re-analysis of the Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 125 B RIT. J. 
PsYCHIATRY 34 I (I 974). In the seven studies reported by these two arti c le s, the interrater 
reliability for schizophrenia was .57. For the reasons why diagnostic agreement is difficult to 
ac hieve, see notes 25 supra a nd 161-71 and accompanying te xt infra. 
48. The diagno sis would probably be "Schizophreni a , Paranoid Type,·· according to 
DSM-II, supra note 26, at 34, or DSM-l!I, supra note 26, at C: lO. 
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the currentl y dominant diagnostic scheme. 49 Indeed, excess ive concern with 
neatness , punctuality, or anything else is a little crazy in the looses t collo-
quial sense. On the other hand, many persons would probably be inclined to 
say about this person, "Oh , so and so has some quirks like all o f us, but 
that' s just the way he is." Most persons would probably agree that his 
" quirks " are somewhat maladaptive, though others might admire an unusu-
ally neat, punctual, and precise person. Is this person normal? Again , does 
the ability to answer this ques tion require medical expertise o r merely 
common sense based on social rules and expectations ? 
Mental health ex perts are a bit more inclined than the average person to 
decl are that parti cular behaviors are abnormal and evidence mental disor-
der 50 Eve n so, mos t experts and laypersons would agree in their assessment 
of our second example. He is a person with some personality quirks (or in 
'' psychiatrese , ' ' characterological symptoms) that interfere to some extent 
with his successful functioning. Thus, the final question of normality in this 
borderline case is simply, ''How quirky must a person be before he or she 
will be labeled abnormal?" There is no scientific answer to this question . 
There exists no objectively identifiable underlying abnormal condition that 
distinguishes this person from those with fewer, different, or no quirks. 
Even if there were an identifiable underlying condition, for legal purposes 
the answer depends on social tolerance for quirkiness or on social value 
preferences concerning how much a person can "normally" hinder his own 
functioning by quirkiness before we consider him crazy. 
49. The diagnos is would probably be "Obsessive compulsive personality" according to 
DSM-lT, supra note 26 , at 43, or " Compul sive perso nality disorder" according to DSM-III , 
supra note 26, at K :15. 
50 . G. N EWMAN , COM PARATI VE DEV IANCE: PERCE PTION AN D LAW IN S IX C ULTUR ES 39-40 
( 1976); o· Arcy & Brockm an, Changing Public Recognition of Psychiatric Symptoms ? Blackfoot 
Revisited, 17 J. H EALTH & Soc. BEHAVI OR 303 (1976); Sarbin & Mancuso, supra note 3. See 
generally Scheff, Decision Rules , Types of Error, and their Consequences in i'vfedical Diag-
nosis , 8 BEHAVIORAL Sci. 97 ( 1963); no te 38 supra ; see also Coie , Costanzo & Cox , Behavioral 
Determinants of Mental l/lness Concerns : A Comparison of " Gatekeeper" Professions, 43 J. 
CON SULTINC; & CLI !-i iCAL PSYC HOL.OGY 626, 635 ( 1975). On occasion, thi s tendency can ass ume 
outrageous proportions. See Cleary , The Writ Writer, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 31 9 (1973) 
(behavi or of patient-pri so ners in for ensic psychiatry units who petitioned in order to secure 
their re lease interpre ted as poss ibl y " the express ion of omnipotent fantasies , th e id ea that 
oppress ive ex ternal fo rces can be routed by a stroke of the pen. The magic is not only in the 
written co mmuni ca ti on itse lf bu t also in the arcane, styli zed phraseology so peculiar to legal 
documents ." !d. at 320); Rosenhan , On Being Sane in Insane Pla ces , 179 Sci. 250 , 253 (1973) 
(pseudopatients wh o were admitted to mental hospit als as part of an ex periment took notes of 
their ex peri ences whil e on the ward ; the note-taking was seen as ev idence of psychopath ology 
according to nursing records in three cases) . 
There is al so ev ide nce that , compared to layperso ns, psychiatri sts co nsistentl y pl ace lower 
social valu e on behavio rs labeled psyc hi atric symptoms. B.P. DOHRENWEND & B.S . DOHREN-
WE!\ D, supra note 38, at 81-88. 
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A fin al example is a person whose sexual orientation is exc lusive ly 
homosexual but who maintains adequate interpersonal re lations, whose 
work life is generally unimpaired, and who has no significantly maladaptive 
personality quirks. This case illustrates the diffi culty in answering the 
questi on "who is c razy?" and exemplifies the processes by which profes-
sionals sometimes decide such questions . 
Our example is a person who would be regarded as quite normal by 
both experts and lay persons except for his homosexuality . But is thi s person 
normal in the me ntal hea lth sense? If ja rgon is deleted from scientific 
definitions, experts and laypersons define homosexuality similarly: the 
occurrence of a (more or less) pers istent sexual preference for members of 
the same sex . There is no test other than homosexual behavior itself w ith 
which to "diagnose" homosexuality. Until 1973, the American Psychiatric 
Association, the organization responsible for the promulgation of the cur-
rently dominant diagnostic scheme of mental disorders, considered 
homosexuality per se a mental disorder 51 In that year, by a vote of its 
membership, the Association decided that homosexuality was not a mental 
disorder _52 The nature of homosexuality did not change, nor were there any 
startling breakthroughs in the scientific understanding of homosexual behav-
ior. No one is sure why the sexual orientation of some persons is homosexu-
al; all that was known to a certainty prior to and after the 1973 vote was that 
some persons behave homosexually. 
What changed were the values of a profess ional group empowered to 
affix labels of deviancy. Historically, many societies considered homosexu-
ality sinful. The ascendancy of the medical model of deviant behavior led to 
a redefinition of this deviant behavior as sick. The majority of mental health 
experts, although by no means all, now view homosexuality per se as 
neither sick nor bad; rather, it is viewed as one possible form of human 
sexual orientation. A homosexual may still be considered mentally disor-
dered , but not on the basis of the homosexuality per se. 
For many reasons, homosexual behavior raises particularly difficult 
questions of defining behavioral normality. Homosexuals are not necessari-
ly dysfunctional in ways important to them or, except for sexual orientation, 
to the rest of society. Nor is homosexual behavior particularly irrational, 
weird, or inexplicable; that is, it does not seem crazy. Yet , the unproven 
notion remains deeply rooted among professionals and laypersons that 
51. DSM-II , supra note 26, at 44. 
52. American Psychiatric Assoc iati on, Position Statement on Hom osexuality and Civil 
Rights , 131 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 497 (1974). See also A Symposium: Sh ould Homosexuality Be in 
the APA Nomenc/ature 7 , 130 A\1. J. PSYCHIATRY 1207 (1973) . 
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homosexuality is somewhat per se biologically and/or socially abnormal 
and/or maladaptive. Homosexuals are no longer officially considered sick 
not because of a scientific finding, but because a majority of professionals 
with the power to affix the " sick" label changed their minds. If the decision 
of whether homosexual behavior is abnormal really reduces to a statement of 
value preferences, however, the assistance professionals can give to layper-
sons to discern such abnormalities is negligible. 
Mental health experts are neither moral experts nor social value ex-
perts, nor even experts on any mental health issue about which there is little 
scientific data or agreement; and mental health is a field of little agree-
ment. 53 For the most part, the experts do not have tests or instruments that 
reliably and validly demonstrate the presence or absence of abnormal condi-
tions. Certainly, no responsible expert would diagnose mental disorder on 
the basis of a test result if the person otherwise behaved normally. Any data 
that experts might use to determine whether a subject meets the legal test of 
craziness is perfectly accessible to lay observers as well. 54 
53. Cf. Rippere, Commonsense Belief5 About Depression and Antidepressive Behavior: A 
Study of Social Consensus, 15 BEHAVIOUR RESEARCH & THERAPY 465, 466-67, 471-73 (1977) 
(subjects who were psychologists were tested on their degree of consensus about beliefs 
concerning depression and antidepressive behavior; subjects agreed on commonsense proposi-
tions verifiable by first hand experience or observation, but disagreed on abstract matters 
debated by experts; support for validity of lay beliefs about psychopathology). For an inter-
esting series of articles by mental health professionals that deal with the appropriate ethical and 
professional responses that professionals should make when they are consulted by gay persons, 
see Bieber, A Discussion of "Homosexuality: The Ethical Challenge," 44 J. CoNSULTING & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 163 (1976); Davison, Homosexuality: The Ethical Cha//enge, 44 J. 
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 157 ( 1976); Halleck, Another Response to "Homosexual-
ity: The Ethical Challenge," 44 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 167 (1976). These 
articles evidence substantial disagreement among professionals. 
54. A possible exception to the statement in the text would occur if experts used 
psychological test results. There are, of course, numerous tests that measure the supposed 
presence or absence of mental disorders. See generally M. MALONEY & M. WARD, PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL ASSESSMENT, A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 311-408 (1976); CLINICAL METHODS IN PSYCHOLO-
GY 61-279 (I. Weiner ed. 1976). For legal purposes, however, there are two major difficulties 
with these tests. First, there is considerable reason to doubt their usefulness in general; tests 
may not produce reliable and valid information about the person tested. Second, in addition to 
possible general reliability and validity problems, present psychological tests do not define 
those persons who are crazy enough to meet the legal standard of mental illness. For the law, it 
is not the person's behavior on a test that is at issue, but his behavior in the real world. If the 
tests accurately predicted who behaved sufficiently crazily in the real world, then they might 
help determine whether the legal standard of mental illness is met. To elate, however, there is no 
indication that tests can do this. See, e.g., M. MALONEY & M. WARD, supra at 336-43, 363-70; 
W. MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 59-70, 110-13 (1968) ; J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH 
PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTI\IONY 144-80 (2cl eel. 1975); Blatt, The Validity of 
Projective Techniques and Their Research and Clinical Contribution, 39 J. PERSONALITY As-
SESS\tENT 327 (1975); Cleveland, Reflections on the Rise and Fall of Psychodiagnosis, 7 
PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 309 (1976); Lewandowski & Saccuzzo, The Decline of Psychologi-
cal Testing, 7 PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 177 ( 1976). 
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In sum, laypersons and experts both form judgments based large ly 
on their observations of behavior. In commo nsense language, the ir 
observations are likel y to be remarkabl y similar. In cases where menu] 
health experts readily agree that an actor suffers from a severe mentai 
d iso rcler , 55 laypersons would agree that the ac tor is crazy . Where persons arc 
le ss crazy but still arguab ly irrationally quirky (as in our earlier case of the 
extremely neat, precise, and punctual man) , laypersons and experts wou ld 
agree on the description although experts wou ld be more likely to diag -
nose mental disorder than laypersons would be likel y to "diagnose" crazi -
ness 5 6 '{ et there wou ld be no scienti fic re ason to call our second person 
·'mentally clisorclerecl" as opposed to "quirky '· or even normal. "Memal 
disorder" and "quirky" are both labe ls affixed to the same behavior. Any 
ex tra meaning connoted by ''mental disorder,·· such as neurological dys-
function or underlying psychological forces , is current ly unver ified. 
The best measuring instrument for determini11g if a person is crazy is to 
find out as much as possible about the actor from those persons who have 
had an opportunity to observe him directly in a wide variety of circum-
stances. When much is learned about how the actor has behaved at many 
different times and in many different circumstances, or at a particular time 
and in particular circumstances, then all members of society wi ll be compe-
tent to judge if the person is crazy in general or if he was crazy at the 
particular time in questionY The current deference the law accords mental 
health experts is misplaced. For legal purposes , the question of who is crazy 
It is no t suggested here that critic s of testing in general are correct about the useles s ne ss of 
th e enterprise . Cf. Wade & Ba ke r, Opinions and Uses of Psychological Tescs: A Survey of 
Clinical Psychologists, 32 AM . PsYC HOLOGIST 874, 879-88 1 ( 1977) (despite c riticism of te s ts, 
the y are st ill wide ly used by clin icians of all therapeutic orientations; clinicians recognize the 
ps yc hometric f laws of tests, but que s tion the reliabilit y and validit y of the negative studies; 
c linici a ns a re probably unaffected by negative res ult s concerning test s because of the need to 
assess, the lack of weight given to experimental evidence, and the lack of practical a lterna-
tiv es) . Thi s writer believes that test ing is worthwhile a nd that some te sts are very use ful fo1 
some purposes. It is cla imed here , however , that prese nt tests do not offer data that ans1.-ver 
lega l quest ion s about normality. By and large , te s ts of psychopath o logy track present psychiat-
r ic categories that them se lves a re of little value in legal decisionmaking. See notes 161-77 and 
accompanying te xt infra. 
55. See note 47 and acco mpa nying text supra. 
56. See note 50 a nd acco mpa nying text supra. 
57. Hall, supra no te 16 , at 1049; see note 47 and accompanying text supra. See also 
Ve stre & Zimmermann, Validity of Informants· Ratings of the Behavior and Symptoms of 
Psvchiatric Patients, 33 J. CoNSULTING & Ct.INIC.AI. P SYCHOLOGY 175 (1969). It is some time s 
sugge,;tc:d that psychiatri c categori es help limit the number of cases of dev iant behavior w here 
mental health law intervention would be just ified. Shapiro. Therapeutic Justifications far 
lnten•ention info Mentation and Behavior, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 673 , 772-73 (1975). Perhaps so , but 
wh y should mental health professio nals be de legated the power to decide fm society and the 
law the social and moral question of w hich persons ought to be subject to special leg<!l 
tre atment~ 
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must be recogni zed as a social and moral judgme nt that must be dec ided as 
such . 
3. S umrnary 
Me ntal di sorder fun dame ntall y re fe rs to crazy behavior . T heori es about 
abnormal underl ying causes of the behavior are yet unprove n. Further, w hat 
behavior is considered crazy depends largely on social and cultural norms 
and ex pectations and on the parti cular situatio nal contex t in wh ich th e 
behav ior occurs. Except in the cleares t cases, de term inations of who is crazy 
are difficult to make because the criteri a of craziness are very imprecise. 
Because determinations of craziness depend on observati ons of behav ior and 
social norms, such determinations can be made by laypersons and expert s 
a like . 
When the legal system must decide if a person is crazy eno ugh to 
warrant special legal treatment , it should recognize the social and moral 
nature and significance of the dec ision. Consequently, the question of who 
is crazy should be dec ided by soc ie ty' s representatives-judges and juries of 
laypersons. 
C. COULD THE PERSON HAVE BEHAVED OTHERWISE? 
Once an initial determination is made that a person has behaved sufficientl y 
crazily to justify labeling him " mentally disordered ," i.e. , a crazy person , 
the next important question for the legal system is whether the person could 
have behaved otherwise. In other words, were the crazy behavior and 
related legally relevant behavior products of free choice or were they the 
product of a disordered mind ? Was the person a free agent and causally 
responsible for the behavior ? Being different enough to be clearly crazy 
seems to be a necessary but not sufficient reason for special legal treatment. 
A further factual assumption appears morally and legally compelled- that 
the legall y relevant behavior was the result of uncontrollable illness .58 In 
such instances , the crazy actor , unlike most persons , is no t regarded as a 
free agent and special legal treatment does not seem to infringe unduly the 
actor 's dignity and autonomy . 
Thi s section first briefly explores the differing views of pe rsonal 
responsibility held by the law and mental health scientists . It then examines 
in general the degree to which crazy persons have less control over their 
behavior than normal persons . Finally, the section considers the two cru cial 
58. See, e.g. , Developments, supra no te 6, a t 12 12- 19 , 1228-35 (ana lys is o f the re leva nce 
to civil com mitmen t decisions o f va ri ous forms of lega ll y re leva nt incapac ity ca used by men ta l 
illne ss; co nte ntion tha t the policies be hind special treatme nt and due process are both sati s fi ed 
onl y if th e person treated specially is incapacitated as a result of me nt a l illness). 
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ques tions fo r the law : whe the r crazy pe rso ns a re responsibl e fo r their lega ll y 
re levant be hav ior a nd how thi s q ue stio n can be de te rmined . These ques ti o ns 
are analyzed by first examining the thres hold iss ue of the relatio nship 
between c raz iness a nd ot her legally re levant beha vi o r. It is concluded that 
whe ther a re la ti o nship e x is ts is a commonsense de te rminat ion . Then, o n the 
assumptio n that the re is a c le ar re la tionship betwee n craziness and legally 
re levant be hav io r, the sec ti o n e xplores w he the r and when the legally re le -
va nt behav io r was a prod uc t o f the ac to r's free choice . It is arg ued that c razy 
pe rsons do have a good dea l of cho ice abo ut the conseque nces o f their 
c raz iness, a nd aga in , the qu es tio n o f respo ns ibility is to be answered on 
moral and commo nsense g ro unds . 
1. S cientifi c and Legal Models of Personal R esponsibility 
T he concept s of free will o r persona l responsibility have littl e mean in g to 
me ntal health scie nti s ts , as sc ienti sts. Simpli s tically put, the sc ientifi c mod-
e l is de te rmini s ti c: all phe no mena, including behav ior , a re all egedl y the 
effects of their multiple inte racting a ntecedent causes. Acco rding to thi s 
model, human thoughts , feelings , and acti o ns are not the products o f free 
will directed by the ac to r ; rathe r , human behavior is the probabilistic 
outcome o f the m any biological, psychological, and social antecedent vari-
ables that have operated o n the pe rso n. 59 R esponsibility is thus a mora l term 
that is allegedly scie ntifica ll y irre levant. 60 The vario us model s of be havior 
assume that diffe rent causes are crucial for explaining behavior and that 
causality is extremely complex. All deterministic scientific models, how-
ever, view all behavior as phenomena subject to the same probabilistic laws 
as the rest of the phenomena of the universe . 
Scientis ts who are s tric t dete rminists a re aware that at present they are 
not able to specify a ll the antecede nt causes that w ould allow them to state 
59. J . M ACKIE, ETHICS 216 ( 1977); Dunham, supra note 40, at 147; W ender , On N ecessary 
and Sufficient Conditions in Psychiatric Explanation , 16 ARCHI VES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 41 
( 1967). The modern view of the determini sm thesi s recognizes th at there are no certain laws and 
that events are best under stood in terms of probabiliti es and contingencies. E . NAGEL, PRINCI-
PLES OF TH E TH EORY OF PROBABILITY 1-4 ( 1939); E . NAGEL, T HE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 73 -78 
( 196 1) . Determinism in modern sc ience also se rves as a regulati ve methodological principle that 
holds that it is useful to look for lawful relations between event s. A. KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF 
INQUIRY 124-25 ( 1964); E. NAGEL, supra , at 605-06 . See generally A . KAPLAN, supra , at 121-24 ; 
Edel, Psychiatry and Philosophy , in I A MERICAN H ANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 96 1, 964-66 (2d ed . 
S. Arieti ed. 1974). 
On the difficulty of f ormul at ing an adequate general theory of behavior , see Al exander , 
Th e Search fo r a Gen eral Theory of Behavior , 20 B EHAVIORAL SCI. 77 ( 1975). 
60. M. FELDMAN , CR I\ 11 N,\L BEHAVIOUR: A PSYCHOLOGICA L A NALYSIS 27 1 ( 1977); B . F . 
SKINN ER, BEYOND F REEDOM AND DIGNITY ( 197 1) : K atz , Law, Psychiatry, and Free Will , 22 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 397, 398 ( 1955) . But see M eehl , Psychology and the Criminal L a w , 5 U. RICH L. 
REV. I , 3 ( 1970) (c ritique of those w ho argue for th e sc ientific irrelevance o f responsibilit y). 
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perfec tl y the probabiliti es th at particular behavior will occur, but they 
believe that this is a result of lack of knowledge, not a flaw in principle in 
the sc ientific mode l. They believe th at when behavior can be perfectly 
predicted a nd contro lled , noti ons of responsibility w ill then w ither away. 61 
The lega l system takes a quite d iffe rent v iew of perso na l re spons ibility. 
Law is a normati ve enterprise that treats nearly all persons in all situatio ns as 
responsible for the ir acts and often for the natural and probable conse-
quences of those acts. 62 In most cases, the law adhe res to the commonsense 
a nd subjec ti ve ly experienced vie w that behavior is a matter of cho ice: it is 
the ac tor' s act. 63 Neverthe less, the law acknowledges that a ll persons are 
subjec ted to var ious biol og ica l, psychological, and sociocu ltural factors or 
press ures that affect their choices of action. A ll such fac tors affec t choices , 
making some choi ces easy and some hard. As a result, the law recognizes 
that so me behavioral choices may be too hard to serve as the bas is for the 
impos ition of legal responsibility. 64 For instance , in cases o f duress the law 
6 1. For the most strikingly optimistic a nd pe rhaps frightening e xample of this view, see 
B F . SKINNER, supra note 60. Some det e rmini s ts react to the prese nt incomple te s ta te of 
knowl eJge by beli ev ing that the o rderly fun c tioning of soc iet y re quires that perso ns be treated 
as if they were re spo ns ible for thei r behavio r , eve n if such treatm ent is based on a n allegedl y 
incorrect view of real it y . A. FL EW, supra note 40 , a t 95 -96 ; Ka tz, supra note 60 , a t 398-99. See 
genera lly Wae lJer, Psychiatry and th e Problem of Criminal Responsibility , I OJ U. PA. L. R Ev. 
378 ( 1952). In any case, the de termini s t does not be lie ve that lack of knowledge or a rejection of 
the behav ioris t app roach mean s behav ior is free: be havi o r is s till J e termined, but by unpl a nn ed 
a nd unknown de te rmina nts. M. FELD~AN , supra no te 60, at 272. 
62. United States v. Ceccolini, 98 S. C t. 1054, 1063 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring); see, 
e.g. , State v. Sikora , 44 N .J . 453, 476-79 , 210 A.2cl 193 , 205-07 (1965) (Weintraub , C.J. , 
co ncurring); J . H ALL , GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 455-58 (2d eel. 1960) (di scussion 
o f conflict of perspectives between law and mental hea lth scie nce). See generally Katz, supra 
note 60; Waelder, supra note 60. M ost lega l discuss ion of re sponsibility occurs in the c rimina l 
la w co ntext , but the assumptio n of responsibility holds ge nera lly . 
63. Morse, Th e Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Ba ze/on , 49 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 1247, 1251 -54 (1976). See generally W. LA F AVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMI~AL LAw 179-81 ( 1972). 
64. Morse, supra no te 63 , a t 125 1-54. See also H. L.A. H ART, P UN ISHMENT AN D R ESPONSI -
BILITY 15 ( 1968). 
T he spec ial features of Mitigation a re that a good reason fo r adm in is te rin g a less 
severe pe nalty is made out if the situatio n or mental state of the co nv icted crimina l is 
such tha t he was exposed to an unusual or s peciall y great tempt a tion , or hi s a bilit y to 
control hi s act io ns is thought to have been impa ired or weake ned otherw ise than by his 
ow n actions, so th at co nformity to th e la w whi ch he has broken was a matter of spec ial 
d ifficulty for him as compared with normal persons norma lly pl aced. 
!d. Presumabl y, if the actor 's abi lit y to conform to law is weake ned suffi cie ntl y, the law wo uld 
co nsider the ac tor co mple tely nonrespo nsib le. ld . at 14. 
It is recogni zed th at philosophers co ns ider s ubstant ive determinism to be an ali-or-none 
propos ition. Determini sm and indetermini s m. howe ver , are both unprovabl e. J. MACKI E, supra 
note 59, a t 2 16 . The law cannot proceed on th e assumptio n o f e ither . The law is a moral -
e valu ative institution th at mu st make dec ision s conce rning real world problems of human 
int e rac tion. Thu s , the law ca nnot afford to be phil osophica ll y pure , but mu s t adopt a com mo n-
se nse cosmology , co ngrue nt with ord inary e xperience a nd useful for mak ing dec isions . That 
va ri o us factors or pressures make some choices harder a nd ot hers eas ier a nd th at s uch fac to rs 
bear o n the moral a nd legal respon sib ility o f actors is certainly a co mmonsense vie w o f th e 
world that ac cords with ordina ry experie nce. See genera lly Ka tz , supra note 60. 
,·;wn] 
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excuses otherwise criminally culpable behavior not because the actor abso-
lutely lacked choice in a causal sense, but because socie ty feels the actor's 
choice to obey the law was too difficult to consider him culpable. In other 
ins tances, such as cases of automatism, the law reflect s the view that the 
acto r \vas not causally responsible for his behavi or; the act was not his and, 
the refo re , the actor cannot be morally and legall y responsible for his behav-
io r 65 
While ackno w ledging that some choices are so hard that it is inappro-
priate for society to ascribe responsibility for them to the actor, the legal 
sys te m allows few exception s to the rule that persons are causally and 
legally responsible for their behavior. But which cho ices are too hard? In 
another article, the author has analyzed this question as follows: 
There is no bright line between free and unfree ch o ices. Harder 
and easier choices a re arranged along a continuum of choice: there 
is no scientifically dictated cutting point where lega l and moral 
responsibility begins or ends. Nor is there a higher morai authority 
which can tell soc iety where to draw the line . All society can do is 
to de termine the cutting point that comports with our collective 
sense of morality. The real issue is where society ought to draw 
the line of responsibility-and by whom it should be drawn. 66 
The central question for our inquiry, then, is whether the choice to 
behave in legally relevant ways is too hard a choice for society fairly to 
ascribe moral and legal responsibility to actors whose legally relevant 
behavior seems caused by craziness. Throughout the analysis, this Article 
will adopt this commonsense model of harder and easier choices. 67 Scientif-
ic data will be relied on, but its relevance to legal determinations will be 
assessed in the light of this model. 
Although the legal system does not generally adopt a deterministic 
model of behavior, if an actor's behavior is apparently and inexplicably 
65. W. L AFAVE & A. Scorr , supra note 63, at 337-41 ; N. MORRIS & C. HOWARD, 
STUDI ES IN CRIMINAL L AW 6 1-73 (1964). 
66. Morse , supra note 63 , at 1253. 
67. This Article will not attempt to resolve either the philosophical dispute about free will 
and determinism or the philosophical and scientific quagmire of cau sation. Interested readers 
are referred to the following works , which have furnished the general background for much of 
the argument in this section. H. BLALOCK, CAUSAL INFERENCES IN NONEXPERIME1-ITAL R E-
SEARCH (1964); H.L.A. HART, supra note 64; A. KAPLAN, supra note 59; E. NAGEL, supra note 
59; D. O'CONNOR, FREE WILL (1971); K. POPPER, Of Clouds and Clocks, in OBJECTIVE KNOWL-
EDGE 206 (1972); A. ROSS, ON GUILT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNI SHMENT (1975); M. SUSSER, 
CAUSAL THINKING IN TH E H EALTH SCIENCES (1973); D ETERM!t--! IS'-1 AND FREEDOM (S. Hooked. 
1958); DETERMI NISM, FREE W ILL, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (G. Dworkin ed. 1970); E SSAYS 
ON FREEDOM OF ACTION (T. Honderich ed. 1973); FREED0\1 & RESPONSIBILITY 1-51 , 282-342 (H . 
Morris ed. 1961 ); FREE WILL AND D ETERMI NISM (B. Berofsky ed. 1966). 
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irrational and crazy, the law and also persons in general assume that because 
of mental disorder the actor was not in control of his behavior-that it was 
not chosen. 68 After all, the generally rational model of behavior held by 
most persons and the law is unable to explain how and why an actor would 
choose to behave inexplicably crazily. When the law adopts the intuitive and 
perhaps correct view that the crazy person has great difficulty controlling his 
behavior, the law comports with and is reinforced in its view by mental 
health science, even if the correspondence in view only extends to the class 
of persons considered crazy. 69 \Vhere there is such a correspondence of 
views, the legal system calls upon mental health experts to help resolve and 
legitimize the decision as to whether a crazy actor's legally relevant behav-
ior was caused by his mental disorder rather than by his free choice. 
It must be remembered, however, that although determinations of legal 
causation and responsibility rest in part on factual scientific notions of 
causation and responsibility, legal and scientific determinations are separ-
able and serve different purposes. Scientists may provide information about 
pressures and probabilities, but the legal system must determine for its own 
purposes when those pressures and probabilities are too great to hold the 
actor legally responsible for his behavior. 70 Although crazy behavior should 
perhaps be considered an illness for some purposes, doing so when the 
actor's moral and legal responsibility is in issue begs the question and 
prematurely ends the analysis. Are legally relevant behaviors simply uncon-
trollable symptoms? As noted, mental health laws assume that mental 
illness is such a powerful cause in fact that it robs actors of their free choice 
and thus renders them legally nonresponsible. Rather than accepting the 
validity of this assumption, this Article will examine in the succeeding 
sections the degree to which the law's assumption is founded in scientific 
fact and the extent to which mental health science provides assistance in 
deciding questions of both factual and legal responsibility. 
2. Craziness and the Causes and Control of Behavior 
Before we explore further the validity of the assumption that the 
behavior of crazy persons is more caused by uncontrollable antecedents than 
the behavior of normals, let us examine the nature of causes in general. 
Causes are antecedent variables that increase the probability that a later 
event will occur. Briefly, there are four types of causes: necessary and 
68. The causal hypothesis is expressed by locutions such as "'result of.·· "because of ... 
"due to," "incapacity," "unable," and the like . See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & lNST. CoDEs 5150 
(West Supp. 1978) 
69. See M. FELD\!AN, supra note 60, at 270. 
70. See generally Waelder, supra note 60; notes 62-67 and accompanying text supra. 
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sufficient, necessary , suffici e nt, and predisposing 71 A necessary and suffi-
cient cause is one that , by itse lf, invariably produces an effec t . A necessary 
cause is one that must be prese nt in order for the e ffect to be produced, even 
though the effec t may not occur unless o ther factor s are also present. A 
sufficient cause is one that , when present, will always produce the effect, 
but that is no t necessari ly prese nt in order for the effect to be produced. A 
predi sposing cause is one th at is neither invariably necessary to produce the 
effect nor capable of producing the e ffec t by it se lf. The predis pos ing cause 
can be prese nt w ithout producing the effect, and the e ffect can occ ur in the 
absence of the predisposing cause . If the predisposi ng cause does occur, 
however, the like lihood th at the effect will also occur is increased in 
proportion to the strength of the pred ispos ing cause. 
Nearl y all causes identified in the med ical and behavioral scie nces are 
of the predispos ing variety. There are almost no known necessary, o r 
necessary and sufficient causes , and few sufficient biological , psycholog i-
cal, or soc iolog ical causes that produce the occurrence of a ny behavior-
normal or abnormal- including behavior that is legally relevant for mental 
health law . 72 It is known only that there are predisposing causes that seem to 
increase the likelihood that an actor will behave crazily. 73 The central 
71. M. SUSS ER, supra note 67, at 45-47; R. WOODRUFF, D . GOODWI N, & S. Gu zE, 
supra note 29, at 187-88 . See generally E. NAGEL, supra note 59, at 73-78, 316-24; M. SUSSER, 
supra note 67. 
n.. M. SussFI<. s11pra no te 67, at 4 1-47; R. WOODRU FF, D. G OODW IN, & S. G uz E, supra 
note 29, at 187-88; see notes 24, 27-28 and acco mpa nying text supra. 
73 . See note 28 a nd acco mpa ny ing tex t supra. The majority o f known causes a re o nl y 
weakl y di sposi ng . Low socioeco nomic status a nd ge netic predisposition are good examp les. 
Epi demio logical stu d ies have co ns is tentl y de monstra ted th a t there a re highe r rate s of severe 
menta l di sorde r (a nd of violent be havior) in the lower socioeco no mic classes of society. B. P. 
DOH RENWEND & B.S. DoHR EN WEN D, supra note 38 , at 1-2 , 174-75. See also Dunha m, supra 
note 40 , at 15 1. On the higher rat es of viole nt criminal behavior in the lower soci oeconomic 
classes, see, e.g. , Raze lon , The Morality of the Criminal Law , 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 402-03 
(1976). The c lass difference is greate r tha n that predicted by chance. Y et, many crazy and 
viole nt perso ns are from higher cla sse s, and most lower c las s perso ns are neither crazy nor 
vio le nt. There is something about lowe r c lass membership tha t seems to increase th e probabil ity 
that a person will be have cra zily or vio lentl y , but lower cla ss membe rship is neither nece ssary 
nor suffi cient to produce e ither type of beh avior. It is poss ibl e that the sa me variable o r 
var iabl es th at acco unt for c raz ine ss a lso account fo r a drift into th e: lower c lass . See Dohren-
wend , Sociocultural and S ocial-Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Mental Disorders , 16 J. 
HEALTH & Soc. BEHA VI OR 365, 370-73 ( 1975) [he re inafte r cited as Sociocultural Factors]. 
Definitive interpretati o n of the correl at ion between social class and mental disorder is difficult , 
but one rea so nable interpretat ion o f the ev idence is that lower c lass membership is ii se lf a 
partial cause o f psyc hological diso rder. B.P. DOHRE~WEI\D & B.S. DOHR ENWEN D, supra no te 
38, a t 174-75; Socio cultural Factors , supra a t 365,382-87. B ut see Dunham , supra note 40 , at 
!55 . See generally Socio cultural Fa ctors, supra. 
A nother exampl e of a predi sposing factor is ge netic predispos ition to sc hizophre nia. See 
Gott es man & Shield s, A Critical Review of Recent Adoption, Twin, and Family Studies of 
Schizophrenia: Behavioral Genetics Perspecti ves, 2 SCHIZOPHRENI A BULL. 360 (1976) (the most 
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question for the legal system is which predisposing causes of what 
strength render an actor's choice too hard to asc ribe responsibility to him. 
a. The causes of behavior-crazy and noncrazy: The legal rationale 
for the assumption that the choice to behave norm1lly is too hard for crazy 
persons is based on the medical model of c razy behavior. This model 
distinguishes between crazy behavior itself (the symptom) and underlying 
conditions (the di sorder o r defect) that are assumed inexorab ly to cause the 
behavior. The medica l model's explanation of unfree crazy behavior is th at 
a person is unable to prevent the crazy behavior and its consequences caused 
by underlying mental disorder in the same way that he is unable to prevent 
the fever and its consequences caused by an underlying infection. The crazy 
person is believed unable to choose to behave normally and the infected 
person is believed un able to choose to lower his body temperature. 74 Thus, 
if the legally relevant behavior is caused primarily by mental disorder, it 
must not have been freely chosen ; the actor could not have done otherwise 
and is not legally responsible. 
recent rev ie w on the question); Wender , Rosenthal , Rainer, Greenhill, & Sarbin, supra note 28 , 
at 784 (1977). It is extremely difficult to se parate the influence of environmental and gene tic 
factors, but a series of studies in Denmark employing a methodology using adopted children has 
been quite successful in this regard. D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 28, at 78-85. Compare Benja-
min , A Reconsideration of the Kety and Associates Study of Genetic Factors in the Transmis-
sion of Schizophrenia , 133 AM. J. PsYCH IATRY 1129 (1976) (a forceful me thodological critique of 
those studies) with Kety, Studies Designed to Disentangle Genetic and Environmental Variables 
in Schizophrenia: Some Epistemological Questions and Answers, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1134 
(1976) (rebuttal to Benjamin) with Benjamin, A Reply to a Rebuttal, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1466 (1976). Although no abnormal genetic material has been discovered and the mode of 
genetic transmission of the predisposition to schizophren ia is not known, this writer believes 
that the evidence for a genetic predisposition is persuas ive, although not as definitive as its 
proponents claim. Interestingly, genetics do not seem implicated in infa ntile autism and child-
hood schizophrenia. Hanson & Gottesman, The Genetics, Jf Any, of Infantile Autism and 
Childhood Schizophrenia, 6 J. AUTISM & CHILDHOOD SCHIZOPHRENIA 209 (1976). For a review 
of the evidence for a genetic basis for affec tive disorders, see Gershon, Bunney, Leckma n, Van 
Eerdewegh , & DeBauc he, The Inheritance of Affective Disorders: A Review of Data and of 
Hypotheses, 6 BEHA VIOR GENETICS 227 ( 1976). See also Gershon, Baron , & Leckman, Genetic 
Models of the Transmission of Affective Disorders, 12 J. PsYCHIATRIC RESEARCH 301 (1975); 
Gershon & Bunney, The Question of X- Linkage in Bipolar Manic-Depressive Illness, 13 J. 
PSYCHIATRIC RESEARCH 99 (1976). See generally D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 28. 
Holding environmental factors constant , there is a greater probabilit y that an actor will 
behave sc hizophrenicall y crazily if he has a ge netic predisposition to that behavior. There is 
evidentl y some genetic factor that inc reases the probabil it y that an actor will behave crazily. 
Yet, many crazy persons see mingly do not have the genetic predisposition, and most persons 
who have the predispos ition are not crazy. Genetic predisposition to c raziness is neither 
neces sary nor sufficient to produce crazy behavior. Wender, Rosenthal, Rainer, Greenhill, & 
Sarlin , supra note 28 , at 78~. 
74. It is also believed that people can not voluntarily ex pose th e mse lves to mental illness 
in the same way that they can voluntarily expose themselves to phys ica l illness. 
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A major difficulty with this teach ing of the medica l model is that nearly 
always the presence or absence of proven underl ying disorders cannot be 
demonstrated. 75 Again, nearly always the only proven fact is that the person 
has behaved crazil y. Further, there is I ittl e or no ev idence to demonstrate 
that the predisposing causes of crazy behavior are any stronger than the 
predisposing causes of any other kind of behavior. Virtually no sufficient 
uncontrollable biol ogical , psychological, or soc iol ogical causes of any be-
havio r ha ve been discovered. 
No matter how quantitatively and qualitatively predisposing to particu-
lar behavior a variable may be, not all persons subject to that variable will 
behave in that way and many persons who do behave that way will not be 
subject to the variable. Indeed, the majority of persons subject to even the 
most predisposing vari ables now recog ni zed do not behave craz ily . 76 We do 
not know why people behave as they do. Both crazy behavior and normal 
behavior are presumably the probabilistic outcome of the ir anteceden ts , 
including motives and reasons of the actor, 77 and there is no scientific 
75. There are exceptions, of course. In a very small frac tion Llf cases (e.g., brain tumors. 
teniary syphili s), an unde rly ing ph ys ical disorder may be present a nd possibly cas ually rela ted 
to the c razy behav ior. In fact, it is a lleged that suc h pathology is pre se nt in a large proportion of 
di sorde red older persons . In these cases the mental di sorder, that is, the crazy behavior, is said 
to be "Caused by or Associated With Impairment o f Brain Ti ssue Fu nctio n ... DSM-11 , supra 
note 26 , a t 5. DSM-II a lso requires tha t the ph ys ical di sorders s hou ld be diagnosed separately. 
Jd. at 4. Thu s, such cases a re not cons ide red primarily as mental disorders, but as physical 
di so rde rs with behavioral correlates. 
Organic brain syndrome is often diagnosed on the bas is of behaviora l evide nce w ithout 
hard phys ica l ev idence o f brain pa tho logy. That is , it is assumed that people w ho behave like 
confirmed brain-damaged persons must themse lves have brain pa thology. Without hard evi-
dence it is difficult to know, however , whether brain pathology is present or not. Rates of 
diagnosis of o rganic brain syndrome (i n similar populations) vary wide ly across c ultures, and 
within our culture the relia bility of the diagnos is is no t as high as might be supposed . Alexande r , 
On Being Imposed Upon by Artful or Designing Persons-the California Experience with the 
In voluntary Placement of the Aged , 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1083, 1096-97 (1977) ; Helzer, 
Clayton, Pambak ian , Reich , Woodruff , & Reveley , supra note 47, a t 136-39 (using highl y 
explicit re searc h criteria , re liabili ty of diagnosi s o f organic bra in sy ndrome was determined to 
be on ly .29, a very low figure in itse lf a nd much lower tha n that fou nd in prev ious studies using 
less careful criteria). But see Sel tzer & Sherwin , "Organic Brain Syndromes": An Empirical 
Study and Critical Review, 135 A:--1. J. PSYC HIATRY 13, 18-20 ( 1978) (ge neral discussion ; hig h 
di agnos tic reliability using behavioral criteri a on ly) . 
DSM-III counsels that the be hav ior assumed to be caused by organic mental di sorde r is 
o nl y presu mpti ve ev ide nce of underlyi ng brain pathology that should be conf irmed by la bora-
tory test ing. DSM-III, supra note 26 , a t A: I . 
It is worth noting here that di scovery of a physical correlate o f c razy behavior does not 
mean that the phys ical correlate is invariably a cause or the only cause of such d isorde r or that 
the d isord ered be ha vio r is un control lable. See no te s 79-R3 a nd accompa ny ing text infra . 
76 . See notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra . 
77. It is quite natural and com mon to asc ribe causal efficacy to inte ntions , desires, 
reaso ns , moti ves , a nd othe r such mental s ta tes. Davidson , Symposium: Action: Actions, 
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reason to believe that either type is "more caused" in a physically uncon-
trollable se nse. 7R 
It is often argued that a biochemical or other uncontro llable cause of 
crazy behavior will be found . This disco very , it is supposed, will finally 
answer the ques tio ns of whether crazy behavior is a disease and whether 
crazy people are responsible for their disordered behavior and behavior 
related to it. Even if such causes of crazy behavior are discovered, however, 
the discovery should not itself compel the conclusion that crazy people are 
diseased and not responsible for their behavior. An example may better 
demonstrate the point. 
Each year mental health scientists report that a new subs tance has been 
discovered that is present in s ig nificantl y different amounts in the brains, 
blood , urine, or nervous systems of crazy people and normals 79 Let us 
assume that thi s year's finding s, or those of next year or the year thereafter, 
Reasons. and Causes, 60 J. PHILOSOPHY 685 (1963); see J. MACKIE, supra note 59, at 2 16. It is 
a lso as sumed that persons have control over their intentions or , at lea s t, tha t they have contro l 
over act ions tha t might be predicated on such intent ions. When an actor behaves c raz il y , 
however, it is assumed that he had little or no control over the formation of his crazy beliefs, 
reasons, impulses, or motives and that he has little or no control over actio ns that seem logically 
to be produced by th ose crazy beliefs, reasons, impul ses, or motive s. Ma ny , if not most, writers 
write as if the point were se lf-evident and needed no proof that the actor is unable, as opposed 
to unwilling, to con trol hi s behavior. See note 5 supra. Determining the validit y of these 
assumpt ions is the task of this section of this Article. 
78. The strength of this conclusion is bolstered by ev id e nce co ncerning the ability of so-
called " alcoholics" a nd "addicts" to resist their craving for alcohol o r drugs. It is widely 
belie ved that such persons cannot preven t themselves from taking tl:e substances. Even though 
the habitual use of such substances may create a great dependence on them, it seems quite clear 
that users ca n slOp if they choose to , a lbeit at the cos t of some emot ional and physical 
discomfort. See Fingarette, Addiction and Cn'minal Responsibility, 84 YALE L.J. 413 (1975); 
Fingarette, The Pen'ls of Powell: In Search of a Factual Foundation for the Disease Concept of 
Alcoholism , 83 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1970). Alcohol and drugs do not deprive their habitu a l users 
of all choice in regard to those substances, even if they make the choice to stop or cut down a 
very difficult one. Even if physical causes for beha vior are discovered, there is little reason to 
believe tha t , compared to other determinants of behav i o~, they are espec ially powerful or 
unco ntrollable. C/. Mostofsky & Balaschak, Psychobiological Control of Seizures, 84 PSYCHO-
LOGICAL BULL. 723, 723 (1977) (epileptic seizures can be controlled to some degree by psy-
chologica l methods) ; Schachter, The Interaction of Cognitive and Physiological Determin-
ants of Emotional State , in I ADVANCES IN E XPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 49, 64 (L. 
Berkowitz eel. 1964) (behavioral responses to biochemical interventio ns affected by socio-
psychological context and expectations). 
79. Schmeck, Opiate-Like Substan ces in Brain May Hold Clue to Pain and Mood, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 2, 1977 , §A, at I, col. 3; L.A. Times, Nov. 9, 1977, pt. I, at I , col. I. See also L.A. 
Times, Nov. 18, 1977 , pt. I , at I, col. I. Often it is also discovered that when the substance is 
inject ed into laboratory a nimals , the creatures behave crazily , become physicall y ill , or eve n 
die. But subsequent replication attempts in other laboratories nearly a lway s fail, or a n a rtifac t is 
discovered that explains the results of the original study. The search co ntinues , however, 
encouraged by persuasive evidence that there is a biological substrate for schizophrenia and 
affective disorder. 
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can be re p licated and are valid. Suppose that Biochemical Bl ip X (here inaf-
ter BBX) is fo und in the brains of schizophrenics sta ti s tica lly s ignificantly 
more ofte n than in the bra ins of normal s or other types o f crazy people . 
Suppose a lso th at it is establi shed th at the presence of BBX in the brain 
precede s c razy be hav ior ra ther th an th e reverse. Wh at wou ld such findings 
look like and what wou ld they mean '' 
1f the prior histo ry of medical and behavioral sc ience is a gu ide ,so we 
rn ay sa fely predict that BBX will not be found to be either a necessary m 
sufficient cau se of sc hi zophrenia. That is , some people who behave ju st li ke 
schizophrenics wi th BBX wi ll not have BBX present in their bra ins, an d 
some people w ith BBX w ill not behave schi zophrenicall y . O f course, a non-
BBX schizophrenic will still be conside red mentally ill bec::JUse he behaves 
sch izoph renicall y, and a BBX person who behaves norm~lll y w ill probabl y 
not be cons idered ill (although he may be conside red predi sposed to illness) 
unless BBX has pathological effects other than producing sc hi zophren ia. In 
sum, it w ill be fo und that BBX is a predi sposing o r facilitating cause o f 
schizophre nic behavior. When present , it s ig nificantl y increases the proba-
bility that the person will behave schizophrenically. 
But would discovery of BBX answer the question of whether schizo-
phrenia was a disease or any of the legal questions raised when schizo-
phrenia appears related to legally relevant behavior? Does finding a bio-
chemical predisposing cause of crazy behavior necessitate the conclusio n 
that the behavior is an illness or di sease or that other behavior related to it is 
an uncontrollable symptom? Whether or not a biochemical cause for crazy 
behavior is found does not y ield a definitive answer as to whether to call th at 
behavior an illness or di sease or to call its related behavioral consequences 
symptoms 81 All behavi or--crazy and noncrazy-presumably has biochem-
ical (as well as psychological and sociological) predisposing causes. We 
80 See notes 72-73 a nd accompa nying tex t supra. 
81. Whethe r or not schizo ph re nia was considered a dis ease , the di scovery o f BBX wo uld 
be enormou sly useful for a ll those who wi sh to preve nt or ameliorate sc hi zophrenic beha vior. 
Ano the r antidota l chemical could be c reated , Anti-BB X (ABBX) that blocks the effects of 
BBX. Of cou rse , the resu lt s of the use o f AB BX , as of a ll c he mical treat me nts , would probably 
be mix ed. Some perce nt age of BBX schizophrenics would be cured , some would not. Indeed , it 
wou ld then seem tha t the schizophrenia of uncured BB X schizophrenics was not caused by 
B BX but by something el se . Further, some BBX normal s who were taking A BBX proph ylacti-
cally wo uld begin to behav e sc hi zo phrenically regardless. Although these BBX normal s might 
be pred isposed to schizoph ren ia, when th ey beca me so de s pite ta king ABBX, the ir sc hizl>-
phrenia would seem to be ca used by something other than BBX . In ad di t io n , it might be so 
expen sive to test all schi zophrenics an d their re lati ves for BBX , that ABBX would be given 
in d iscriminately to all sch izo phrenics a nd their rel a ti ves eve n though ABBX would not work 
w ith non -BBX indi vi dual s. Finally, the use o f ABBX surely would cause side effe cts in some 
use rs. Still , disco very of BBX and subsequ e nt creati o n of ABBX would be a great boon to the 
accurate and efficient treat me nt of some persons who behave schizophrenicall y, whe ther o r not 
sc hi zop hren ia was consid ered a di sease . 
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search mainl y for th e bio logica l causes of crazy behavior, however, because 
we have chosen on other , soc ial grounds to consider crazy behavior illness, 
and illness is expected to have organic causes . 
Let us take another example. Great ana lyt ic abi lity (GAA) and me ntal 
diso rder arc both extreme fo rms of behavior found general ly in the popu l<.t-
tion , but of the two , onl y me ntal disorder is considered an illness (large ly 
because it is unsettling , inexpli cable, and often dysfunctional and pro-
d uc ti ve of sufferi ng). We search hard fo r the biochemical causes of c raz i-
ness, but we do not search for the biological causes of GAA because it is no t 
considered an illness. Bu t if researchers spent a century and enormous 
resources looking fo r th e biochemical cause, Biochemical Blip Y (here inaf-
te r BBY), that produces GAA, they would surely find it or some prom is ing 
leads to it. Of course, if BBY were found , we would not begin to conside r 
GAA an illness o r it s consequences uncontroll able sy mptoms. Cons idering 
any behavior to be an illness depends on social evaluation of the behavio r 
and analogizing it to ph ys ical dysfunction , suffe ring , mo rtality, and the like . 
Nor would BBY "soft-thinkers" be considered to have GAA. With o r 
without BBY, a person would be considered to have GAA only if hi s 
behavior demonstrated it by evidence of hard thinking. Schizophre ni a is 
considered an illness not because it has a bioche mical cause or because a ll of 
those who behave that way show biological defects. It is considered an 
illness because schizophreni c behavior tends to be interpersonally dysfunc-
tional and to cause schizophrenics and others to suffer psychologicall y . 
Now , would di scovery of BBX mean that persons with BBX are not 
responsible for their schi zophrenic behavior and its consequences? Even if 
we do consider certain behavior a disease and find some biochemical causes 
for it, does this mean that pe rsons behaving that way specially lack control 
over their behavior ? While the answer to the question is unknown, it seems 
clear that discovery of BBX is not dispositive. Some proportion of BBX 
indi viduals are normal: BBX is only predisposing to schizophrenia and is 
not necessary or sufficient. Still, we might decide as a moral matter that if 
Q% of BBX indi vi du als are also schizophrenic, BBX schizophrenics sho uld 
not be considered respo ns ible for their schi zophrenic behavior and its 
consequences . Thi s is fine so long as we are also willing to admit that if Q% 
of BBY individuals are also GAA, BBY GAA' s should not be considered 
responsible for the ir great analytic ability and its consequences. Thu s, if we 
do not wish to condemn BBX schizophrenics for the legally relevant conse-
quences of their schi zophrenic behavior, nei ther should we praise BBY 
GAA 's for the products of their great analytic abi lity. 82 Each has equally 
pred isposing biochemical causes and calling one an illness does not answe r 
82. Cf. J. R AWLS, A THEORY OF JU STICE 103-04 ( 197 1). 
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the question of responsibility. 
Who is to be considered responsible , for both positively and negatively 
valued behavior, does not depend on proof of some degree of biochemical or 
other causation . It depends on social evaluation of how predisposing the 
causes are. Finding biochemical or other causes for behavior does not 
dispose of the millenia! prob lem of free will and responsibility although it 
may provide data helpful in deciding moral and legal questions. Society can 
draw the line of responsibility wherever it chooses, but however we 
choose to evaluate the rela ti onshi p between various causes and responsibili-
ty, the evaluation of predisposing causes log ically should apply equally to 
both crazy and noncrazy behavior. 
In sum, in terms of our knowledge of the strength of predisposing 
uncontrollable causes, at present, there is little reason to believe that any 
behavior, noncrazy or crazy, is irresistible. Indeed, most of the alleged 
causes of crazy behavior are only weakly predisposing and craziness is only 
weak ly predisposing to legally relevant behavior. 83 Few causes are as strong-
83. See notes 24, 28, 71-73 and ac compa nying text supra and note 98 infra. A pertinent 
ques tion is often rai sed about cases where craziness and consequent legally relevant behavior 
appear closely related to physical disease . These cases a re rare and probably are best viewed as 
instances of physical disorder with behavioral correlates rather than cases primarily of menta l 
disorder. Such cases deserve discussion here, however, because they are one powerful 
paradigm of mental disorder. An understandable first impul se in such cases is to assume that 
the actor could not have behaved otherwise. This may be true in some instances, but rarely is it 
clearly so; the issue is more complex. 
Let us take an apparently clear example: suppose a previously normal person begins to act 
a typically hostile and strangel y suspicious and finally commits a violent act stemming from the 
hostility. It is discovered that the perso n has a brain tumor and neurologists agree that the tumor 
probably became large enough to exert significant pressure on his brain at about the time he 
s tarted to behave strangely. When the tumor is surgically removed , the defendant behaves like 
his old self once again. 
How should one analyze the questions of the defendant's ability to behave otherwise and 
his legal responsibility~ An immediate ly releva nt question would be what percentage of people 
with tumors of the same type behave as this defendant did. Suppose nearly all people with such 
tumors act strangely , but most behave harmlessly strangely. Or to make the case harder, 
suppose the vast maj or ity of such persons experience an uncharacteristic increase in hostility , 
but most of them control it or ex press it in trying but not legally relevant ways. Or to make the 
case easier, suppose few tumor sufferers of this sort experience serious pe rsonality changes 
a nd a lmost none be have in legally re levant ways. In a ll three cases, the tumor seems to be a 
predi sposing cause of some personality changes, and, indeed, in the first two cases it seems to 
be almost a sufficient cause of the uncharact erist ic strangeness or hostility , yet not a sufficient 
cause of lega ll y relevant behavior. 
In all three cases, the tumor is o nly a predisposing cause (of varying strength) of legally 
rele va nt behavior. Clearly o ther causes seem to be operating, including , perhaps, the actor 's 
characteristic self-control that is being sore ly tested by unusual feelings he cannot account for. 
If the tumor-suffering ac tor does behave criminally, the law might decide that hi s choice to 
co nform his behavior to law was too difficult to ascribe moral and legal respons ibility to him. In 
the absence of perfect corre la tion between physical disea se and resultant legally relevant 
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ly predispos ing as poverty is to criminal behav io r , ye t we do no t excuse the 
criminal behav ior of poor offenders. If a specif ic var iable ove r whi ch an 
acto r had no control, such as a brain les ion , or a spec ific interac ting set of 
vari ables was found to be antecedentl y present in every or nearl y every case 
of a parti cul ar type of crazy or legally re levant beha vi,) r, th en we might be 
inclined to say that the behavior was the uncontro ll able res ult o f the les ion-
that the les ion was a sufficient or near- suffic ient cause of the behavio r. But 
almos t no such invariant or near-in vari ant relationship has been discovered 
between beha vior and any causal facto r. In any case, it will be necessary for 
soc ie ty to make the moral dec ision as to whether the cause, no matte r how 
pred ispos ing , should excuse the ac tor from responsibil ity fo r hi s behav ior. 
fn thinking about the responsibility of persons fo r the ir behavio r , we 
are left with a moral and commonsense determination o f whether we 
be lieve the actor 's choice was too hard to asc ribe responsib ility to him. T o 
the extent that there is sc ientific data about the causes of be havio r, this may 
be helpful but it is not di spos iti ve. And , at present , too little is known in 
most cases about the causes of behavior for science to be of much help. Still , 
we be lieve that the choices of crazy persons to behave normally must be 
harder than the choices of normals because we believe th at no one would 
freely choose to behave crazily . We shall therefore next examine some 
further evidence bearing on the ability of crazy people to behave normally 
and rationally . 
b. Is the behavior of crazy people and normal people significantly 
different ?: Another approach to thinking about whether crazy persons have 
control over their behavior is to consider the total range of behavior emitted 
by crazy persons and then to compare thi s behavior broadly to that of 
supposedly normal persons. Three types of evidence are relevant here: (1) 
clinical observation of crazy people; (2) empirical research comparing crazy 
people to normal s; and (3) empirical research bearing directly o n the 
rationality and normality of crazy persons. If the differences be tween crazy 
people and normal s are not as great as one might suppose and if crazy 
persons have significant capacity for normal, rational behavior , then doubt 
must be cast on the hypo thesi s that crazy persons are vastly out of control of 
their behav ior. 
behavi o r , sc ie ntif ic e vide nce wo uld not su pport the inference that the de fe nda nt lac ked all 
abil ity to contro l h imse lf a mi to act withi n the law . S ee V irkku ne n , Nuutil a, & Huu sko, Brain 
Inju ry and Criminality, 38 DI SEASES NERVOUS SYS . 907 ( 1977). 
F inall y, if amo ng a ll acto rs wh o commit th e defe nda nt' s act , more ha ve a backgro und of 
b roke n ho mes tha n have a tumo r , o ne may wo nder why the law wo uld co ns id e r a tum o r but no t 
a broken ho rne re levant to respon s ibi lity . See Baze lon , supra note 73 , a t 394. 401-05 . 
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It is a striking clinical commonplace that crazy persons behave normal-
ly a great deal of the time and in many ways. Even when they are in the 
midst of a period of crazy behavior , much of their behavior will be normal. 
Further , between crazy periods crazy people are not reliabl y distinguishable 
from normal persons. 84 As a general matter , then , crazy people are by no 
means constan tly crazy and they are capable, even when behaving crazily, 
of also behaving normally and rationally. 
Most of the empirical research concerning craziness has attempted to 
demonstrate the difference between crazy persons and normals in a var iety 
of behavioral tasks. Two well-respected researchers recently reviewed 300 
such published studies of schizophrenia that appeared between 1959 and 
1973 in t\VO particularly prestigious and rigorous journals . 85 The objective 
of the review was to determine if the enormous amount of research during 
the period covered had identified any stable, objective behavioral correlates 
of schizophrenia. 
If I had to make a general statement about the results of the 
300 s tudies, I would say that most of the investigations show small 
differences that favor the normal sample. That is, normals on the 
average get "better" scores . A few studies report no differences, 
and at least one reports a difference where the normals do worse. 
The statistical operations are designed only to show th a t the small 
differences between averages of the samples are probably not 
rel ated to chance factors. . . . 
So long as there is a statistically reliable difference between 
the means of the two samples (no matter how small) , the inves-
tigator implies or asserts a claim for the validity of hi s model and 
then makes the logically inappropriate inference that schizophren-
ics function differently from normals. From inspection of the 
data it is clear that most schizophrenics function no differently on 
these experimental tests from most normals . It would be the height 
of folly to try to identify a person as schizophrenic or normal by his 
score on any known experimental variable. This is an alternative 
way of saying that every study contains a high proportion of cases 
that are counter-instances to the predictions of the particular 
hypothesis. 86 
84. Lehmann, Schizophrenia: Clinical Features, in Co\1PRE HE NSIVE TEXTBOOK OF Psv-
CHIATRY-11 , supra note 26, at 892. See also A. BECK, DEPRESSION : CLI NICAL, THEORETICAL AND 
EXPERIMENTAL ASPECTS 44-56 ( 1967). 
85. The reviewers were T.R. Sarbin and J.C. Mancuso. The re sult s of the review are 
reponed in T . Sarbin , Ideologica l Restraints on the Science of Deviant Conduct 14-15 (Apr. 19, 
1975) (unpublished ms.) (on file with the Southern California Law Review ). The journals 
reviewed were the Journal of Abnormal Psychology and its predecessor, the JoumrJl of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology. 
86. T. Sarbin, supra note 85, at 15-16 (emphasis in original). 
The stati stical tests are not designed to locate the subjects preci se ly as belonging to 
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Similar findings have been made with respect to affective disorders. 87 
In sum, those behavioral deficits that are hypothesized to be character-
istic of the most common severe disorders are ranged along a continuum of 
severity and are ubiquitously present in the normal population. The inability 
to think straight, pay attention, process information, perform soc ial tasks 
cornpetently, and the like is hardly unique to crazy people. Few, if any, 
formal, measurable behavioral deficits seem uniquely and inexorably to lead 
to craziness or to consequent legally relevant behavior. 
Another type of empirical evidence bearing on the capability of crazy 
persons to behave normally and rationally is found in two programs of 
research done on hospitalized crazy persons-those who are usually the 
most crazy. The first deals with "impression management, " 88 the ability of 
the class "schizophrenia" or to the class "normal.·· With this standard procedure, the 
distributions of the scores for schizophrenics and for normals on the experimental 
tasks can be nearly identical. 
!d. at 15 (emphasis in original). 
Of course, the validity of all the studies reviewed by Sarbin and Mancuso depended on 
the accurate differentiation of the two groups being compared-schizophrenics and normals. 
Sarbin doubts whether such differentiation is theoretically and practically possible, but as-
sumes for purposes of the review that it is. See also note 25 supra. Even thought disorder, the 
symptom allegedly most unique to schizophrenia, is regularly found in the normal population. 
See Harrow & Quinlan , Is Disordered Thinking Unique to Schizophrenia?, 34 ARCHIVES OF 
GEC:ERAL PsYCHIATRY 15, 19-21 (1977). Another reviewer found that when schizophrenics 
showed greater thought disorder than normals, in some cases it could easily be modified , 
leading to the possible conclusion that thought disorder was not a valid indicator of schizo-
phrenia . K. SALZINGER, SCHIZOPHRENIA: BEHAVIORAL ASPECTS 64-65 (1973). Almost none of the 
formal cognitive or motivational variables studied would seem to be the sorts of behaviors that 
would inexorably lead to legally relevant behavior in any case. 
87. See, e.g., A. BECK, supra note 84, at 228 (conclusion from the studies reviewed 
disputed on the basis of one study performed by the author, but this study is too flawed 
methodologically to count as significant contrary evidence); Andreasen, Do Depressed Patients 
Show Thought Disorder?, 163 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 186 (1976) (limited definition of 
thought disorder; nonpsychotic sample although some subjects had endogenous phenomenolo-
gy). But see Braff & Beck, Thinking Disorder in Depression, 31 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL 
PsYCHIATRY 456, 458-59 (1974) (rather limited definition of thought disorder; depressives 
showed greater abstract thought deficit than normals, but less than schizophrenics; but depres-
sion in depressives positively correlated with abstract thought). Fewer empirical studies have 
compared normals to persons with affective disorders than have compared normals to persons 
with schizophrenia. Even if persons with affective disorders have cognitive defic its such as 
thought disorder, however, it is clear that normals have such deficits as well. See note 86 and 
accompanying text supra. 
Of course, depressed persons will tend to be generally le ss activated and "motivated" than 
nondepressed persons, but many nondepressed persons have similarly low levels of activation 
and motivation. Indeed, it is. unclear where one places the cutting point for distinguishing 
normal low mood from affective disorder. See Klerman, Overview of Depression, in COMPRE-
HENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY-II, supra note 26, at !007. 
88. See generally E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EV ERYDAY LIFE 208-37 
( 1959). 
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hospitalized patients to manipulate the craziness of their own behavior in 
order to maneuver hospital personnel so that the patients will attain their 
goals. For example, many patients, even quite crazy ones, are able to 
convince their hospitals that they are crazy or not in order to remain in 
hospital or gain releases9 
Some patients are arguably unaware of their manipulations, a possibili-
ty that has led some commentators to claim with some justification that such 
unself-conscious behavior is not evidence of the patients' ability to cope 
rationally with their environment. 90 This argument, however , proves too 
much. The inability to identify correctly and be aware of one's "real ' ' 
reasons for action is hardly evidence of irrationality or abnormality; if it 
were, the class of persons considered abnormal would expand considerably. 
Indeed, some researchers claim that correct identification and awareness of 
the reasons for one's action are the exception rather than the rule. 91 Further, 
it is not certain that some patients are totally unaware of what they are 
doing; many are so aware. 
The second research program bearing on the rationality of crazy per-
sons involves "token economies," behavior modification regimens wherein 
institutionalized mental patients are rewarded for approved behavior by 
being given tokens such as points or poker chips. The tokens can then be 
used to purchase desired goods or increased privileges. 92 Token economies 
89. B. BRAGINSKY, D. BRAGINSKY, & R. RING, METHODS OF MADNESS: THE MENTAL 
HoSPITAL AS A LAST RESORT 49-74 (1969); Fontana, Machiavellianism and Manipulation in the 
Mental Patient Role, 39 J. PERSONALITY 252 (1971); Martin, Hunter, & Moore, Pulling the Wool: 
Impression-Management Among Hospitalized Schizophrenics, 2 RESEARCH CoM. PSYCHOLOGY, 
PsYCHIATRY & BEHAVIOR 21 (1977); Martin, Sterne, & Moore, Impression-Management Among 
Hospitalized Acute Schizophrenics: A Follow-Up Study , 2 RESEARCH CoM. PsYCHOLOGY, 
PsYCHIATRY & BEHAVIOR 91 ( 1977). But cf. Watson, Impression Management Ability in Psychi-
atric Hospital Samples and Normals, 43 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 540 ( 1975) 
(schizophrenics can manage impressions but not as successfully as normals). Since some 
writers claim that the patients are feigning normality or feigning craziness, this raises the 
question of how this can be determined in the absence of objective indicators of pathology. 
90. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 14, at 1485-87. 
91. Nisbett & Wilson, Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental 
Processes, 84 PsYCHOLOGICAL REV. 231 (1977). It might reasonably be claimed that the unself-
conscious ability to manipulate one's environment is a sign of high social competence. Cf. 
Anthony, Malingering as Role Taking, 32 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 32 ( 1976) (positive relation-
ship between intelligence and simulation of roles). See generally H. FINGARETIE, SELF DECEP-
TION ( 1969). Psychoanalysts believe, of course, that a vast proportion of everyone's causal 
motivations is unconscious and irrational. 
9~. T. AYLLON & N. AZRIN, THE TOKEN ECONOMY: A MOTIVATION.~L SYSTE~I f'OR 
THERAPY AND REHABILITATION (1968). The possible legal implications of token economies have 
not escaped attention. Friedman , Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior Analysis in Mental 
Institutions and Prisons, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 39 (1975); Wexler, Token and Tahoo: Behavior 
Modification, Token Economies and the Law, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 81 (1973). For a useful series 
of articles dealing generally with behavior modification techniques in closed institutions, see 
Viewpoints on Behavioral Issues in Closed Institutions, 17 ARIZ. L. REv. 1-143 ( 1975). 
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are of ten effective; patients do change their behavior in the des ired ways 9 3 
A lthough cast in the theore ti cal te rms o f ope rant psychology, the programs 
can also be characterized as positing a rational, economic theory of human 
behavio r. Patien ts respond to changes in relative prices and wages as 
econo mic theory pred icts normal pe rsons will respond;94 th at is , patients act 
to maximize the ir ex pected utilitie s . The effectiveness o f token economie s 
and the ir confo rmity ro " rat iona l pe rso n " economic models is furthe r 
evidence that c razy persons are capable of behaving as rati o nal be ings w hen 
they are o ffer ee! the incenti ves to do so. 
T hu s , a grea t deal o f evidence indicates that crazy persons are capable 
of behaving normally and rat iona lly, and that they are no t very diffe rent 
from norma ls in terms of behavioral def icits o r background var iab les. T h is 
ev idence suggests that many c razy people can behave normall y or contro l 
themse lves when they choose to do so . A t the least, one can in fe r tha t the 
behavioral control of crazy persons is not an all-or-nothing pheno menon and 
that it is ranged al ong a continuum. Ve ry fe w, if any, crazy people seem to 
have no control and most appear to have a great deal. 
Thi s Article does no t contend that peop le who are considered crazy are 
no differe nt from people who are considered normal. Some crazy perso ns do 
seem tot all y or near totally diffe rent from mos t people . It is s imply unbe lie v-
able to most persons that people who are ha llucinatory or delusional have 
substanti al control over their crazy behavi or , or over behavior that is directly 
re lated to the crazy behav ior. For some crazy people, behaving normally or 
controlling behavior rel ated to the ir craziness may be extremely difficult. 
Little hard evidence indicates, however , that crazy persons cannot control 
much of their craziness, or at least other behavior related to their craziness. 
Claiming that crazy persons could not do otherwise is little more than 
an intuitive hunch , a post hoc moral justification employed to reach the 
result of differential legal treatment. The widely held hunch that the choice 
of crazy persons to behave normally or that to control behav io r related to 
93. See Gripp & Magaro , The Token Economy Program in the Psychiatn·c Hospital: A 
Review and Analysis, 12 BEH AVIOUR RESEARCH & TH ERAPY 205 (1 974); note 92 supra. For a 
less pos itive anal ysis of token econom ies, see Hersen , Token Economies in Institutional 
Settings: Historical, Political, Deprivation , Ethical and Generalization Issues, 162 J. NERvous 
& MENTAL. DISEASE 206 ( ! 976). 
94. Fisher, Winkler, Kras ner , Kage l, Battal io, & Basmann, Implications for Concepts of 
Psychopathology of Studies of Economic Principles in Behavior Therapy Programs, 166 J. 
N ER VOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 187 , 19 1-93 (1978); see Milby, Cla rke , Charles, & Willcur, Token 
Economy Process Variable: Effect of Increasing and Decreasing the Critical Range of Savings , 
8 B EHAVIOR THERAPY 137 ( 1977) and sources cited therein; cf. Gagnon & Davison, Asylums, 
The Token Economy and the Metrics of Economic Life, 7 BEHAV IOR T HERAPY 528 ( 1976) 
(cr itique of the usefulness of teaching patients economic rationa lit y). 
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craziness is a very hard choice may be correct , but beha vioral sc ie nce has 
not furnished persuasive proof of this. Even in the seemingly easiest cases of 
ex treme disorder, no one can be sure that the ac tor could not have behaved 
otherwise (although it might have take n great effort to do so). With this in 
mind, let us turn to the question of the casual re lationship between craziness 
and legally re levant behavior. 
3. Is Craziness the Ca use of L egally Relevant Behavior ? 
The behaviors referred to in the second component of mental health law 
standards such as dangerousness , inability to appreciate the nature of one's 
actio ns, inability to assist one's criminal defense counsel , or lack of ability 
to manage one's property are all maladaptive behaviors. In these instances, 
respec tively , civil commitment , a defense to criminal responsibility , incom-
petence to s tand tr ia l, or conservatorship can result if the behav iors 
were rel ated to and legally caused by mental illness; the behavior must be so 
clearly caused by the mental disorder that socie ty and the law can no longer 
ascribe causal responsibility to the actor 's free choice. 
It must be shown that the actor could not do otherwise. Persons who are 
capable of controlling the ir behavior are considered fully responsible and, 
within the usual legal limits, are allowed to behave as irrationally or 
irresponsibly as they wish; the law does not treat such people specially. 
Unless there is a causal nexus be tween the mental disorder and the other 
criteria, mental health laws should not apply because it is assumed that there 
is something legally special only about behavior that is primarily caused by 
mental disorder and not by autonomous choice. The questions, then , are 
how can the relational and causal nexuses be demonstrated and who should 
make such determinations . 
The threshold issue for deciding if the actor could do otherwise is 
whether there is a relationship between the actor 's mental disorder and the 
o ther legally relevant behavioral criterion. If the relationship exists , the 
case may be appropriate for mental health law adjudication because the 
legally relevant behavior may be a product of the mental illness and there-
fore not freely chosen. 
Although a person has acted crazily in some ways on some occasions, 
all his behavior is not necessarily the product of craziness. If we were to 
conclude otherwise, we should also have to assume that a crazy person's 
normal behavior is the result of the person's craziness. The actor may be 
crazy, but if his legally relevant behavior is not the product of or at least 
affected by craziness, there is little reason to believe that the other behavior 
was not freely chosen . If the actor freely chose his legally relevant behavior, 
the usual legal rules, not special mental health rules, should be applied to the 
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actor. 
This Article has argued that mental disorder is really crazy behavior of 
usually unknown origin. Thus, when one asks if mental illness is the cause 
of or is related to legally relevant behavior, one is really asking when 
behavior causes or is related to other behavior. That is, when are crazy 
thoughts, feelings, or actions the cause of legally relevant thoughts, feel-
ings, and actions? Stated this way, three types of relationships between 
mental disorder and legally relevant behavior may be distinguished. 
I. Clear relationship-e.g., a paranoid attacks someone who is 
not an enemy but who is part of the paranoid's delusional 
system. 
2. No relationship-e.g., a paranoid who self-defensively strikes 
a person who has attacked the paranoid without provocation. 
Even paranoids have real enemies. 
3. Unapparent but assumed relationship-i.e., where the legally 
relevant behavior itself seems crazy but where there is no 
other independent and significant evidence of craziness, e.g., 
cases of alleged impulse disorder such as inexplicable violent 
outbursts. 
Before we can consider whether legally relevant behavior is caused by 
craziness, we must first make the threshold determination that there is a 
relationship of some type between craziness and the legally relevant behav-
ior. How is the presence or absence of the relationship determined? Are 
mental health experts needed to help make this determination? 
a. Crazy behavior clearly related to legally relevant behavior: A 
clear case is presented where crazy behavior, such as a belief in hostile 
enemy agents, is the obvious precursor to legally relevant behavior, such 
as killing a victim sincerely believed to be an agent. If the defendant is not 
lying about his beliefs, he is clearly crazy and his particular crazy behavior 
is beyond doubt related to the legally relevant behavior, the killing. 
Do we need an expert to help us determine that a relationship exists in 
this case? No test will demonstrate the presence or absence of a mental 
disorder other than the behavior-the crazy belief itself. We clearly do not 
need an expert to tell us that this particular belief is crazy or that it is related 
to the legally relevant behavior. We might question the person's sincerity 
with respect to his beliefs, but sincerity and truthfulness are not the special 
province of mental health experts. There is no underlying disorder whose 
presence or absence tells them or judges and juries if this crazy belief is ''for 
real." We should probably be inclined to trust the defendant's sincerity if, 
for example, he had also entertained other crazy beliefs or had consistently 
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demonstrated this belief. Again, there are no tests; we observe the behavior 
or hear evidence about it, and then decide if it is crazy and related to the 
legally relevant behavior. 
b. Crazy behavior seemingly unrelated ro legally relevant behavior: 
The second case is where there seems to be no relati onship between the 
actor ' s crazy behavior and other behavior that sati sfies the behavioral 
component of the mental health laws . Behaviors that satisfy the behavioral 
component of mental health laws are usually maladaptive, but they are not 
necessarily crazy behaviors. The behavioral standard of "dangerous to 
others" is an example of behavior that need not be crazy in the sense that we 
are using the term "crazy." For instance, an organized crime "hit man" is 
not necessarily crazy, nor is his dangerous behavior seemingly crazy in 
itself. 
Now consider the case of a generally nondangerous paranoid who gets 
into a fight with a person he considers an enemy for reasons totally unrelated 
to his paranoia. It would strain plausibility to assume that the fight was a 
result of the paranoia. 
Consider the harder case of an actor who is both crazy and generally 
dangerous in a noncrazy way. For instance, a person may have very crazy 
beliefs and also be temperamentally hostile, becoming quite assaultive when 
crossed, including when crossed about matters unrelated to his crazy beliefs. 
If this person did not have queer beliefs, he would be considered difficult, 
dangerous, and perhaps rather evil. Because of the queer beliefs, however, 
it will often be claimed that he is dangerous because he is crazy. Such a 
claim could only be proved by establishing the existence of an underlying 
mental disorder that allegedly causes both the craziness and the tempera-
mental hostility. We have seen, however, that claims about the existence of 
such underlying states are, in nearly all cases, unprovable speculations. 
Finding the link between craziness and legally relevant behavior in 
either of the examples just described would necessitate relying on the 
assumption that when a person exhibits any crazy behavior, all of his 
socially deviant behavior must also be related to his craziness. 95 Such 
assumptions are often made in order to reach a particular result such as 
commitment of the dangerous person . But no scientific evidence presently 
demonstrates the existence of relationships between underlying mental dis-
95. This assumption is especially unlikely in view of the fact that even the craziest 
persons behave normally in a great number of ways and a great amount of the time. Indeed, 
in many if not most respects , crazy persons are more like normals than unlike them. See notes 
84-94 and accompanying text supra. 
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orders and two seemingly unrelated behaviors, one of which is crazy. Thu s , 
the re is no scientifi call y based rationale for appl ying the mental health law 
in such cases and no need for experts to theorize about the presence of 
all egedl y underl y ing connections. 
c . Crazy legally relevant behavior : The third case ari ses when the 
behav ioral criterion of a mental health law is satisfied by behavior that is 
arguably crazy, but where there is no other significant , independent 
evidence of craziness . Inexplicable or seemingly random assaulti ve behav-
ior is a good example. Consider the case of a person who attacks others o nl y 
when he fee ls li ke it or when he has inexplicable rages and for no other 
rati onal reason. Or , consider a person who mutil ates himself for no apparent 
reaso n. Such behavior is dangerous , deviant , disturbing, and may be 
deemed crazy by some persons . If , however , the ac tor g ives no other 
evidence of crazy thoughts , feelings, or ac tions , is the actor crazy , and if so, 
is the craz iness related to his violent behavior ? In thi s case , as usual , an 
expert cannot tell us whether the person suffers from an underlying mental 
disorder that causes the violence, and without the assaultive behavior the re 
is no other evidence of craziness. In order for the mental health law to be 
applied here , laypersons must simply decide that the person is or must be 
crazy because the behavior that satisfies the "dangerousness " standard is so 
crazy in itself. 
Absent independent evidence of craziness, however , a tautological 
conclusion must be reached to apply the mental health law. For instance , we 
decide that the ac tor is crazy because he is randomly assaultive . Why is he 
assaultive? Because he must be crazy. The relationship is found on the basis 
of c ircular reasoning . Such an outcome is possible and occurs regularly 
because a vast number of persons , including many, if not most , mental 
health professionals, probably feel that such behavior is evidence of mental 
disorder. 96 That is, most people believe that no rational person would 
choose randomly to hurt others or himself because he feel s like it. Rathe r , 
they believe that the person must be crazy. The relationship of craziness to 
legall y relevant behavior is not apparent here , but many assume it is present. 
96. T his author knows of no e mpirica l stud y bearing directl y on thi s po int , but it fo ll ows 
logicall y f ro m the definiti on of c razi ness itse lf and fro m the ge nera l a ttitudes of psyc hi a tr is ts 
and the public to such behav io r. S ee note 3 supra. Such be havior will be conside red queer o r 
odd or as ev ide nce that some thing is wrong un le ss a coherent explanatio n can be given fo r it. 
See J. FEINBERG, supra note 39, at 285-89; Me cha nic, supra note 4 , a t 22; Moo re, supra note 
14 , a t 1485. 
The hypothe tica l in the text rul es out the possibilit y of a coherent expla na tion . The notion 
that so mething is wrong in this case would be rein fo rced by the stereo type tha t c razy persons 
are dangerous a nd un predi ctable. S ee sources cited in note 3 supra. The Ja ck of a cohere nt 
ex pla nati on toge the r with the s te reotypes will a lmost certa inl y lead both laypersons a nd ex pe rt s 
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Now, whether or not random violence or any other behavior is crazy in 
itself plainly is not a sc ientific matter; it is a matter of cultural expectati o ns , 
and thus can be assessed by any member of society. In all cases, the 
de termination of whether the legall y relevant behavior is crazy per se or is 
re lated to crazin ess is a commonsense dete rmination. There are no sc ientific 
tes ts to demonstrate underlying connect ions; observable relationships can be 
evaluated by anyone 97 
4. Is Craziness th e Un controllable Cause of 
L egally R elevam Behavior ? 
As we have seen, craz iness is not invariantly related to legally rel evant 
behavior. Most crazy perso ns do not behave in legally relevant ways such as 
dangerously or incompe tentl y. 98 Further , many people who are not crazy do 
behave in those ways. The conclusion that an actor is crazy does not compel 
the further conc lusions that hi s legally re le vant behavior was uncontroll ably 
caused by his craziness, or, even , that the behavior was related to the 
craziness. If all or nearly all crazy persons were found to behave in a 
particular legally relevant manner and such behavior ne ver or rarely oc-
curred in the absence of craziness, then we might be inclined to say that in 
general the behavior was perhaps caused by the craziness, especially if the 
to the co nclu s ion tha t such behav ior is crazy and evidence of illness. Of course, some people 
might also co nsider it evil. 
97. An interesting exa mple that may see m to disprove some aspec ts of the th es is of thi s 
section is prese nted by Dr. Bernard Diamond . The crazy behavior he di scussed was the killing 
of an 8-week-old infa nt by its mother who fe lt that she was unable . to care properly for the 
baby a nd that there fore it was be tter off dead. The woman did not seem menta lly ill at the time 
of her psyc hiatr ic examinat ions and evidently she had been in contact with reality at the time of 
the killing. All the doctors ass umed , however, tha t she must have been crazy beca use she had 
behaved craz il y in similar c ircumstances in the pas t: immediate ly afte r th e birth of her first 
child, she had behaved in a terribl y depressed and disorganized fas hion . Further , psychologica l 
tests (we are not told which) supported the alleged presence of a residual schizophrenic 
di sorder . Thus, it may see m tha t experts were necessary to demonstrate the relatio nship of an 
underlying mental d isorder to the killing where no relationship was o therwi se evident. Dia-
mond , Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill , 14 STAN. L. R EV. 59, 61-62 (1961). 
Thi s Arti c le co ntend s, however, that no expe rts we re needed . Even if the woman had 
be haved crazily in the past, there is no evidence that she was still behaving crazily a t the time of 
the killing-except, perhaps, for the killing itself. The evidence from the psychological tes ts 
is almost certa inly inconclusive because of general reliability and validity problems. A ssume, 
however, tha t she was able to demonstrate independentl y of the killing that she was under 
te rrible stress foll owing the birth of the second infant. Putting a ll the facts togethe r , one might 
reasonably infer a nd conclude tha t afte r the second birth she was under enormous s tress a nd 
not herself even though she was not behaving c razil y. Under such circumstances, it might seem 
just to mitigate he r culpability or pe rhaps excuse her actions altogether. There is no persuasive 
ev idence , howe ver, that the killing, crazy as it may seem compared to the usual maternal 
response, was re lated to an underlying mental di sorde r. No ti ce too that no expert ise was 
necessary to colle ct the crucial data or to draw the critical infere nces. The co nclu sions of the 
expert s about underlying diseases were unproved speculations and ad ded very little to th e 
co mmonsense moral evalua tion that needed to be made. 
98. See Buchsbaum , Hai e r , & Murphy, Suicide Attempts, Platelet Monoamine Oxidase 
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rel at ionship between the craziness and the legally relevant behavior was 
clear. But no such invariant or near invar iant rel at ionship has been dis-
covered between craziness and lega lly relevant behavior. As a general 
mat ter, then , craziness is perhaps pred isposing to legall y relevant behav iors , 
such as incompetence and dangerou sness, but not more pred ispos ing tha n 
many variables affecting normal perso ns who behave in the same way . 
Still, the law is concerned with specific cases where an actor may be 
clearly crazy and where the craziness is clearly related to legally re levant 
behavior. Even if , as a general rul e, craz iness is only predisposing to legally 
relevant behavior , in specific cases where craziness is clearl y re la ted to 
legally relevant behavior how does one dec ide if the actor could have 
behaved otherwise ? In terms of responsibili ty, how should one concep-
tualize the individual case of clear relationship between craziness and 
legally relevant behavior (e .g., killing someone because it is believed that 
the victim is a hostile enemy agent)? Is the paranoid capable of 
attending to and weighing information contra to the delusional belief , or at 
leas t controlling overt action based on the belief? These questions may 
seem strange, but their answers are at the theoretical base of why such 
persons are treated specially. The questions seem strange, especially to 
mental health clinicians, largely because mental health scientists and layper-
sons alike assume they know the answers despite the lack of what most 
would consider acceptable scientific proof. 
Individual cases of clear relationship may be separated into two types: 
crazy urges and crazy reasons. In each case, this section considers the 
particular factors that help one decide whether the actor could have behaved 
otherwise . Even assuming that the craziness was a causal variable, the 
critical question remains: Was the crazy urge uncontrollable or was the 
crazy reason and the legally relevant behavior based on it the inexorable 
result of a disturbed mind?99 
and the Average Evoked Response, 56 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCAN D!NAY ICA 69 , 70 (1977) (suicide 
not a specific symptom of a parti cu lar mental disorder, including affecti ve disorders, or of 
menta l disorder in general; rates of s uicide co nsiderably highe r a mong me nta l patien ts than 
among norma ls, but only small percentage of patient s atte mpt or succeed in suicide); Lagos, 
Perlmutter , & Saexinger, Fear of the Mentally II/: Empin'cal Support for the Common Man 's 
Response, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1134 (1977) (li terature revi ew a nd d isc us s ion; origi nal 
empirical stud y too fl awed to a llow a ny significant co nc lu sions to be dra wn therefro m); 
Virkkunen , N uutila, & Huusko, Effect of Brain Injury on Social Adaptability , 53 ACTA 
PsYCH IATRI CA SCANDINAYICA 168 ( 1976) (certain brain injuries do not lead to reliable co nclu-
s ions abou t how a previous ly hea lth y person wi ll be affected in the long run or whe ther s uc h 
inju ries lead to criminal behavior) ; sources c ited in note 24 supra. Mental illness is so weakl y 
correlated with most lega lly releva nt behavio r that knowing a subject is crazy does not help 
pred ict with substantia l accuracy his future legally re levant behavio r. See generally notes 116-
44 infra. 
99. Crazy urges (i.e., impul ses, feelings) and crazy reasons are the phrases used in thi s 
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a . Crazy urges: The case of crazy urges refers to what is usually 
termed an " irres istible impulse." The actor may be perfectly rational 
cogniti ve ly , but he feels as if he must carry out a particular behav ior and that 
he cannot prevent himse lf from doing so . He may be quite aware that the 
ac tion he fee ls compe ll ed to pe rform is wei rd , dev iant, immora l, maladap-
ti ve, or the 1 ike . S ti II , he feels incapable of behav ing otherwise . If the 
behavio r felt to be compelled is weird, deviant, or immoral, we are inclined 
to be lieve that the urge is crazy, because no one would desire to behave in 
those ways when he comprehe nds how those behav iors we re assessee!. The 
pro totypical case of a crazy urge is the sexual deviant, e.g. , a chile! 
moleste r, who knows that hi s ac tions are viewed as sick or evil (or both) by 
most persons, and yet who feels an overwhelming desire to molest chil-
dren . 100 
Is the child molester's behavior the irres istible effect of hi s crazy urge ? 
To a nalyze this ques tion we must first ask the threshold question of whether 
the ac tor's crazy urge is related to mental illness. This case is a clear 
example of the situation where craz iness is diagnosed because the legally 
relevant behavior seems crazy itself and where no other significant evidence 
of me ntal disorder may exist. We assume that there must be some underly-
ing abnormality because no rational person would choose to molest children 
unless he was "forced to " by circumstances beyond his control. We have 
already seen that there is no evidence of underlying abnormality in such 
cases, but let us accept arguments that it is reasonable to call this person 
crazy because he experiences a perhaps inexplicable and crazy urge . 101 
Is the urge irresistible? For at least two reasons , most persons would 
assume that the urge must be very strong. First, the molester reports that the 
urge is overwhelming. Second , it seems intuitively obvious that most 
Artic le to map the com mo nsense and long recognized observa tion tha t the re are two major 
classes of var iables tha t undercut re spons ibility---compulsion and igno rance o r mistake. ARIS-
TOTLE, Nicoma chean Ethics , in 2 TH E WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 339 (R. Hutchins ed . 1952) . 
Modern insanity defense tests, for ins tance , have recognized thi s classification by allowing two 
different sorts of insa nity excuses : those based on volitional incapacity and those based on 
cogniti ve-affective incapacity . MoDEL PENAL CODE§ 4 .01, Comments, 156-60 (Tent. Draft No. 
4, 1955). See also J. F EINBERG , supra note 39, at 285-92 (crazy reasons a re what is so special) . 
The common as sumption about crazy people is tha t crazy urges and crazy reaso ns are 
the mselves beyo nd the ac tor's contro l and that actions based on those urges a nd reasons are 
likewise beyo nd the ac tor 's contro l. 
100 . For a very interest ing study of such a case and it s trea tme nt , see K ohl e nberg, 
Trea tment of a Homosexual Pedophiliac Using In Vi vo Desensitization: A Case Study, 83 J. 
ABNORMAL PsYCHOLOGY 192 ( 1974) (behav io ra l treatme nt successfull y c ha nged pa tient 's 
prefe rence from child re n to ad ult ma les) . A provocati ve comme nt on the case that no tes th e 
ro le of val ues in such the rape utic s ituat io ns is Strupp , Some Observa tions on the Fallacy of 
Valu e-Free Psychotherapy and the Empty Organism : Comments on a Case Study, 83 J . AB NO R-
MAL PSYC HO LOGY 199 (1974). 
I 0 I . See no tes 96, 99 and accompanying te xt supra . 
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persons would not "give in" to such an urge unless it was overpowering . 
Let us assume that, indeed, the urge is powerful and perhaps even torment-
ing to our molester. But could it have been resis ted , albe it at the cost of 
frustration and discomfort? Do all persons who feel such urges give in to 
them, or are there some who resist? 
Although there exists little systematic epidemiological study of such 
quest ions, it is clear from clinical pratice that many persons report extremely 
strong " dev iant " urges that are often a source of misery to them. 102 Yet 
most persons do no t engage in the urged behavior; indeed, many seek 
ass istance from clergymen, doctors, counselors, and psychotherapists in 
order to defeat the urge. Holding that the urge is not overwhe lming in such 
cases , but that it is overwhelming in the cases of those who give in, is 
tau tological reasoning : the urge must be overwhelming because the person 
gave in. In terms more familiar to lawyers, we are faced with the difficult y 
of distinguishing between the irresistible impulse and the impulse not 
res isted. 
There is no scientific measure of the strength of urges. Nor is there 
evidence of what percentage of people who experience various urges of 
various strengths act on those urges. Even if such measures and data were 
available, as they may be someday, the measured strength of the urge would 
not answer the question of whether the urge was irresistible . 103 Such data 
may help us to identify how predisposing , in a statistical sense, the urge 
might be, but they would not answer the question of moral and legal 
responsibility . Where to draw the cutting point would clearly be a moral and 
legal determination. In the future , behavioral science may provide more 
precise information to help draw the line, but science alone cannot draw the 
line of legal responsibility. 
At present, then, the determination of the irresistibility of crazy urges 
must rest on commonsense assessments of the craziness and strength of the 
urge . The data to be evaluated would be first, the report of the urged actor, 
102. Thi s is a common subjective experience of most persons. Indeed, psychoanaly sis 
teach es that "deviant ' ' impulses are part of the normal biopsychological makeup of all persons. 
See, e.g. , S. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents , in 21 THE STANDARD EDIT! ON OF THE 
C0\-1PLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD (1964); S. FREUD, Instincts and Their 
Viscissitudes, in 14 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICA L WORKS OF 
SIGM UND FREUD ( 1964). See generally C. THORESEN & M . MAHONEY , B EHAVIORIAL SELF-
CONTROL ( 1974) (behaviorist perspective); BEHAVIOR CHANGE THROUGH SELF-CONTROl_ Uvl. 
Goldfried & M. Merbaum eds. 1973) (same). 
103 . A behavioral view would characterize the matter differently. however, and might 
claim that one can measure the stre ngth of urges by n~ciproca ll y measuring the strength of self-
contro l. Briefly, this could be done by es timat ing quantitatively the actor's knowledge of and 
con trol over the si tu ational variables that seem functionally related to the crazy urge. See C. 
THORESON & M. MAHONEY, supra note 102, at 8- 10. 
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and second , the craziness of the urged ac tion. Whether certain urges are 
crazy is not a sc ient ific question that needs expert answers. And whether the 
urge is sufficiently strong or crazy is a question that is answered by 
assessing the repor ted feelings of th e actor and the sincerity of his report. 
There is simply no test for knowing when an urge is irres istible, and indeed, 
there is no reason to be lieve that there is any urge that is not , to some 
degree, resistible. Deciding whether an urge is irresistible is no t a scientif ic 
decision. 
b. Crazy reasons: It may also be believed that an actor had no free 
choice about whether to engage in certain behavior if the actor reports crazy 
reasons for his behavior. If an actor kill s someone because he sincerely 
believes the vic tim was a hostile agent , we believe that the killing not 
only is re lated to the crazy belief as was seen above, but that it is the 
compelled result of the crazy belief. After all, no one would hold and act on 
such beliefs unl ess there were something uncontrollably wrong with him 
that caused him to have those beliefs. 
Before we can determine whether an actor had control over hi s crazy 
reasons and consequent actions, we must first analyze the nature of a crazy 
reason . Following from our definition of craziness itself, we may define a 
crazy reason as one that is irrational and inexplicable. Of course, the degree 
of craziness of a reason varies along a lengthy continuum. Consider three 
variations of an example: a person refuses to take a lifesaving drug , even 
though the drug is minimally risky in itself. In variation one, the person 
refuses because he sincerely believes the prescribing physician is an enemy 
agent who intends to poison him. In variation two, the actor expresses 
fear of the drug even though he recognizes that it is quite irrational to refuse 
to take it. In variation three, the person refuses to take the drug because he is 
a firm believer in a reli gion that accepts only natural healing. 
Most persons would agree that the reason in variation one is crazy and 
that the reason in vari ation three is not. There would probably be a great deal 
of di sagreement about variation two , however. Expectedly, decisions about 
the unclear cases seem difficult because they are contextually and culturally 
relative. 
It is difficult to conceive of any reason for behavior that is per se crazy; 
whether a reason is crazy is a function of cultural expectations. In all three 
variations of the example above , the actor is operationally suicidal. Yet in 
our culture, religious reasons are considered valid and therefore noncrazy . A 
completely " techno-sc ientific" society might find the religious reason in 
variation three quite crazy. Variation two is particularly hard in our socie ty 
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because there is no general culturai valuing of such inchoate fears; in 
general, however, the person seems quite normal. Ultimately , the touch-
stone for decision in variation two would probably be whether or not the 
person was capable of reasoning normally and of reaching a different 
decision. Indeed, this capacity is probably the heart of the issue. In variation 
one, we assume the person was not capable of reasoning normally. In 
variation three we are fairly sure the person is so capable. In variation two 
we are simply not sure. 
Once it is determined that the reason given for legally relevant behavior 
is or may be crazy, the crucial issue becomes ·whether the crazy reason was 
an irresistible product or result of mental d isorder. We ascribe personal and 
legal responsibility to the actor who gives a crazy reason for hi s behavior so 
long as we believe that he was capable of reasoning noncrazily. Thus, we 
must delineate the criteria for deciding vvhether a person is capable of 
reason ing noncrazily. 
A crazy reason may be considered the compelled product of a disor-
dered mind if either (or both) of two criteria are met : First, the actor's 
behavior seems to demonstrate a significant perceptual and attentional 
deficit, that is, the actor seems incapable of attending to the factors relevant 
to his decision to act; or second, the actor is incapable of weighing the 
factors relevant to his decision. 104 These criteria explicitly focus on the 
reasoning process itself rather than on the outcome of the reasoning process 
(i.e. , the crazy reason itself or the behavior chosen). The law should and 
often does focus on the process because the nonresponsibility argument 
holds that the person is incapable of reasoning noncrazily, not that the 
person finally gives reasons that may seem crazy. By focusing on the 
person's reasoning capability rather than the reasons he gives (although the 
two are intertwined in practice), the law preserves the person 's autonomy, 
104. See H. FINGARETTE, supra note 39, at 175-203; Murphy, Incompetence and Paternal-
ism, 60 ARCHIVES PHILOSOPHY L. & Soc. PHILOSOPHY 465, 473-78 (1974). Most authors 
assume that if the actor consistently attends and weighs data irrationally, it must be because he 
is incapable of doing so rationally. This is a fine, commonsensical approach; if the person 
shows no counter-instances of rational weighing or attending, it is perhaps a fair conclu-
sion that the person was incapable of behaving otherwise. Of course, this conclusion follows 
not from the discovery of a defect in the person, but from observations of his interactions in the 
world. If, however, there are counter-instances of rational weighing and attending, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that this actor does have some capability for rationally weighing and 
attending. See Lehrer, An Empirical Disproof of Determinism?, in DETERMINISM, FREE WiLL, 
AND MoRAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 67, at 173-82; notes 84-94 and accompanying text 
supra. A possible response to counter-instances would be to show that a person always gives 
crazy reasons under certain conditions even though he atte nds and weighs rationally under 
others. We might then assume that under specific conditions he is incapable of behaving 
rationally. 
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dignity, and liberty; the actor is allowed, within the usual legal limits, to 
live his life as he pleases and to act irrationally if he chooses. 105 
To analyze further the question of whether a crazy reason is the 
inexorable result of a disordered mind, let us return to variation one, the 
case of the person who refuses to take a drug because he believes that his 
physician is an enemy agent who intends to poison him. Assume that the 
actor is reasonably intelligent and that he has been fully informed of the 
known benefits and risks of the medication. The actor who believes the 
doctor is a hostile agent who intends to poison him is clearly mistaken 
and crazy. Almost certainly, enormous amounts of data are available that 
would contradict his belief, and we may expect that much of this data has 
been brought to his attention by those concerned for the actor ' s health. 
Assuming he is totally convinced and has no reservations about the crazy 
belief, 106 either the actor is not attending to this data or he is not weighing it 
in any rational or explicable manner. But is he incapable of attending to or 
weighing the relevant considerations? Unfortunately, there is no scientific 
means by which to test such capability. Nor does the fact that the reason 
given is crazy decide the question in a scientific sense. 
It is clear in variation one that the person has given a crazy reason and 
that the crazy reason is related to the refusal to take the drug. We may 
conclude that a person who sincerely believes that his physician is a hostile 
agent must be incapable of attending to and weighing the data that 
might lead him to a contrary conclusion, particularly because the conse-
quences to the actor are so great. The grounds for such a conclusion, 
however, are moral and social. Indeed, the decision must be based on the 
belief, unsupported by scientific evidence, that it is simply impossible for 
someone to maintain and act on such a crazy belief unless he is incapable of 
doing otherwise. 
We do not and cannot know in a scientific sense whether the actor was 
incapable. There is, after all, an alternative to the intuitive hunch that he 
must be incapable. It may be that the actor has great difficulty in thinking 
straight, in perceiving consensual reality in a more or less normal manner. 
He may be and probably is aware to some degree that his perceptions are 
"out of line," but he may also be unwilling to exert himself to pay attention 
to or to give any weight to the data that might help him better align his 
105. Friedman, supra note 92, a t 77-80; Developments , supra note 6, at 12!2-17 ; Note, 
Mental Health: A Model Statute to Regulate the Administration of Therapy Within Mental 
Health Facilities, 61 MINN. L. REv. 841,879-80 (1977). 
I 06 . There is no scientific way to prove this. It is a commonsense evaluation that must be 
based on an assessment of all the relevant circumstances . See text accompanying note 57 supra 
and notes 181-85 and accompa nying text infra. 
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perceptions and beliefs with consensual reality. Or , g iven his crazy reaso ns , 
he may be un willing to exert himself not to ac t on the basis of those c razy 
reasons or beliefs. 107 
It may be very hard for a person to think straight ; in some cases, c razy 
be liefs may powerfully compel the crazy person to ac t on them. But the re is 
no certainty that an actor cannot control his crazy beliefs or, at least, control 
act ions based on them . Indeed , even the craziest pe rsons seem to behave 
quite normally or rationally a great deal of the time, especially if there is 
good reason to do so. On at least some occasions, including some instances 
whe n they are behav ing crazily, crazy persons are clearly capable of playing 
by the usual rules. 108 Nor do they always act on the basis of their crazy 
reasons. Moreover, the defects and disordered thinking that supposedly 
di stingui sh crazy persons from normal ones are very prevale nt in the general 
population. 109 The actor in variation one may finally be decl ared incompe-
tent and forced to take the drug, but the decision will be based on the 
stro ngest so rt of commonsense or intuitive basis and not on any scientific 
knowledge. Even if it is found that the person typically seems out of touch 
with real ity, reasons crazily, and gives mostly crazy reasons for hi s behav-
ior, scientific evidence cannot demonstrate that such behavior is the result of 
mental disorder and that related legally relevant behavior is sufficiently 
unfree to ascribe nonresponsibility to the actor. At most it can be urged that 
a person who typically does not think " straight" is more or less predisposed 
to give crazy reasons and to act on them. Whether Daniel M'Naghten could 
have countered his crazy belief about Peel or could have controlled his 
behavior based on the belief is simply not capable of scientific determina-
tion .1 10 
In summary, no test can determine whether the crazy reason given in a 
particular case was the product of an underlying abnormal condition or 
whether the actor could have controlled his behavior based on the reason. 
Indeed, there is no sc ientific standard of how a person should "normally" 
attend to and weigh factors relevant to a particular matter. All we have are 
culturally determined standards. Behavioral scientists arguably possess the 
expertise to determine and describe in precise detail how a specific ac tor's 
107. Tt is well recognized that delusional people do not a lways act on th e basi s of th eir 
crazy beliefs . See, e.g. , DSM-III , supra note 26, a t C: II ("The impairmen t in functioning [of a 
paranoid schizophrenic] may be minimal if the delusional materi al is not acted upon . . ''). 
I 08. See notes 84-94 and accompanying tex t supra. See also note I 04 supra. 
109. See notes 85-87 and acco mpanyi ng text supra. 
110. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 7 18 (House of Lords 1843); N. WALKER , I CRIME 
AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND 84-103 ( 1968) (an account of the case and its background); Moran, 
Awaiting the Crown's Pleasure: The Case of Daniel M'Naught on, 15 CRIMINOLOGY 7 (1977) 
(argument that the exculpation of M'Naghten on medical ground s he lped the Tory gove rnment 
to minimize the cons iderab le political problems that were then plaguing it ). 
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mind functions in general or in relation to a specific matter, 111 but whether 
the described type of functioning is compelled or ought to be considered 
compelled is not a matter for scientific determination. 112 Decid ing whether 
the person could have attended to or weighed the fact ors differently is a 
moral, social, and legal determination that must be based on co mmonsense 
observations and eva luations of the actor's behavior. Some cho ices may be 
too hard, but ide ntifyi ng which ones are too difficult is not a matter of 
scientific judgment. 
5. Summary 
Whether craziness IS re lated to and seems to be a causal variable that 
produces legally relevant behavior is a commonsense and moral determina-
tion. A commonsense and intuitive view would hold that although all of us 
choose our behavior, we are all subject to various factors that affect our 
behavior. The many variables operating on an actor affect choice, making 
some choices harder and some choices easier. The choice to behave crazily 
or to behave in ways related to the craziness seems not to be an exception. 
No mental health-related factor makes certain the occurrence of crazy 
behavior, nor does craziness make certain the occurrence of legally relevant 
behavior. It is possible, however, that some of these factors so predispose an 
actor to crazy behavior and its legally relevant consequences that it is unjust 
not to respond differently to the crazy actor. 
There is no bright line, however, between free and unfree choices . 
Whether persons are to be held responsible for their crazy behavior is not a 
scientific matter to be determined by experts . It is a moral, social, and legal 
matter to be determined by legislatures and courts, the political and legal 
representatives of society. Moreover, the line drawn reflects a moral judg-
ment that is not compelled by scientific findings. We simply do not and 
cannot have a scientifically proven answer to the question of whether crazy 
persons or normal persons have free will. Behavioral scientists and layper-
sons both have intuitive hunches: observers simply decide whether in their 
judgment it was too hard for the crazy person in question to behave 
otherwise, e.g., to counter the crazy reason or to resist the crazy urge. Even 
if it could be demonstrated that people who act crazily often have underlying 
mental disorders, this finding would not require the conclusion that the 
disordered person's legally relevant behavior was compelled . 
Like a gun held at one's head or a particular type of upbringing, an 
underlying mental disorder (if such exists) might be a predisposing factor to 
Ill . See tex t acco mpan ying notes 178-79, 186, 189-90 infra. 
112. See Murphy, supra note 104 , at 476-79. 
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certain types of behavior, but there is little reason to believe that crazy 
persons do not choose their behavior or are incapable of behaving otherwise , 
even if the reasons for their behavior are inexplicable to normal persons . It 
may be extremely difficult for crazy persons to control their crazy behav ior 
and related legaliy relevant conduct , but we simply do not know that the y 
cannot. 
D. How W ILL THE PERSON BEH AVE IN THE FUTURE? 
Once the legal system has determined that a person is abnormal and that his 
legal ly relevant behavior was uncontrollably caused by craziness, the next 
question that is asked by mental health law is, "How will this person behave 
in the future?'' Although predictions about future behavior are not re levant 
to all mental health or mental health-related laws , in many important areas 
such as civil commitment or ch ild custody disputes, predictions are a cruc ial 
focus of legal inquiry. Indeed, predictions about the actor's future behavior 
often will be central to decisions about what to do with or to an indi-
vidual. 113 
The accuracy of predictions of human behavior is an empirical issue. 
The law has long assumed that predictions by psychiatrists and other mental 
health experts were largely accurate, and that interventions such as civil 
commitment, which are based in part on those predictions, were justified. 
Nevertheless, because predictions about future behavior are often pivotal in 
mental health law decisionmaking, it is necessary to explore the accuracy in 
fact of behavioral prediction in order to assess properly the fairness and 
efficiency of mental health law. This section briefly analyzes the nature 
of legal questions about future behavior and then examines the art and 
science of behavioral prediction. 
1. Legal Questions About Future Behavior 
Behavioral predictions are statements that describe the quantitative probabil-
ity that a given behavior will occur in the future. A law that includes a 
prediction as a criterion for decisionmaking should comprise two distinct 
standards: First, it should specify the behavior to be predicted; and second, it 
should specify the degree of probability of occurrence that warrants legal 
intervention. 114 For example, the behavioral component of civil commit-
ment statutes typically provides that the alleged crazy person is "likely to 
113. See generally Dershowit z , The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predic-
tions , 23 J. L EGA L Eouc . 24 ( 1970); Ok paku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody 
Cases?, 29 RUTGERS L. R Ev . 1117 ( 1976). 
114. Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental !//ness: Some Observations on the 
Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity , 70 YALE L.J. 225, 235 ( 1960); 
Ju stification·s , supra note 36, at 81 , 84. 
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harm himseif or othe rs. '' It is readily apparent that in this standard the 
behavior to be predicted and the degree of probability are both quite 
imprecise. 11 5 W hat quantitative probability is meant by " likely"? What 
kind of behavior or result is meant by ''harm'' ? 1\lfost ment al health law 
predicti on criteri a are d rafted in the vague form gi ven in the e xample. 
JVIental health la~;v intervention based on prediction usuaily involves 
some depri va! ion of iiberty or the right to avoid involuntary treatment. 
Because important ri ghts depend on the predi ct ion , the probability of oc-
currence of a particu lar behav ior that should justi fy legal intervention should 
be spec ified on moral and soc ial grounds. This trui sm becomes especially 
clear when one considers the nonscientific nature and vagueness of the legal 
prediction criteria. Terms such as "likely'' or "harm" do not have an 
agreed on scientif ic meaning . A scientist, as a scientist, might be able to 
sta te the quanti tati ve probabi lity that precisely de fined behavior such as 
suicide was going to occur. If a sc ientist says "harm is likely," however , he 
is behaving as an mdinary layperson , ass igning his own private, unscientific 
meaning to the terms "harm" and "likely." Th is determination, however, 
is not part of the scientist' s proper role in the courtroom. Rather, the judge 
or jury shou ld consider the empirical data and then decide the social, moral, 
and legal question of whether the legal standard is met. 
Of course, if utte rly explicit prediction standards were drafted, it might 
be clear in specific cases whether the empirica l data met the legal test. For 
example, instead of using the standard, " likely to harm self," the following 
standard might be substituted: "75% likelihood to attempt suicide by a 
means 50% likely to cause death." If such a statute were adopted and its 
terms were all operationalized, the primary issue in a particular case would 
be whether the standard is met , sure ly a "question of fact." Statutes are 
rarely so written, however, because of the inevitable complexity of human 
behavior and the wide range of need for legal intervention. Thus, criteria 
such as "likely to be dangerous" are written and enacted. T he task then is to 
give content to the standard and to decide if it is met-issues of both law and 
fact that must be answered by reference to common notions of morality and 
probability. Thus again, the decisions should be made by laypersons . Broad 
statutes will leave judges and juries some room to maneuver to fulfill the 
social and moral weighing function of applying the law to the case at hand . 
And, as we shall see, this conclusion is strengthened when the accuracy of 
predict ive judgments is considered. 
Legal decis ions may be based in part on empirical data, but whether 
a given probability warrants legal intervention is a social, moral, and legal 
115. Goldstein & Katz , supra note I 14, at 235-37 ; Ju stifications, supra note 36 , a t 79-84. 
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question. Moreover, when mental health law relies on predictive criter ia, 
it ought to do so in light of an ho nest and rigorous assessment of the 
acc uracy of behavioral predictions. Therefore , thi s secti on next turns to an 
analys is of the art and science of behavioral prediction. 
2 . The Art and Science of Behavioral Predi ction 
T wo meanings of behavioral prediction or prognosis should initi ally be 
distinguished: First , rather general prediction based on the " natural his-
tory" or course of a "behavi oral condition" ; and second, prediction of 
specific future behavior. Although the two meanings are related, the second 
meaning is far more important for lega l , as opposed to clinica l, purposes . 
There is much clinical wisdom about the course of vario us mental 
di sorders but prec ious little hard , reliable data . 116 It is extre me ly difficult to 
perform good retrospective or prospective longitudinal studi es th at examine 
the course of various disorders . 117 Yet some fac ts do seem rel ative ly estab-
lished . For instance, persons who are depressed, even severely, feel be tte r 
after some amount of time whether or not they are treated, and many persons 
who seem chronically crazy throughout childhood and ado lescence will tend 
to remain chronically crazy throughout life. 11 8 Although there are some 
suggestive prognostic indicators , 119 most prognoses are very imprecise and 
general. 120 The data are often soft, and seemingly good predictors are often 
invalid. 121 
Although general and soft prognostic data may be useful to clinicians 
who treat patients, the mental health legal system should require more 
11 6. See, e.g., R. K ENDELL , TH E ROLE OF DI AGNOSI S IN PSYCHIATRY 40-4 1 (1975) ; 
Lehmann , supra note 84, at 890 ("no consistent pre-morbid history , course , or out come [of 
schizophrenia] can be ascertained"). 
11 7. See Roff, Some Problems in Life History Resea rch , in I LIFE HiSTORY RESEARCH 1:--1 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 10-30 (M. Roff & D. Rick s ed s. 1970). 
118. See, e.g. , A. B EC K, supra note 84 , at 44-55; Aarkrog , Psychotic and Borderline 
Ps ychotic Adolescents: Frequency of Psychiatn"c Illness an d Treatm ent in Childhood in 
}()() Consecutive Cases , 52 ACTA PSYCHIATRIC\ SCANDINAVICA 52, 58 ( 1975); Cor bett , 
Harris , T ay lor, & Trimble , Progressive Disintegra tive Psychosis of Childhood , 18 J. CHILD 
PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHI ATR Y 211 (1977); Winokur, The Natural History of the Affective Disor-
ders (Manias and Depressions}, 2 SEMINARS PSYCHIATRY 451, 453 -54 ( 1970). 
119 . See, e.g . , Pokorny, Thorn by, K aplan , & Ball, Predictions of Chronicity in Psychiatric 
Patients, 33 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 932 (I 976) ; W att , Patterns of Childhood Social 
Developm ent in Adult Schizophrenics, 35 ARCHIVES OF G ENERAl. PS YCHI ATRY 160 , 165 ( 1978) 
(some behavioral differences be tween preschizophrenic children and tho se w ho develop nor -
mally). 
120 . See, e.g., V aillant , Prospective Prediction of Schizophrenic Remissimz, II ARCHIVES 
OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 509 , 510 (1964) (vague cr iteria used on followup). 
121. See Rutter, Relationships Between Child and Adult Psychiatric Disorders, 48 ACTA 
PsYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 3 (1972); Trainor , Follow-up Study Fails to Find Predictive Signs, 
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accurate predicti ons of specific legall y relevant behavior. Afte r all , mental 
health law predictions do involve important rights. What is adequate predic-
tive scie nce for the clinic, laboratory, or class room is not necessarily 
adequate whe n legal rights are involved. The important prognosis for the 
legal system is whether legally relevant behavior (e. g ., dange rou sness or 
inability to manage in the community) will occur o r continue if there is no 
intervention. 
Most behavio rs that concern mental health law (and behavior in ge ner-
al) are parti cularly hard to predict accurately .122 First, these behaviors occur 
very infrequ ently , and infrequent behavior is especially ha rd to predict. 123 
Second, it is virtually impossible to obtain all the data necessary to make an 
accurate prediction. Put simplistically, behavior is a product of the interac-
tion between the individual's biological and psychological predispositions 
or characteris tic s and the environmental variables that act on him. Indeed, 
some theori sts claim that environmental variables have the vast share of 
causal efficacy. 124 Even if everything is known about the individual, the 
specific future environmental influences that will act on him cannot be 
known. And of course, behavioral scientists do not approach having perfect 
knowledge of the individual either. Taken together, the lack of knowledge 
about the individual, the unpredictability of the environment, and the infre-
quency of the behavior to be predicted render future legally relevant behav-
122. Megargee, The Prediction of Dangerous Behavior, 3 CRI \>1. JusT. & B EH.-\ VIOR 3 
( 1976) 
123. P. M eehl, Antecedent Probability and the Efficiency of Psychometric Signs, Patterns, 
or Cutting Scores , in PSYCHODIAGNOSIS: SELECTED PAPERS 32-62 (written with A. Rosen); 
see Justifications, supra note 36, at 84-85. 
124. B.F. SKINN ER , supra note 61 (the most extreme behaviorisl swlemenl ); see A. 
8AN DURA , SOCIAL L EARNING TH EORY (1971) (a more balanced behavioral view) ; B. F. SKIN NER , 
SCIENC E AND H UMAN BEH AVIOR (1953). The debate over !he relaii ve weigh! o f personal and 
situational vari ables in cau sing human behavior has a long and intense hi story. See generally 
W. MISCHEL, supra note 54: Alston, Traits, Consistency and Conceptual Alrernatives for 
Personality Theory , 5 J. THEORY Soc . BEHAVIOUR 17 ( 1975); Bem & Allen , On Predicting Some 
of th e People S ome of the Tim e: The Search for Cross-Situational Consistencies in Behavior , 81 
PsYCI-IOLOGICA L RE v. 506 ( 1974) ; Bourne, Can We Describe an Individual's Personality 7 Agree-
ment on Stereotype Versus Individual Attributes, 35 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH OLOGY 863 
( 1977) ; Bowers, Situationism in Psychology: An Analysis and a Critique , 80 PSYCHOLOGICAL 
REV. 307 ( 1973): Mi sc hel, Toward a Cognitive Social Learning Conceptualization of Personaii-
ty , SO PsYCHOLOGICAL REv. 252 (1973). 
This Article cannot resolve the person-versus-situation debate, but the existence o f the 
debate might cast some light on why mental health-based predictions may be difficult. If 
crazin ess is not a "trait'' inherent in the person, but like other behavior is siiuation specific , 
then predi ction s based on mental health diagnoses would necessaril y be quite inaccurate 
unle ss th e situation al variabl es could be predicted with great acc uracy. If craz iness is a 
condition in the person, it can be the basi s for accurate prediction onl y if there is good , specifi c 
data about the behavioral course of the condition and how it affects other behavior. A s we have 
seen , such hard , spec ific data is usually lacking. Notes 116-21 supra. 
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ior hard to predict with any reasonable degree of accuracy. 125 Menta l health 
law is concerned with predi c ti ons about re latively speci fi c behavior, and the 
specificity of predictions of future behav ior is inversely re lated to their 
accuracy. 
Predictions generally can be based on two types of processes--
statistical and clinical. 126 In stati stical prediction , the predicti on of behavior 
IS based on the known actuari al probability that persons similar in re levant 
ways to the indi vidual to be predicted will behave in the pred icted manner. 
The predictor need not have any theories about behavior in general or the: 
indi vidual to be pred icted . The prediction depends on a mechanical 
"cookbook" approach 127 that compares data about the person to ac tuarial 
dat a about the class of persons to which he be longs. For instance, if one 
wishes to know the probability th at a young paranoid male wi ll behave 
vio lently , one makes the pred iction by simply determining what percentage 
of young male paranoids in ge neral behave viole ntly. No atte ntion is paid to 
fact ors or hunches that seem relevant to this case , but that are extraneous to 
the ac tuari a l data. 
By contrast , clinica l prediction is based on the clinician's assessment of 
the individual case. Even if the clinical predictor knows the hard actuarial 
data collected on the prediction question in point , he changes the we ight of 
actuarial predictive factors based on his intensive study of the particu lar 
individual in question . Often , the we ight will be changed on the bas is of the 
clinician 's own untested actuarial impressions, his clinical hunches, and his 
theoretical preferences. For instance, although the clinician may know that 
X % of young paranoid males behave violently, he might decide that a 
particular young paranoid male has a higher or lower probability depend ing 
on the clinician' s clinical assessment of the individual case before him. 
The comparative accuracy of statistical and clinical prediction is one of 
the most well-studied topics in behavioral science and one of the few in 
which there is near unanimity in the outcome of the studies. Statistical 
prediction is nearly always more accurate . 128 Prediction based on clinical 
125. Ennis & L i twak , supra note 25, at 734; Megargee , supra note 122 , at 5-15 ; see Shah , 
Dangerousness: A Paradigm for Exploring Some Issues in Law and Psychology , 33 AM . 
PsYCHOLOCiiST 224, 227-30 ( 1978) (exce llent discussion of the difficulties in predi cting f uture 
behav ior accurately because o f illusor y correla tion , low base rates , and o ther factors). 
126. The most famou s treatment of thi s issue is P. MEEHL , CLINICAL v. STATISTICA L 
PREDICTION: A TH EORETICAl. ANALYSIS AND A RE VIEW OF THE EVtDENCE (1954). Both types o f 
prediction are complex proce sses. T he discuss ion following in th e tex t w ill attempt onl y to 
outline their general nature and differences. 
127. SeeP. rvi EEH I' Want ed-A Good Cookbook, in PSYCHODIAGNOS IS: SELECTED P.-\PERS 
63-80 ( 1973). 
128. P. MEEH L, When Shall We Use Our Heads instead of the Formula, in PSYCHODIAG-
NOSIS: SELECTED PAPERS 83-89 ( 1973); Justif ications , supra note 36 , at 75 n.4 ; Meehl , Psycho/a-
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judgment may seem more " human ," but it is simply not as good as 
mechanical appli cation of actuarial data to the case at hand. 
The law should thus be extremely skeptical about pure clinical predic-
tion. Although statistical prediction also is generally not highly accurate, it 
is the best tool for making legal predictions. At the least, if clinical 
orediction is to be used, the law should be concerned with how accuratelv 
' J 
clinicians predic t such behavior. 
Unfortunately, there arc few methodologically sound studies that 
examine the accuracy of predictions, by any method, of legally relevant 
behavior. Most studies that have assessed the accuracy of predictions about 
specific legally relevant behavior have focused on predictions by behav ior 
scientists of violence to others or to the self. Reviewers agree that the abi lity 
to predict v iolence to others is ex tremely limited. 129 At best, such predic-
tions are accurate on ly about one-third of the time, and even one-third 
accuracy is obtained on ly under ideal conditions. In most studies the accura-
cy rates are considerably lower; indeed, the mean accuracy for predictions 
of violence in seven leading studies is approximately 19%. 130 That is , when 
experts predict future violence, on the average they overpredict by incorrect-
ly predicting violence in four cases for every one case in which they are 
correct. And, because mental illness is not highly correlated with legally 
relevant behavior, knowledge that a subject is mentally ill does not substan-
tially increase the accuracy of predictions of his legally relevant behavior. 13 1 
gy and the Criminal Law, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 8 n.8, 9 n. 9 ( 1970) (more recent reference s a nd 
contrary sou rces). But see, e.g., Cohen, Groth, & Siegal, The Clinical Prediction of Dangerous-
ness, 24 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 28 ( 1978) (report of a study where clinical prediction arguably 
is more accurate ; incomplete review of literature). Not only is stati st ical prediction supe rior , 
but there is a lso reason to believe that mechanical data measurement and collection is also 
superior. The data on this point is less conclusive, however. Sawyer , Measurement a nd 
Prediction , Clinical and Statistical, 66 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 178 (1966). 
129 . AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 
23-28 (Task Force Report 8 , 1974); Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions 
of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 ( 1976) ; Diamond , 
supra note 24; Schlesinger, The Prediction of Dangerousness in Juveniles: A Replication , 24 
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 40, 48 (1978). 
130. Monahan, The Prevention of Violence, in COMMUNITY M ENTAL HEALTH AND THE 
CRIMINAL JuSTICE SYSTEM 13 , 16-22 (J . Monahan ed. 1976). Further, the validity of the two 
s tudies that demonstrate the greates t degree of accuracy has been severe ly questioned. Wilkins, 
Treatment of Offenders: Patuxent Examined, 29 RuTGERS L. REV. 1102 (1976); R. Evenson & 
H. Altman, A Re-evaluation of the Diagnosis and Trea tment of Dangerousness (unpubli shed 
ms.) (on file w ith the Southern California Law Review). 
131. See Dix, Administration of the Texas Death Penalty Statutes: Constitutional Infir-
mities Related to the Prediction of Dangerousness, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1343 , 1398 (1977); notes 24, 
98 supra. But see Martin, Cloninger , & G uze, Female Criminality and the Prediction of 
Recidivism, 35 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 207, 2! 2-13 (1978) (diagnoses of an ti social 
personality and drug depende nce were s ignificant predictors of female recidivism; but note that 
these diagnoses are among those that are most questionably considered mental disorders). 
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Predictions concerning suic ide or capacity to manage in the open 
community are similarly unsuccess ful. Pred ictions of su ic ide, a very infre-
quent event, are even lessaccurate than predictions of violence to others. At 
best , suicide prediction is unlike ly to be more than 20% acc uratc. 132 There is 
less clear data concerning predictions about whether persons can manage 
their li ves or " get along" without professional intervention and hospi taliza-
tion, but !n such instances, as in predictions of violence, mental health 
professionals tend to be highly inaccurate. 133 
Mental health laws also are often concerned with predictions about the 
outcome of various mental health treatments or interven tions. For legal 
purposes , the critical questions about mentta1 health treatment outcome are 
whether and in what way the intervention will change the actor's behavior, 
especially legally relevant behavior. If effective, mental health treatments 
change behaviors (i.e., the alleged symptoms); they do not "cure" underly-
ing diseases in the way that a fever is lowered by treating an underlying 
132. Mackinnon & Farberow, An Assessment of the Utility of Suicide Pre vention, 6 
SUICIDE & LIFE THREATENING BEH AVIOR 86 (1976). See generally Greenberg, In voluntary 
Psychiatric Commitments to Prevent Suicide , 49 N Y. U. L. REv . 227 , 249-50 , 259-63 ( 1974); 
Rose n , Detection of Suicidal Patients: An Example of Some Limitations in the Prediction of 
Infrequent Events, 18 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 397 (1954). 
133. Martin, Friedmeyer, & Sterne, Absconders, Elopers, Escapees, and other Irregular 
Patients : A Review , in l RESEARCH COM. PSYCHOLOGY , PSYC HI ATRY & BEHAVIOR 435 (1976); 
Barre t , Kuriansky, & Garland, Community Tenure Following Emergency Discharge, 128 A:-vt. J. 
P sYCH IATRY 72 ( 1972) (among a large grou p of chronic , long-institutiona li zed patient s , a group 
with an extremely low probability of making a satisfactory community adjustment , 29% were 
able to remain in the community six months after being released because of a general staff 
strike in the hospital; there were no differences in patho logy between those able to re main out 
and those who returned to the ho spital; available comm unity roles for the patients accounted 
for co mmunity adjustment differences); Ennis & Litwak, supra note 25 , at 717-18; Scheer & 
Barton, A Comparison of Patients Discharged Against Medical Advice with a Matched Control 
Group , 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1217 ( 1974) (review of literature a nd origi nal empirical study 
both demonstrate that patients discharged against medical advice have same posthospital 
adjustments as patient s discharged with medical advice). Because there a re few direct studies 
of predictions of community adjustments , it is difficult to estimate precisely how inaccurate 
such predictions are , but they are clea rl y quite inaccurate. 
It shou ld be noted that predictions of community adjust ment without hospitalization are 
usually made for commitment purposes and assume that the person will be treated in a hospital 
but not in a community. A more reasonable comparison would be to predict community 
adjustment when the person is receiving outpatient treatment while remai ning at li berty. There 
is an enormous amount o f data showing that co mmunity treatment , including community-based 
foster homes , is as effective as hos pita l treatment, and certainly it is c hea per. See, e.g., Davis, 
Dinitz, & Pasaminick, The Prevention of Hospitalization in Schizophrenics: Five Years After 
Experimental Program, 42 A\!. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 375 ( 1972); Levinson, Lord , Sermas, 
Thorn by, Sullender, & Comstock, Acute Schizophrenia: An Efficacious Outpatient Treatment 
Approach as an Alternative to Full- Time Hospitalization, 38 DISEASES NERVOUS SYS. 242 
(1977); Linn, Caffey, Klett, & Hoga rt y , Hospital v. Community (Foster) Care for Psychiatric 
Patients , 34 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 78 (1977); Mendel, Lepers, Madmen-Who's 
Next ?, SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL., Winter 1974, at 5; Murphy & Date!, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
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infection with antibiotics. 134 Many treatments have been studied to deter-
mine their efficacy in changing behavior, and there is now an enormous 
amount of data to help predict treatment outcome. 135 The vast majority of 
the data, however , do not refer to changes in legally relevant behavior. 
Instead, the data refer, often in rather global terms such as "improved," to 
diminution of crazy behavior. Consequently, there is much data on the 
reduction of anxiety, depression, crazy thinking, and the like, but the re is 
less data on the ability of c lini cians to "treat" such behaviors as violence, 
financial incompetence, social isolation, or an inability to assist counsel. 136 
Comm unity Versus Institutional Living , 27 HoSPITAL & COM\IU~ITY PSYCHIATRY 105 (1976); 
Stei n , Test, & Marx, Alternative to the Hospital: A Controlled Study, 132 AM. J. PsYCHIATR Y 78 
(1977). 
Of course, hospitalization does h:lVc its advocate s . See, e.g . , Rabiner & Lurie, The Case 
for Psychiatric Hospitalization , 131 AM. J. PSYCHL\TR Y 761 ( 1974). Al so , too often the promi ses 
of communit y treatment do not materiali ze. Arnhoff , Social Consequences of Policy Toward 
Mental Illness , \88 Sc i. 1277 (1975) . 
If predictions of communit y adjustment are te sted by observing the behavior of 
in st iT ut iona lized patients who profess ionals believed shou ld no t be relea sed , the likelihood of 
correct prediction of nonadjustment is increased great ly by a phenome non know n as " in-
stitutionalism "-the pati ent' s socialization into dependence on hospital life and the sick role. 
See R. STUA RT, TRICK OR TREAT MENT 21-42 (1970); Townsend , Self-Concept and the In-
stitutionalization of Mental Patients: An Overview and Critique, 17 J. H EA LTH & Soc. BEH AV -
IOR 262 (1976); Wing, Institutionalism in Mental Hospitals , I BRIT. J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 38 (1962). The results of the study reported in Barret , Kuriansky, & Garland , supra, 
are particularly striking in light of this phenomenon. 
134. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY , PHARMACOTHERAPY AND 
PSYCHOTHERAPY: PARADOXES, PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS 279-81 (1 975); May, When, What, and 
Why? Psychopharmacotherapy and Other Treatments in Schizophrenia , 17 COM PREH ENSIVE 
PSYCHIATRY 683, 688 (1976) (antipsychotic drugs do relie ve ' 'primary" symptoms , howe ver) ; 
Scheff , Medical Dominance: Psychoactive Drugs and Mental Hea lth Policy , 19 AM. BEHAV-
IORAL SCIENTIST 299, 300 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Medical Dominance]; see Price v. Shep-
pard, 307 Minn. 250,239 N.W.2d 905,9 13 (1976). Of course, if a person continues to take drugs, 
the unwanted behavior may be constantly suppressed. For example, there is evidence that 
taking lithium salts will help prevent recurrent mania , but the lithium must be taken constantly. 
See Fieve, Lithium Therapy , in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY-II , supra note 26, 
at 1982, 1985. Thi s is not the same as curing the underlying pathology. Further , long-term 
maintenance psychiatric drug treatment has serious risks of side effects. 
!35. See, e.g. , Cole & Davis, Antidepressant Drugs , in COMPREHENSIVE T EXTBOOK OF 
PSYCHI ATRY-II , supra note 26, at 1941; Davis & Cole , Antipsychotic Drugs , in COMPREHENSIVE 
T EXTBOOK OF PSYCHI ATRY-IT , supra note 26 , at 1921 ; May , Rationa l Treatment for an Irrational 
Disorder: What Does the Schizophrenic Patient Need?, 133 A~t. J. PSYCHIATRY 1008 (1976); 
National Insti tute of Mental Hea lth Psychopharmacology Service Center-Collaborat ive Study 
Group, Phenothiazine Treatm ent in Acute Schizophrenia , 10 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIA-
TRY 246 (1964); Smith & Glass , Meta-Analysis of Psych oth erapy Outcome Studies, 32 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 7'52 (1977). For a less optimistic view of the effi cacy of drug treatment of 
schizophre nia , see DuBose, Of the Parens Patriae Commit men! Power and Drug Treatment of 
Schizophrenia: Do th e Benefits to the Patient Justify Involuntary Treatment?, 60 MINN. L REV. 
1149, 1167-209 (1976). See generally GROUP FOR THE ADV ANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY , supra 
note 134; Marholin & Phillips, Methodological Issues in Psychopharmacological Research: 
Chlorproma zine- A Case in Point , 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYC HIATRY 477 ( 1976). 
136. See, e.g., A. STONE, supra note 10 , at 36-37 (lack of ef fecti ve treatment for danger-
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Nearly always, professionals err in the direction of overpredicting the 
occurrence of legally relevant behavior, of overproducing false positives. 137 
Thus, they tend to err in favor of legal intervention. Although there are 
many reasons for professional overprediction of legally relevant behavior 
such as violence, 138 two particular reasons should be em phasized here: 
illusory correlation and professional treatment bias. An illusory correlation 
is a systematic error of observation or prediction based on an assumed 
ousness). Hospitalization involves mainly drug treatment, but drug treatment is effective 
mainly to reduce cognitive and affective symptoms-it does not socially rehabilitate a person. 
See sources cited in note 134 supra. Community care programs are more successful for social 
rehabilitation. See sources cited in note 133 supra. 
Treatment methods developed by mental health science arc usually directly aimed at 
craziness. Except for behavior therapists, less work has been undertaken on developing 
treatments for specific social disabilities. See J. KRUMBOLTZ & C. THORESEN, COUNSELI NG 
METHODS ( 1976) (case studies wherein specific behavioral techniques are applied to specific 
behavioral problems). It appears logical to assume that if crazy behavior is ameliorated, 
consequent legally relevant behavior will also change. This is a commonsense prediction based 
on the observational knowledge that particular craziness is sometimes directly related to 
particular legally relevant behavior. If the craziness is affected, the resultant legally relevant 
behavior should also be. But this is often not the case. Craziness is usually only a part of the 
reason for legally relevant behavior and ameliorating craziness will not necessarily significantly 
change legally relevant behavior even if it is clearly related to the craziness. One noted 
researcher has cogently and eloquently stated the problem in the context of a discussion of the 
limitations of drug therapy for crazy behavior that is termed schizophrenia: 
Treatment of the schizophrenic person will always need people and the kind of things 
that only persons can do. Drugs may be helpful in promoting restitution and restoring 
perceptual control. But, quite apart from unwanted side effects, they do not enlighten 
the patient about his problems, inform him how to adapt, help him to take advantage of 
opportunities, or accept his limitations. They do not repair self-esteem, nor do they 
repair the damage that he has done to his friends and family. They cannot get him a 
job, they cannot make mothers or mothers-in-law change their minds, they don't 
handle traffic violations and ... they cannot teach him to play the violin if he 
couldn't do so before. Obviously, therefore, treatment must include someone who has 
a relationship with the schizophrenic person and who tries to help him with the 
practical affairs of everyday living. 
May, supra note 134, at 689. The costs of providing such treatments for all those persons with 
legally relevant social disabilities would be prohibitive; these treatments are labor intensive and 
therapists are very expensive. See, e.g., G. PAUL & R. LENTZ, PSYCHOSOCIAL TREATMENT OF 
CHRONIC MENTAL PATIENTS (1977). Moreover, there is yet no persuasive evidence that such 
treatments would be reasonably effective given their costs. See Miller, The "Right to Treat-
ment": Can the Courts Rehabilitate and Cure?, PuB. INTEREST, Winter 1977, at 96-107. But see 
G. PAUL & R. LENTZ, supra (successful psychosocial treatment of chronic patients). 
Treatment outcome predictions are completely relevant to mental health law only under a 
"need for treatment" behavioral component standard, a standard that is increasingly in ques-
tion as an appropriate basis for involuntary legal intervention in the actor's life. See notes 215-
18 and accompanying text infra. But see A. STONE, supra note 10, at 66-70 (explicit treatment-
based standard for civil commitment). 
137. Two other important terms: When a prediction is made that an actor will behave a 
certain way and then he does not do so, the case is termed a "false positive." Similarly, an 
incorrect prediction that a particular behavior will not occur is termed a "false negative." When 
experts or laypersons predict future behavior, both types of false predictions will far outnum-
ber correct ones. 
138. Monahan, supra note 130, at 13, 22-25; Shah, supra note 125, at 227-30. Other 
reasons given are (I) lack of corrective feedback to the predictor; (2) differential consequences to 
the predictor (i.e., it is safer for the predictor to overpredict violence and incarcerate too many 
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relationship between two variables that does not exist in fact. 139 For in-
stance, a clinician may predict that a mentally disordered person will be 
violent because the clinician erroneously believes that as a rule mentally 
disordered persons behave significantly more violently or incompetently 
than noncrazy persons. But the stereotypes are incorrect; crazy persons are 
probably not considerably more violent, criminal, or incompetent than 
' 'norma!·· persons. 14D 
Treatment bias refers to the professional attitude that incorrect failure 
to treat is a greater error than treating unnecessarily . 141 Mental health 
professionals are well-meaning clinicians whose whole training orients them 
to fine! problems and remedy them . Thus, they tend to overcliagnose and 
overpredict. This is perhaps especially true in the mental health field where 
there arc fewer objective criteria of illness and less prognostic knowledge 
than in physical medicine. 
In the absence of good probability data, the best data to use for 
predicting future specific behavior is past behavior in similar situations. 142 
Such data, if available at all, is of course available to all persons. In such 
cases, predictions can and should be based on commonsense lay judgment. 
Everybody makes predictions about the future behavior of his fellows and 
often relies on those predictions. If an employee decides on Sunday to wait 
until Tuesday to ask his boss for a raise because the boss is always grumpy 
on Monday, he is making and relying on a (probably quite accurate) 
prediction of the boss's behavior. 143 Neither a diagnosis nor a "dynamic 
people than to underpredict and release someone who may cause harm and thus cast doubt on 
the accuracy and wisdom of the predictor); (3) differential consequences to the subject (i.e .. 
using the prediction of dangerousness in order to achieve other goals such as tacit retribution in 
the case of indefinite confinement of a "mentally disordered sex offender"); (4) unreliability of 
the criterion (e.g., the vague definition of the behavior to be predicted, or the fact that the 
prediction itself may influence the later labeling of an actor as within the predicted class); (5) 
low base rates (discussed at note 123 supra); and (6) powerlessness of the subject (i.e., those 
about whom predictions are made, e.g., prisoners and mental patients, may be unable to 
challenge incorrect predictions). 
139. Chapman & Chapman, Illusory Correlation as an Obstacle to the Use of Valid 
Psychodiagnostic Signs, 74 J. ABNORMAL PsYCHOLOGY 271, 272 ( 1969); see note 138 supra. 
140. See notes 24, 98 and accompanying text supra. 
141. Dershowitz, supra note 113, at 46-47; Scheff, supra note 50, at 97. 
!42. W. MISCHEL, supra note 54, at 135. Indeed, past behavior is a key variable used in 
creating actuarial predictive data and typically it is the best predictor. See , e.g., H. Sn-:-\mP.N 
& J. CocozzA, supra note 24 , at 107, 152-53 (only age and a legal dangerousness scale based on 
past behavior distinguished returnees originally released pursuant to Baxstrom v. Herold, 398 
U.S. 107 (!966). from nonreturnees); Monahan, supra note 130, at 3, 16-22. 
!43. For interesting and useful analyses of such predictions, see generally Ajze n, Intuitive 
Theories of Events and the Effects of Base-Rate Information on Prediction, 35 J. PERSCJN.~LITY 
& Soc. PsYCHOLOGY 303 (1977); Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuris-
tics and Biases, 185 Sci. I 124 (1974). 
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formulation·' of the boss or anyone else seems to increase substantially the 
accuracy of predictions of a person's specific future behavior. 144 If there is 
no good, directly relevant data, lay prediction is thus likely to be as accurate 
as expert prediction. 
3. Summary 
In general, mental health professionals (and laypersons) are more likely to 
be wrong than right when they predict legally relevant behavior. ·when 
predicting violence, dangerousness, and suicide, they are far more likely to 
be wrong than right. Although statistical prediction is nearly always more 
accurate than clinical prediction, it remains highly inaccurate. 
How the mental health legal system should respond to scientific data 
about behavioral prediction is hardly a scientific matter. Analysis of the 
costs and benefits of interventions based on predictions should rely on 
scientific evidence, but that evidence is not dispositive per se. To decide 
how much unwarranted infringement on liberty, autonomy, and dignity 
based on false prediction is acceptable compared to the benefits conferred by 
special treatment of crazy persons requires social, moral, political, and legal 
weighing of interests; the degree of successful prediction necessary to 
authorize intervention is not a scientific determination. The mental health 
legal system need not abandon rules that require predictions. But when 
legislatures make such rules or when factfinders make predictions, whether 
or not based on expert testimony, they should be aware of how inaccurate 
those predictions are likely to be. 
IlL APPLICATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of the analyses presented in the preceding section, this section will 
first explore the relevance of expertise and its proper role in legal decision-
making. It will then turn to an examination of substantive mental health 
laws. 
A. THE RELEVANCE OF EXPERTS 
This Article has examined the nature of the questions asked by mental health 
laws when crazy behavior causes a legal problem. It has argued that 
these issues are primarily social and legal questions that call for common-
sense social and moral determinations, and that answering them requires 
considerably less scientific expertise than is commonly supposed. Further, a 
clear implication of much of the previous argument that will be explored in 
144. Ennis & Litwak, supra note 25, at 700-11. Indeed, a diagnosis does not describe with 
accurate specificity the person's abnormal behavior. !d.; see notes 168-77 and accompanying 
text infra. 
1978] CRA Z Y BEHA VJOR 601 
Sect ion fii.B is that there is less reaso n than is usu ally be lie ved to give 
specia l consideration to c raziness as a variab le that may affect legally 
re levan t behavior. 
Still, society w ill probabl y continue to conside r crazi ness a spec ial 
fac to r fo r so me time. Craziness w ill probab ly co ntinue to be a focus of legal 
decis ionmak ing when it seems related to legal ly relevant behavior, and the 
law is likel y to turn to mental health experts for ass istance in ex pl aining and 
dea ling with it. Crazy peopl e simply appe ar too diffe rent to be trea ted like 
eve ryone else, and mental health laws do auth or ize, albei t ineffi cien tly and 
often unfairly , seemingl y des irable result s (e.g. , preventive de tention of 
dangerous persons) that might not be eas il y reached by o ther means. 
It is important , howeve r, th at the law continues to di s tinguish legal 
cri te ria from mental heal th sc ience criteria because the goals of each are 
different. Mental health science is co nce rn ed mainly with clinical and 
research purposes . The law is concerned with crazy beha vior for soc ial and 
moral purposes. This distinction sugges ts that mental hea lth experts should 
play a much more limited role in mental health law decisions than present 
practice permits . 145 It will be argued that mental health experts should be 
limited to testifying about behavior they observe and in limited cases about 
relevant reasonably hard scientific data. They should not be allowed to 
testify about theoretical matters that are in dispute or to state conclusions 
that are not based on firm scientific evidence. The thrust of the argument is 
that very little mental health knowledge meets the standards for expertise 
required by law. 
It is a matter of hornbook law that experts are qualified to draw 
inferences from facts that jurors are not competent to draw. Thus , expert 
testimony is appropriate when the subject of the infe rence is "so distinctive-
ly related to some science, profession .. . as to be beyond the ken of the 
average layman. " 146 It is also a matte r o f ho rnbook law that expert tes-
145. Other commentators have also addres se d thi s issue . See J. ZISKIN, supra note 25; 
A lbe rs, Pasewark , & Meyer , Involuntary Hospitalization and Psychiatric Testimony: The 
Falibility [sic] of the Doctrine of Imm aculate Perception , 6 C APITAL U.L. R Ev. II (1976); 
Bartholomew & Milte, The Reliability and Validity of Psychiatric Diagnosis in Courts of La w, 
50 AUSTL. L.J. 450, 457-58 (1976) ; E nn is & Litwak , supra note 25 , a t 735-44; Leifer, Th e 
Competence of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of Incompetency: A Sceptical 
Inquiry into th e Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists , 14 SYRACUS E L. REv. 564 ( 1963). 
See generally Schulma n , To Be Or Not To Be an Expert, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 57 , 64-66 ; 
Weihofen , Detruding the Experts, 1973 WASH. U. L. Q . 38. Another article with a di ffere nt 
focus, w hich neverthe le ss co ntributes a n e normous amount to thinking abo ut the ro le of 
experts , is fllstifi cations , supra no te 36. 
Although thi s Article 's conclus ions agree substantially with man y of these wr iters, the 
p rese nt e mphas is is often different and th e author is somewhat more optimist ic about the 
poss ible role of mental hea lth ex perti se. 
146. C. McCORMICK, HA NDBOOK OF THE L AW OF EV IDENC E 29 (2d e d . 1972). 
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timony will not be a llowed if the state of the relevant scientific discipline 
does not allow for reasonable opinions even by an expert. 147 It is , o f course, 
widely believed that inferences about mental disorder and its co nsequences 
fa ll within the c rite ri a of the proper scope of ex pert te stim o ny . 14R As Sec tion 
II of thi s Article demonstrated, however, much of the sc ience of me ntal 
health is uncertain and expertise is extremely limited , especially when legal 
standards must be applied. Although the law has given mental experts 
considerable responsibility for helping decide legal qu es tions rai sed by 
crazy behavio r , experts have less compete nce to assis t in these decisions 
th an is commo nly believed. M oreover, much of the factual knowledge 
necessa ry for lega l decisionmaking is access ible to lay observers as well as 
experts. 
The use of experts encourages courts, leg islatures, and lega l dec ision-
makers to avo id the hard soc ial, moral, and legal questions posed by mental 
health laws by responding as if there we re scientific answers to them . This 
tendency is exacerbated when mental health questions are often conflated 
with ultimate legal questions and experts are allowed to draw conclusions 
about legal issues. For instance, in United States v. Brawner, 149 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia adopted the Model 
Penal Code test for the insanity defense, 150 and specifically allowed experts 
to testify whether , in the expert' s opinion , the defendant met the test as a 
res ult of mental di sease. 15 1 Whether a person lacks substantial capacity 
e ither to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct 
to law is not , however, a scientific question. 152 As the court recognized, the 
insanity defense tes t requires an ethical and legal judgment and not a 
sc ientific conclusion. 153 When experts testify on ultimate legal issues, they 
147. /d . at 3 1. 
148. For a lis ting of the numerous legal standard s to which psyc hiatri c testimo ny is 
re levant , see Mezer & Rheingold, Mental Capacity and Incompetency: A Psycho-Legal Prob-
lem , 118 AM . J. PSYCHIATRY 827-28 ( 1962). 
149. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
ISO. fd. at 973. The ALI standard adopted by the Brawner court reads as follow s: 
( I) A person is not respo nsi ble for cri minal co ndu ct if a t the tim e of suc h 
conduct as a result of menta l disease or defect he lac ks substantial ca pacit y either to 
a pprec iate the c rimina lity [wro ngfulness] of his conduct or to co nform hi s conduct to 
the req uire ments of law. 
(2) As used in this Article, the te rms " mental disease or defect" do not include 
an abnormality mani fes ted on ly by repeated cr imina l or otherwise anti -soci a l co nduct. 
MooE L PENAL CoDE§ 4.0 1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). 
151. U nited State s v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 , 1006 & n.82 (D.C. Cir. 1972). This is the so-
ca lled "ca usalit y" o r "prod ucti vity " requirement. 
152. If a n expert test if ies tha t a particu lar state of mind is a res ul t of me nta l disease, he is 
impl ic itl y testifying that there is a n objective, scientifically me asurable state of mind prod uced 
by a simil arly object ive ly ide ntifi able disease a nd that he has s pecial knowledge about such 
a sra te of mind and disease. As we have seen in Section II and will see further in thi s section , 
there is co nsid erab le reason to believe tha t such special knowledge is lac king . 
153. United S ta tes v. Brawner , 47 1 F .2d 969, 101 8- 19 (D .C. Ci r. 1972). 
r ·-. 
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are offering unscientific value judgments that are no more reliable or entitled 
to weight than lay judgments. 
The difficulty of the questions presented and the confusion of legal and 
me nt al health issues often lead to three results: courts abdicate responsibility 
fo r dec iding legal iss ues independently , 15-+ or become confused about the 
iss ues, or both. In nonadversary proceedings, legal decisionmakers tend to 
treat the decision as a scientific matter and to ratify the conclusions of the 
expe rt s. 155 If the proceedings are truly adversary, with each side represented 
by competent counse l and competent psychiatri sts , the social and moral 
iss ues tend to be obscured by the confusion and conflict over what appear to 
be scientific matters. 156 
Responsibility for deciding legal questions conce rning crazy behavior 
must be accepted by legal decisionmakers . If crazy persons are to be 
depri ved of liberty , "fixed" against their will s, or are to have the usual lega l 
s ignificance of their actions negated , such decisions should be made with 
the full realization that they are extremely difficult social and moral deci-
s ions and not simply legal ratifications of scientific judgments. This Article 
contends that laypersons are perfectly competent both to provide most of the 
observational data necessary for mental health decisions and to make such 
decisions. Despite the general competence of laypersons and the dangers of 
reliance on experts, it is also argued that for limited purposes experts will 
be able to furnish helpful data . They should not , however, be allowed to 
154 . See notes 13, 16 a nd accompanying text supra . 
155. See note 16 supra. Even if one side is represented by a n adve rsary expert , judges a nd 
juries te nd to defer to an " impa rtia l expert " appointed by the court. 
156. See Goldstein & Fine , The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrist , and the Insanity 
Defense, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1061, 1073-74 (1962). 
A me ntal health proceeding is truly adversarial only if both s ides are represented by 
a ttorne ys and psychiatrists. At the least, the party disputing the a llegations of craziness should 
be represented by a zealous attorney who understands mental health la w and science and who is 
abl e e ffectively to cross-examine mental health experts. Whe re the attorney disputing allega-
ti o ns o f c raz iness perform s o nl y pe rfunctorily, the proceeding ca nno t be considered trul y 
ad versari a l. See Cohen , supra note 15 , a t 446-49; Wexler , supra note 16 , a t 51-60. Even w here 
a tt o rneys a re present and effective , however, and where pe rsuas ive independent e vidence of 
c raziness and legally relevant beha vior is absent , judges still de fe r unduly to psychia tric 
co nc lu sio ns. Hiday, supra no te 16, a t 664. 
Of course , the need for effec tive legal and psychia tric repre sentation is increas ingly 
recogni zed. See, e.g., State ex rei. Memel v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 276 , 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977); 18 
U .S .C.A § 3006A(a) & (e) (We st Supp. 1977) (right of criminal defendants to obtain nece ssa ry 
ex pe rts); WASH. REv. COD E ANN. § 71:05.470 (1975) (right to independent psychiatrist of one' s 
c hoice in civil commitment proceeding) ; Farrell, The Right of an Indigent Civil Commitment 
Defendant to Psychiatn'c Assistance of His Own Choice at State Expense, II IDAHO L. REv . 141 
( 1975) ; No te , The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 
84 Y AL E L.J 1540 (1975 ). 
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draw conclusions or to state their data in other than commonsense and 
observational terms. There are no scientific answers to legal questions such 
as whether the actor's behavior is normal or whether he could have behaved 
otherwise. Moreover, the categories and theories of mental health science 
are at present too imprecise and speculative to help clarify legal ques-
tions.157 When scientific expertise is used, it should be based on direct 
observations or other hard data. The legal decisionmaker should not be 
offered unscientific theories or conclusions that are supported mostly by the 
Aesculapian authority of unproven expertise. 158 
To support these contentions, this section will return to an analysis of 
the three questions raised by mental health laws 159 and examine the role of 
expertise in answering them. The analysis will not try to be exhaustive and 
cover every possible instance where expertise might be relevant. Rather, it 
will suggest the general areas in which expertise may or may not be helpful 
and the general form in which expert testimony should be offered. 160 
1. Expertise and Normality 
The crucial question for the law is not, or at least should not be, whether the 
actor allegedly fits one of the mental health diagnostic categories, but 
whether the actor behaves crazily enough to warrant special legal treatment 
on moral and social grounds. The law must therefore decide on legal 
grounds and for legal purposes which cases fit this criterion of sufficient 
craziness. These decisions should not and cannot be totally dependent on 
scientific categories that may serve other purposes, and experts should not 
testify about whether an actor suffers from a mental disorder or even about 
whether the actor is normal. Conclusions about mental disorder or psychiat-
157. Justifications, supra note 36, at 80; see notes 161-65 and accompanying text infra. 
158. Some commentators have suggested that physicians possess a unique kind of authori-
ty that is based on a combination of knowledge and expertness, moral authority, and charisma. 
This authority is strengthened by the facts that medicine deals with death and was once unified 
with religion. Siegler & Osmond, Aesculapian Authority, 1 HASTINGS CENTER STUD. 41-43 
(1973). This unique authority may be extended, however, to spheres where it is not applicable. 
Many commentators believe that crazy conduct is not a medical matter and that the psychia-
trist's authority in judicial proceedings is improper and derives solely from the magico-religious 
background of much of medicine. See generally authorities cited in notes 13-14 supra. Of 
course, Siegler and Osmonj believe that crazy behavior is a sphere where the authority of 
physicians is appropriate. In either case, the concept is useful for understanding the power of 
medical experts in the mental health legal system. See generally Bazelon, The Perils of Wizard-
ry, 131 A:-..1. J. PSYCHIATRY 1317 (1974); Starr, Medicine and the Waning of Professional 
Sovereignty, 107 DAEDALUS 175, 175-76 (1978). 
159. The three questions are: Is the person normal?; Could the person have behaved 
otherwise?; How will the person behave in the future') 
160. See generally Einhorn, Expert Judgment: Some Necessary Conditions and an Exam-
ple, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 562 (1974). 
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ric normality are not particularly and precisely relevant to legal decisions 
about normality. Rather , for various reasons , experts should be limited to 
describing behavior to the factfinder that laypersons may not notice but that 
may be relevant to legal deci sionmaking . 
The fir st reason for limiting expe rts to descriptions of behavior is that 
their conclusions are based , in part, on mental health diagnostic categories 
that are gene rall y overinclu sive. These categories are much broader than the 
crazy behaviors that seem to compel special legal treatment. 161 The various 
di sorder categories delineated by both the present and proposed diagnostic 
manuals of the American Psychiatric Association 162 may be ranged along a 
qu antitative and qualitative continuum of craz iness. Some categories seem 
to describe behavior that wo uld be considered quite crazy, at least in its 
extreme forms, by anyone. 163 Others desc ribe behavior that would not be 
considered crazy and, at worst, would be considered normally quirky. 164 
Thus , present definitions of mental disorder cover such a wide range of 
behavior that vast percentages of the population may be considered disor-
161. See Pollack , The Role of Psychiatry in the Rule of Law , in PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE 
L EGA L PROCESS: DIAGNOSIS AND DE BATE II , 18 (R. Bonnie ed. 1977); notes 37-38 and accom-
panying text supra. 
162. DSM-II, supra note 26; DSM-III , supra note 26. 
163. See, e.g. , Ca ta tonic Schizophrenia : 
It is frequently possible and useful to distingui s h two subtypes of catatonic 
schizophrenia. One is marked by excessive and sometimes violent motor activity and 
excitement and the other by generalized inhibition manifested by stupor, mutism, 
negativism , or waxy flexibility. In time , some cases deteriorate to a vegetative state . 
DSM-II , supra note 26 , at 33-34. 
The essential feature is a marked psychomotor disturbance which may involve 
particular forms of stupor, rigidity, excitement or posturing. Sometimes there is a 
rapid alte rnation between th e extremes of excitement and stupor. Associated features 
inc lude negativism , stereotypes, manneris ms, and waxy flexibilit y . Muti sm is particu-
larly common. Thi s subtype is not applicable in the presence of the full depressive or 
manic syndrome, which is suggestive of the Schizo-affective subtypes. 
This subtype tends to be associated with two different courses: one with an abrupt 
onset whic h is frequently followed by periodic remi ss ions and recurrences (sometimes 
called periodic catato nia) , and the other with a chronic course without remission. 
During catatonic stupor or excitement the patient needs careful supervision and 
his illnes s may constitute a medical emergency because of the risks of starvation , 
ex hausti on, or inflicting injury o n himself or others . 
DS M-TII , supra note 26 , a t C:lO. 
164. See, e.g., Inadequate Perso nality: 
This behavior pa ttern is characteri zed by ineffectual re sponses to emotiona l, 
social, inte llectual and physical demands . While the pa tient seems neither physically 
nor mentally deficient , he does manife st inadaptability , ineptness, poor judgme nt , 
social instability, and lack of physical a nd emotional stamina. 
DSM-II, supra note 26, at 44; or, Avoidant Personality Disorder (Other): 
The essential fe atures are excessive soc ial inhibitions and shyness, a tendenc y to 
w ithdraw from opportunitie s for de veloping close rela tionships, a nd a fearful expecta-
tion that the y will be belittled and humilita ted. Desires for a ffection and acceptance 
are strong but they are unwilling to enter relationships unless given unu s ually strong 
guarantees that they will be uncritically accepted. Therefore, they have few close 
relation ships and suffer from fee lings of loneliness and isolation. 
DSM-III , supra note 26 , at K: 13; or , Compuls ive Personality Di sorder: 
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dered , including most persons whom the legal system would not consider 
crazy or different enough to warrant special treatment. A la rge proportion of 
the diagnostic categories simply do no t describe behavior that seems very 
crazy and the inexorable product of a deranged mind. If no conclusions 
about diagnosis, illness, disease, or abnormality are draw n by experts, the 
law will avoid the confusion engendered by the metaphysical complexities 
of the mental health debate about which behavi ors ought to be labeled and 
considered illnesses. 165 Further , whether behavior is considered disordered 
for clinical or research purposes should not be dispositive of legal decision-
making where narrower moral and soci al definitions of craz iness are appro-
priate. 
The second reason for limiting ex perts to descripti ons of behavior is 
that particular diagnoses do not accurately convey legall y relevant informa-
tion concerning the person's behavior . A diagnosis will no t inform the law 
whether, how, or to what degree an actor behaves crazily . The major related 
reasons for this fact are that present psychiatric diagnoses are not highly 
reliable or descriptively precise. 166 
The es se ntial feature s are excessive emotional control and concern with confor-
mity and adherence to internalized standards. There is usually a conspicuo us concern 
with matters of order , organization and efficiency. Everyday relationships usually 
have a conventional , formal and serious quality to them, often precluding personal 
informality and unstruc tured relaxation. There often is a perfectionis m , a tende ncy to 
inappropriate focus on details and to be upse t by deviations from the routine . A 
premium is often placed on work and productivity to the exclusion of pleasure a nd the 
value of interpersonal relationships. 
DSM-III , supra note 26, at K :15. 
165 . As we have seen , underlying abnormality has been demonstrated to be a cause of only 
a tiny fr ac tion of crazy behaviors, and many of the persons who exhibit these beha viors do not 
suffer unduly nor are they significantly dysfunctional. See notes 26-28 , 36-37 and accompany-
ing text supra. Nonetheless, it is easy to see why those people whose behavior places the m in 
the categories that do seem to describe obvious craziness are also considered disordered. In 
addition to being crazy, such persons often suffer or behave significantly dysfunctionally 
according to dominant social standards. It doe s not strain common sense or the analogy to 
physical illness to co nsider the behavior of such pe rso ns di sordered or to consider them ill. 
It is not apparent, however, why categories that do not describe obvious craziness are 
considered disorders. There is no scientific or even commonsense a nswer to thi s questi on; 
rather , the answer is a product of how mental health sc ience developed in this century. Menta l 
health scientists, especially in the United State s, came to believe th at their provi nce was no t 
only di sabled and agonized persons who were "out of their minds," but also the total range of 
behavioral maladaptation , the complete sphere of normal unhappiness, quirkiness, suffering, 
and ev il. Kendell , supra note 34. For instance , criminal behavior, homosex uality , and quirky 
neatness have a ll been viewed as "symptoms " of mental d isorder. See generally A. F LEW, 
supra note 40; sources cited in note 14 supra. There seems little justification for labeling such 
behavior as di seased or di sordered, however , and the term "i llness" is used largely because 
mental health scie nti sts have decided to appl y it to suc h behavior. Indeed , many me ntal health 
scienti sts are now suggesting that their proper domain should be lim ited to the grosser form s o f 
craziness. Kendell , supra note 34, at 314; Kety, supra note 14 , at 962. 
166 . Mental health sc ienti sts often refer to descriptive precision as a matte r of validity. 
."'1 
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rn behavioral science , reliability is a complex construct, but for the 
purposes of legal decisionmaking abo ut abnormality it can be defined as the 
accuracy of a diagnos is . The preeminent "measuring tool" used to make 
diagnoses is a human observer applying the present diagn ostic categories to 
behavior. Unlike much physical disorder that often can be ve rifi ed by 
various tests that measure pathology (w hether or not the cause of the 
symptom, syndrome, or condition is known), there is no objective, emp iri-
cal referent of mental disorder other than crazy behavior itself. 167 Indeed, 
the only possible verification of the presence o f mental disorder is by a 
consensus of those who have observed the actor's behavior. There is no 
postmortem patholog ical examination or other diagnostic procedure to 
verify conclusively whether or not a perso n suffered from a particular 
disorder or any di sorder at all. Even if objectively verifiable referents other 
than behavior itself are present , an actor is not considered mentall y disor-
dered unless he behaves crazily. 
In a sense, there is no such thing as an independently "correct" or 
"incorrect" mental health diagnosis ; there are only agreed on and disagreed 
on diagnoses. 168 The crucial issue, then , is the extent of agreement achieved 
by professional diagnosticians when they apply their categories of disorder 
to behavior itself. The best evidence of the reliability of present diagnostic 
categories indicates that if two professionals independently diagnose a 
perso n on the basis of the same or similar data , it is rare for them to agree on 
the diagnosis in more than half the cases. The large amount of disagreement 
is not narrowed appreciably by limiting the possible diagnoses to broad 
diagnostic categories. 169 Thus, mental health diagnoses are not terribly 
reliable; people who do not have mental disorder or a specific disorder will 
Evaluative Criteria, supra note 25, at 145-46. 
167. See notes 26-31 and accompanying text supra; note 168 and accompanying text infra. 
168. E.g., Kend ell , Cooper, Gourlay, Copeland, Sharpe, & Gurland, supra not e 40 , at 
128: " One can not meaningfully discuss which [concept of schizophrenia] is right, for we have 
no external c rite rion to appeal to-no morbid anatomy , no et iological age nt , no biochemical or 
ph ysiological ano mal y ." This, of course, is why the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis is 
measured by the degree of agree ment of two judges who have observed th e actor's behavior. It 
also expla ins in part why psychiatric di agnoses are so eas ily manipul able by the social-
psychological context in which diagnoses are made. Temerlin, Suggestion Effects in Psychiatric 
Diagnosis , in LABELING MADNESS 46-54 (T. Scheff ed. 1975) ; Cohen, Harbin , & Wright , Some 
Considerations in the Formulations of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 160 J. N ERVOU S & MENTAL Dts-
EASE 422 ( 1975); Rosenhan , supra note 50; Temerlin & Thorsdale, The Social Psych ology of 
Clinical Diagnosis, 6 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RES EARCH & PR.ACT. 24 (1969). 
169. Enn is & Litwak, supra note 25, at 699-708; Helzer, Clayton , Pambakian, Reich , 
Woodruff , & Reveley , supra note 47; Spitzer & Fleis s , supra note 47 (re-a nal ysi s of s ix 
studies). 
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be diagnosed as having it, and vice versa. Of course, in clear cases everyone 
will agree the ac tor is crazy, but such cases are few. 
Mental hea lth diagnoses are unreliable and thus do not accurately 
con vey information for many reasons, but two causes require discussion 
here: observer variance (d ifferences resulting from charac teri stics of the 
diagnostician) , and criterion variance (differences resulting from the impre-
cision of the diagnos ti c caregori es). 170 A diagnostician's ori entation, person-
al characteri stics, va lues, and preferences must play so me role in hi s 
observation and evalu ation of behavior because behavior always has a social 
Table 3-:\ Co mpa rison of Diagnostic Agree me nt 
Sp itzer and Fleiss Present Study 
Mean 
Di agnost ic Ca tegory k k Di agnos ti c Ca tegor y 
Affective disorder .41 .55 De pression 
Manic dep ress ive I" ·-·' .82 Ma nia 
Sociopath y .53 .81 Antisocia l pe rso na lity 
Anxiet y react ion .45 .76 Anxiet y neuros is 
Alcoholi s m .71 .74 Alcoholism 
Schizophrenia .57 .58 Schizophren ia 
Organic bra in sy ndro me .77 .29 Organic brain syndrome 
Helzer , Clayton, Pa mabakia n , Reich, Woodruff, & Revel ey, supra note 47 , at 139. Some 
observations a bout these fi gures a re necessary . First , the se reliabilit y fi gure s are statistica ll y 
s ignificant , a ltho ugh the y are quite low in an absolute sense. Second , the lowes t re li abilit y 
occurs for so me of the diagnoses tha t are especially pertinent to mental health law, e.g., 
a ffectiv e disorder a nd schizophrenia. Third, in the Helzer study, the reliability of the diagno sis 
of organic brain sy ndrome , a condition with a n allegedly physica l etiology, was extremely low . 
Diagnos tician s hope that by increas ing the spec ificit y of the behaviora l criteria for specif ic 
diagno ses, their reli a bility will be increased. Indeed, the Helzer group was able to achi eve 
somewhat higher tha n usual re li ability because it used research criteria that are co ns iderably 
more explici t tha n those in c urre nt use. These criteria are described in Feighner , Robins, Gu ze , 
Woodruff , Winoku r, & Munoz, Diagnostic Cn"teria for Use in Research, 26 ARCHIVES OF 
GENERAL PsYCHIATRY 57 (1972). But not only were the criteria used more explicit than those 
ge nerall y in use, th ey ma y not co mport well with cli nica l reality , acc o rding to othe r in ves -
tiga tors . Ke ndell , supra note 25 ; T aylor & Abra ms, A Critique of the St . Louis Psychiatric 
Research Criteria for Schizophrenia , 132 AM. J. PSYCHI ATRY 1276 ( 1975) . See generally R. 
KEND ELL, supra note 25, at 29-39; Hel zer, Robins , T a ibleson, Woodruff , Reich, & Wish, supra 
note 25. 
It is often point ed out that diagnoses of ph ys ical disorders are a lso quite unre liable. Eve n 
so. the consequences of unreli ability a re considerably different. Physical diagnoses rarely lead 
to stigmatizing special legal treatment that deprives persons of rights or brands them as lacking 
in behav ioral aut o no my and dignity . Simpl y put , behavioral a bnormalit y impli es vas tl y more 
negative mora l a nd lega l evaluation than does most physica l a bnormal it y. 
170. Other reasons give n for unreli a bility are: (I) subject variance-<:lifferences result ing 
from patients having different co ndition s at different times; (2) occasion variance-<:lifference s 
resulting from pa ti en ts being in differe nt s tages of the sa me condition a t diffe re nt time s; (3) 
information varian ce-difference s re sulting from ra ters having differe nt informa ti o n a bout the 
patient; (4) observation varian ce-diffe rences res ulting from differing characteri zat ions of the 
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and moral conrext. 17 1 Of course, good diagnosticians try to be as socially 
and morally value-neutral as possible, but the problem cannot be avoided 
entirely, and it is heightened when the diagnosis has powerful ethical, 
social, or political implications. 
Legal cases involve just such implications ; observations, diag-
noses, or other conclusions in the context of legal decisionmaking will be 
consc iously or unconsciously affected by the diagnostician's feeling s about 
the issue in question. 172 For instance , a hardnosed forensic psychiatrist 
might be expected to diagnose much malingering or benign disorder among 
those seeking to avoid criminal responsibility , whereas a more softhearted 
same stimu li; (5) context variance- differences resulting from differing contexts in which the 
behavior may occur. Ennis & Li twack, supra note 25 , at 719-32; Spitze r, Endicott , & Robins, 
supra no te 25 , at 1187-88. 
A theoretical reason for unreliabilit y that needs no ex tended di sc uss ion here is whet he r 
mental di sorder is a condit ion of the person or whether d isordered behavior is a product of 
interac tions between the person and the en vironment. See note 124 supra. If the latter is more 
nearly correct, then a diagnosis primari ly of the person makes little sense . For purposes of this 
di sc uss ion , howe ver, we sha ll assume that the diagnostic process is conceptually coherent. 
17 1. 8. BRAG INSKY & D. BR.-\GINSKY, MAINSTREAM PSYC HOLOGY: A CRITIQUE 120-32 
(1974); Ennis & Litwak , supra note 25, at 726-29; cf. Abramowitz & Dockeki, The Politics of 
Clinical Judgment: Early Empirical Returns, 84 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 460 (1977) (review of 
studies examining the e ffect on examiner judgment of various patient and examiner variables; 
mixed results found for race, sex , class, values; a nalys is of political values yields most 
consistent results-prejudice found aga inst political di ss idents). A major bias of menta l heal th 
professionals is a prefere nce for diagnosing mental di sorder. See note 50 and accompanying 
text supra. Observer variance will of course depend on the context in which the diagnosis is 
made. See also note 168 and accompa nying text supra . 
172. Diamond, Th e Fa/lacy of the Jmpartial Expert, 3 ARCHIVES CRIM. PSYCHODYNA\11CS 
221 ( 1959); Diamond, The Psychiatrist as Advocate , 1 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 ( 1973); Goldstein & 
Fine , supra note 156 , at 1073. Psychiatric observations and opinions bearing on legal issue s are 
thu s especially unsuited to presenta tion in allegedly impa rtial form. See Diamond & Loui sell , 
The Psychiatrist as Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 MtcH. L. REV. 
1335 ( 1965); Goldstein, The Psychiatrist and the Legal Process: The Proposal for an Impartial 
Expert and for Preventive Detention, 33 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 123 (1963); sources cited in 
note 171 supra. But see Griffin, Jmpartial Medical Testimony: A Trial Lawyer in Favor, 34 
TEMP. L.Q. 402 (1961). 
If there is an adversar ial presentation, the judge or jury can decide which side has 
presented better observa tional data or more persuasive opinions. If , however, there is only one 
allegedly impartial expert, the jury is likely to believe that the impartial expert is presenting 
unbiased a nd scientifically correct testimony. An unbiased and purely objective scie ntific 
menta l hea lth expert , however , is an illu s ion . Of course, problems of bias arise in physical 
medic ine as well, but the difficulty is further compounded in the mental health area where there 
is a much greater Jack of objective standards and reliable measuring instruments--especially if 
only one expert has made the examination. Except in the clearest cases , where no expert will be 
needed, a mental health professional's observations and judgment will be affected by his own 
social a nd political value s and preconce ptions, even if he tries very hard to be objective a nd 
fair. 
For a n interesting argument that scie ntists should use a more adversarial method to resolve 
scientific disputes in some areas, sec Levine, Scientific Method and the Adversary Model: Some 
Preliminary Thoughts , 29 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 661 (1974). 
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profess ional who believes that crime is a symptom of illness and that prisons 
are abominations might be expected to diagnose many more cases of true 
and severe disorder. 173 Thus, in the legal context, expert observations or 
conclusions are usually affected by value judgments, and thereby probably 
tend to be even less reliable than otherwise . 
T he major cause of diagnostic unreliab ili ty--criterion variance- fur-
ther explains why particular diagnoses do not convey legally relevant infor-
mation. Criterion variance is both a general cause of unreliabil ity and a bar 
in spec ific cases to the ability of a diagnosis to convey precise information, 
even when observers agree on the diagnosis. The diagnostic categories of 
mental disorders are descriptions of allegedly recurring clusters of behav-
iors , that is, of recurring patterns of thoughts, feeli ngs , and actions. It is 
hypothes ized that each category describes a more or less distingui shable 
disorder. 174 The present and proposed diagnos ti c categor ies , however, are 
vag ue and overlap; each includes a quite heterogeneous range of behav-
ior. 175 Some persons who rece ive the most seve re di agnoses that seem to 
map legal craziness, such as "schizophrenia," may not be crazy enough to 
warrant spec ial legal treatment . Vastly different behavior, ranging from 
only mildly to wildly crazy, may properly fit into the same and most serious 
diagnostic categories. Thus, even if two psychiatrists do agree on a diag-
nosis, it is impossible to know whether social and moral purposes will be 
173. Dr. Lawrence C. Kol b, former Commiss io ner of the New Yo rk Department of 
Menta l Hygiene has observed: "To believe that a psychiatri st is anything other than a thirteenth 
juror when he pleads to the right/wrong question is utter non se nse.·· Address by Dr. 
Lawrence C. Kolb, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, a t 23 (Sept. 29, 1975) 
(transcript). 
The difficulty of expert bias can arise also in the civi l law context. Consider the case of a 
will contest where the decedent omitted his ch ildren from hi s w ill and left hi s money to a young 
paramour who "befriended" him in his declining years. Assume there is some general 
evidence that the testator's mental powers were failing somewhat at the time he made his will; 
he was not as sharp as he once was, but he was no t totally or near totally disoriented. A 
psychiatri s t who believes in general that such amorous behavior is evidence of senile dementia 
and who feels that the childre n have been treated unfair ly , is likel y to conclude tha t the testator 
was incompe tent and thu s to focus on evidence of craziness. Converse ly , a psychiatrist who 
believes that relationships with paramours enhance the golden years and who firmly believes 
that people should do as they wish with their money , is far more like ly to believe that the will 
was not the product of the testator's declining facultie s and thu s to foc us on evidence of 
normality. 
174. To be more preci se, there has been a long debate about whether eac h mental disorder 
is a distinguishable and finite class of homogeneous behavior clusters or whether di sordered 
behaviors are simply extreme forms of behavior that occu r on a continuum of craziness in the 
general population. The former is termed category c lassif ication while the latter is termed 
dimensional classification. Category class ification is the more popular, but the dimensional 
approach has powerful support. See R. K END ELL, supra note 25 , at 119-36. 
175. See Spitzer , Endicott, & Robins, supra note 25, a t 11 90; Zigler & Phil li ps, Psychiatric 
Diagnosis and Symptomatology, 63 J. AB NO RMAL & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 69, 71-73 (1961). See 
generally sources cited in note 25 supra. One need only consult DSM-II, supra note 26, or 
DSM-Ill , supra note 26 , to appreciate thi s point. See generally Evaluative Criteria , supra note 
25 , at 145-46, 147-48. 
1978] CRAZY BEHA V!OR 611 
served by special legal treatment unless the behavior itself is described to the 
f actfinder. 
A particular diagnosis would be a useful shortcut in normality determi-
nations only if it were based on the same or a very similar type of crazy 
behavior every time the diagnosis was reliably made. It is unfortunate , but 
for legal purposes, present categories of menta! disorder do not meet this test 
of precise particularity. A diagnosis does not convey information about an 
actor's behavior with substantial accurac y and specificity . 176 In sum , the 
banning of diagnostic terms yields no loss in behavioral description for 
purposes of determining normality , and it avo ids the false implications that 
the person suffers from an objectively identifiable (and perhaps uncontrol-
lable) condition with a well-known cause , hi story, and course. 177 
Thi s Article has tried to demonstrate that for the law the answer to the 
question, "Who is normal?" or "Who is crazy?" depends largely on social 
and moral values and goals, and that the question is best resolved by 
laypersons. It has also claimed that mental health categories do not convey 
significant amounts of legally relevant information. There is still a role, 
however, for expert assistance and expert testimony in deciding whether an 
actor is crazy. 
Because experts interact with all types of crazy persons far more often 
than laypersons, they may be especially sensitive to or inquire about behav-
ior that would go unnoticed by laypersons. Laypersons may not know to 
ask, for example, if a person hears voices, entertains crazy beliefs, or has 
trouble sleeping or staying awake. Because the expert is attuned to crazy 
behavior, he may help the factfinder attend to a fuller range of the actor's 
behavior. Nonetheless, the expert need not and should not report conclu-
176. It is not claimed, nor should it be, that current categories are totally lacking in 
usefulness to clinicians and researchers . U sefulness depends on context , and the focu s here is 
on the categories' precision for legal decisionmaking. See generally R. KENDELL, supra note 25, 
at 40-48; Evaluative Criteria, supra note 25. 
177. Another way of stating the point that diagnoses are not ve ry useful for di scussing 
present behavior is to note that they are not valid. In broad terms, thi s means that the members 
of any diagnostic class are not generally homogeneous and are not exclusive in relation to any 
other va riables such as etiology, past behavior , or future behavior. See B.P. DOHR ENWEND & 
B.S. OOHR ENWEND, supra note 38, at 95-109; G. FRANK, supra note 25; Ennis & Litwak , supra 
note 25, at 697-99 , 708-19 ; Frank, Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Review of Research , 81 J. G ENERAL 
PsYCHOLOGY 157 (1969) ; sources cited in note 25 supra. 
In the future, it is of course possible that diagnostic categories may be more highly refined 
and will achieve greater reliability and va lidity. See, e.g . , Murphy, Woodruff , Herjani c, & 
Fisc her , Validity of the Diagnosis of Primary Affective Disorder , 30 ARCHI VES O F G ENE RAL 
PSYCHI ATRY 751 (1974) . But see Kendell , supra note 25. It is believed , for example , that the 
proposed diagnostic criteria in DSM-III will be more reliable and valid. 
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s ions abo ut mental disorder, abnormality, or even craziness; these are legal 
determinations for the judge or jury. It is far more preci se and useful to the 
judge or jury if the expert simply describes his observations of behavior. For 
the legal question of normality, then, the relevant expertise of mental health 
profess ionals is not their ability to draw inferences from data or to form 
opinion s. Rather , their special skill is observational-to perceive behaviors 
that nonexperts may fail to notice. 178 The expert should describe, in as much 
precise but commonsense detail as possible, his observat ions of how the 
person thinks, feels , and acts. The test of relevance for the testimony of 
expert s and laypersons alike should be whether their obse rvations of the 
actor' s behavior shed light on the question of whether the actor is crazy. 
For example, experts should not testify that an actor is "hallucinatory 
and probably schizophrenic.'' Instead, the expert shou ld testify that the 
actor told the expert that on some (specified) occasions , the actor heard or 
hears voices despite the fact that no one was or is talking to him and the 
voices told or tell him the following (specified) things. For another example, 
experts should not testify that an actor ''suffers from loose associations 
when questioned on an ego-threatening topic and is therefore probably 
schizophrenic.'' Rather, the expert should testify that when the expert asked 
the actor certain (specified) questions about topics that seem to mean a lot to 
the actor, the actor responded in the following way (specified by exam-
ples) . 179 Of course, if laypersons such as family, friends , coworkers , or 
neighbors are aware of such behavior, they too can testify about it. 
Using lay as well as expert testimony about the actor's behavior, the 
178. For an explanation of who is a n expert for such purposes, see notes 205-07 and 
accompanying te xt infra. 
179. Descriptions a nd co nclusion s may be difficult to distinguish in so me instances. En nis 
& Litwak, supra note 25, at 743-45. Terms such as "depressed" have both commonse nse , 
de scriptive con not at io ns and technical con notation s . Experts should care fully <~void using 
technical te rm s and s hou ld put their obse rvatio ns in commonsense la ngu age. Because psychiat-
ric term s ge nera ll y descr ibe behavior , nearly always there w ill he ordin a ry la nguage equiva lents 
for jargon. Also, s ince concl usion terms , whether or not technical , are based on observable 
referents, the referents should be described. If possible, it would be most usefu l if the 
factfind er co uld hear a tape recording of the intervi ew o r see a videotape of it. 
It is assume d , too, th at the adversary model wou ld ensure, through the use of adversary 
experts or e ffecti ve c ro ss-examination , that the person' s normal as wel l as crazy behavior 
wou ld be described by the ex pert s. Otherwise, it is far too easy to maJ,;e a person appear crazy 
by selective testimony. Ennis & Litwak, supra note 25, at 745. The problem of se lective 
testimony would be reduced if the factfinder has access to a tape of th e interview. 
One difficulty that will arise from the s uggested mode of testifying concerns th e presenta-
t io n of psyc hological test results. The results of suc h tests are un li ke the data of ord ina ry 
expe ri ence-lay observers have no baseline to measure them again st. If there we re test s that 
validly a nswered legally relevant que stions (wh ich at pre sent there are not ) , the expert would 
hav e to describe the valid ity studies, spec ifying th e probability thar a person who achieved a 
certain test result also behaves sufficiently crazy for legal purposes in real life. 
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decisionmaker can then decide if the person is sufficiently crazy to be an 
appropriate candidate for the application of mental health laws. If the 
factfinder's response to the behavioral data it hears is "so what," then the 
actor probably does not mee t the legal criterion of mental disorder; if the 
response is "that's crazy" or "he's crazy ," then the criterion of mental 
abnormality may be met. 
It is sometimes claimed that experts may be useful in differentiating 
persons who seem to be truly crazy from those who are malingering or 
faking. Expert assistance on the issue of credibility or malinger ing is 
problematical, however. There is little systematic study of the ability of 
experts to identify mental health malingering, and the evidence available is 
not very encouraging. Mental health professionals can be quite easily fooled 
by faking, even when the shamming is rigged to make spotting it easy. I RO It 
is relatively easy to fake clear craziness, 18 1 and even crazy persons learn to 
fake craziness in order to manipulate their environment. 182 Moreover, the 
180. Rosenhan , supra note 50 . In thi s study, psychiatrists at 12 hospitals were una ble to 
de termine that pse ud o pat ient s were indeed faking craz iness when the pseudopa tien ts pre -
se nted themselves at the ho s pitals a nd c laimed to be sufferi ng from symptom patterns neve r 
described before. Furthe r , a lth o ugh the pseudopatients s to pped fa king craziness immedi at e ly 
after gaining admission to the hos pital , the range of time spent in hos pital was from 7 to 52 day s . 
R ose nhan then informed one ho spital that he was planning to sen d more pseudopatients. Of the 
193 pa tients admitted during the "trial" period, 41 were alleged to be pseudopatients by a t leas t 
one member of the staff. In fact, no pseudopatient from Rose nh an' s st udy attempted admis sion 
during the period in question. 
Th e Rosenhan swdy is powerful a nd ha s enormously s trength e ne d the argume nt s that 
di agnoses are unre liabl e a nd tha t ascriptions of memal disorder do not depend on qu a liti es 
within the person but are largely context-dependent. The most forceful c ritique of the s tud y is 
Spitzer, On Pseudoscien ce in Science, Logic in Remission, and Psychiatric Diagnosis: A 
Critique of Rosenhan 's "On Being Sane in Insane Pla ces ," 84 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 442 
( 1975). Rosen han's rejoinder is Rose n han, The Contextual Nature of Psychiatric Diagnosis , 84 
J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 462 (1975). 
For a study that attempts to describe a method for distinguishing true pathology from 
malingering , see Pankrantz, Fausti , & Peed, A Forced-Choice Technique to Evaluate Deafness 
in the Hysterical or Malingering Patient , 4:< J. CONSULTI NG & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 421 (1975). 
181 . See note 180 supra. See also note 89 supra (s tudi es o n impress ion manageme nt ). A 
trul y te lling example comes from a rece nt news item that is worth quoting almos t in full: 
Actors Used for Psychiatric Diagnosis 
Sa ne actors are being used . . in producing videota pes to teach medical s tudent s and 
o the r interested groups how to recognize and deal with variou s forms of mental illnes s 
. the scripts for the tapes a re drawn from act ua l interviews with ps yc hi a tric 
patients, first altering a ny clues that might identify individual pati e nts. Tapes of ac tu al 
interviews cannot be used because of the need to protec t the confidentiality of the 
d oc tor-patient relati o nship . 
"Another pmhlem with real tapes," according to Snibbe, "is that they are either 
too long or too short and that the diagnosis is seldom clearcut. So we hit on the idea o f 
using actors. We found that simulated interviews are almost more helievahle than th e 
real ones and much better from the technical standpoints of photography and voice 
reproduction. Our students seldom realize that they are watching simulations, although 
we do not try to keep it a secre t." 
Ps yc hi a tric News , Feb . 4 , 1977 , a t 23 , col. 4 (emphasis ad ded). 
182. See notes 88-89 supra . 
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reliability of a diagnosis of malingering is further compromised because 
diagnoses tend to be quite unreliable in general. 183 More specifically, where 
malingering is a possibility in a legal case, we might expect the expert's 
determination to depend at least in part on his values and how he wishes the 
case to be decided . 184 Because at present there is no referent other than the 
behavior , there is simply no way to demonstrate that the person is truly 
disordered except by assertion. i SS 
The detection of psychiatric malingering is a question of credibility, 
and on this issue experts are probably not particularly expert. Indeed, to 
determine whether an individual is truly crazy and how crazy in a given 
case, it would probably be more useful to find out as much as possible about 
the events in question and about how the person has behaved in the past. 
Common sense should then be applied to the data. If the actor has never or 
rarely behaved crazily or if there seem to be motives for behaving crazily at 
present, he is more likely to be shamming . If he has behaved crazily in other 
ways and at other times, then it is more likely, although not certain, that he 
is truly crazy at present. 
Another use of experts would be to identify those very few cases in 
which there is a previously unrecognized but explicable physical reason for 
crazy behavior. For example, various neurological and nonneurological 
physical disorders have correlates that mime mental disorder. Further, non-
disease factors such as the ingestion of hallucinogenic drugs can also 
produce crazy behavior. Experts are far more likely to be aware of, inquire 
about, and recognize the various explicable disease and other physiological 
causes of crazy behavior. Although the identification of a cause of possibly 
crazy behavior does not answer the question of whether the person is 
sufficiently crazy to warrant legal intervention, such identification does help 
clarify the question of whether or not the actor is shamming. 186 Moreover, 
needed medical treatment might then be provided. 
183. See notes 25, 47, 166-77 and accompanying text supra. 
184. See notes 171-73 and accompanying text supra. 
185. In the future, however, if powerful biochemical or other predisposing causes of 
craziness are discovered, their identification in an actor who is behaving crazily certainly 
increases the likelihood that the actor is not shamming. Also, some psychological tests such as 
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) may be useful for identifying malin-
gerers when used by a sophisticated tester. Test subjects taking a long and complex instrument 
are unlikely to be aware of the proper "sick" responses. Some studies have at tempted to assess 
the usefulness of the MMPI for distinguishing malingerers, but its validity for this purpose is 
inconclusive. See W. DAHLSTROM, G. WELSH, & L. DAHLSTROM, A N MMPI HANDBOOK: 
RESEARCH APPLICATIONS 133-35 (rev . eel. 1975). 
186. In the absence of demonstrable physical indicia , however, courts should not accept 
speculations from experts about whether the actor is ·'really' · suffering from a physical 
···:w:·• 
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In conclusion, experts shouid serve as gui des to behavior. In clear 
cases, laypersons will have noticed the craziness and littl e expert assistance 
will be needed. In less clear cases, however , the ex pert may focu s the 
court ' s at tention on rel evant behavior that \vou ld not be noticed by layper-
sons . Ex perts may facilitate accurate identi fic ati on of those pe rso ns who are 
crazy , provided that they simply descri be behav ior and do no t superfluously 
and prejudic ially report conclusions about illness, abnmmali ty, or crazi-
ness . 137 
.., Erpertise and Personal R esponsibiiity 
Whethe r an actor could have behaved other than as he did, and whether 
(!i,;,JrLkr \v ith behavioral co rre latt:s . F urth t: r, c:xpc:n-; w ho do tes ti fy about ph ysic al di sorders o r 
indicat,Jrs -; hould be highl y q ua lifi ed as to the ph y,;ica l disorder or indi ca to r in que s ti o n. No 
ph y-; ic ian. fo r in s tance. is a n expert on all phy-; ical medic in e an d ma ny psyc hi a tri sts in 
part icu la r te nd no t to be well qu a lifi e d in p hys ica l med ici ne or even neuro logy . S ee no tes 205 -
0E and accompa nying tex t inf ra. See also S nyder . i'leumlogy in rhe Psychiatry Boards , 134 
A\1. J. PsYC HiATRY 1267 (1 977). For ins tance . s uppose a n ex pe rt tes tifi es that the ac tor' s 
int:xpl ica hle assaulti ve be hav ior may be a cor re late of e pil epsy. T he qu es ti o ns to be ra ised a re: 
h the expert a n expe rt o n ep il e psy 0 ; Has he do ne a ll th e neu rologica l tests cu stom a ril y do ne 0 ; 
How sure is he of the di ag nos is a nd wh y") If the a nswe r to the fi rs t two qu es tions is " no ." the n 
the test imony about epil epsy sho ul d be e xcluded. 
Because physicians may be a ll o wed to state conclus io ns a bout reasonably verifi abl e 
ph ys ica l di sease does not mea n th a t the y should be allowed to dra w co nc lu s ions about unve rifi -
ab le me nta l disease or to o ffe r specul a tive hypotheses about the a ll eged but unid e ntifi ed 
un de rl ying ca use s of cra zy be hav io r . 
IR7. Although it may be diffic ult fo r ex perts (and other w itnesses) to confine themse lves to 
fac tua l obse rvations and to avo id conc lu s io ns, thi s s ho uld no t be undul y burdensome whe n the 
iss ue is whe ther or not the ac tor be haves crazil y . 
Adopti o n of the prese nt syste m would amel iora te ma ny of the probl e ms of reli a bilit y 
prese nted when ps ychiat ri s ts prese nt hearsa y data or form co nc lu s io ns a bout normalit y tha t a re 
based o n hearsay. A full expl o ra ti o n o f the he arsay issu e is beyond th e scope of this Arti c le, but 
a fe w po ints should be noted. Although mental health pro fess io na ls can usually base the ir 
conc lu sions on hearsay if it is th e type of information c us to ma rily relie d on in the field, thi s is 
a n unwi se e xception to the hearsay rul e . In clinical me nta l health prac tice little is at stake if a 
pro fess io na l relies on sources o the r th a n hi s own observ,1ti o ns in for ming opinions. In a court of 
iaw, however, wh ere libert y or ot he r impo rta nt righ ts a re in quest io n , hearsa y source s a re far 
too u nre lia ble on ques ti o ns o f me n ta l hea lth to acce pt the m as the bas is fo r ex pert te s timo ny . 
T he o bjecti vit y and re lia bilit y o f prima ry observers the mse lves, eve n profes sional s, a re in 
grave doubt when san ity is in question ; use of hearsay inc reases the ri sk of unreliability beyo nd 
acce ptable levels . A ll observa ti o na l data s ho uld be desc ripti ve a nd fir s thand. 
E xpert w itnesses w ho have o bserved allegedl y c razy pe rso ns a nd w ish to have the ir 
obse rva ti o ns admitted int o ev ide nce should be in co urt to a ll ow th e oppos ing part y to cross-
exam in t: th e m in order to tes t th e ir obse rva tions a nd ch a rac te ri za ti o ns fo r subjectivity and bi as . 
Baze lon, Psychiatrists and the Adversary Process. 230 SC IENTI FIC AM. 18 (1974). For a tho r-
oug h d isc uss ion of psyc hi a tri c tes timo ny based on he arsay th a t a rgues persuasively that no 
except io n to the he arsay rul e sho uld apply, see Note , H ea rsay Bases of Psychiatric Opinion 
Testimony: A Critique of Federal Rule of E vidence 703 , 5 1 S. CAL. L. R Ev . 129, 154-58 (1977) . 
But see Se idel & G ingric h , Hearsay Ohjecrions to Expe11 Psychiatric Opinion Testim ony and 
the Proposed Federal Rules of E vidence, 39 UM KC L. R EV . 14 1 (1 970-7 1) . 
616 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vo l. 5 1:527 
moral and legal responsibility should be ascribed to him, have been shown 
to be social , moral, and legal questions. They can and should be decided by 
judges or juries on the basis of their commonsense conclusions about the 
actor's behavior. 188 This sec tion suggests that mental health ex perts may be 
able to produce data that will assist the legal decisionmaker ' s determinations 
about responsibility, but it is urged again that experts sho uld not report 
conclusions-in this instance about whether an ac tor could have behaved 
otherwise or was responsible for hi s acts. 
Expert assi stance may be helpful in determining the threshold question 
of whether there is a relationship between craziness and legally relevant 
behavior. As was shown above, this question really asks if there is a 
relationship between crazy thoughts, feelings , and actions and other legally 
relevant behavior . 189 
In determinations of the degree to which a crazy actor is able to control 
hi s behavior, it is desirable to have some picture of how the actor typically 
behaves. If an actor consistently demonstrates crazy thinking or consistently 
gives in to his impulses, it is a fair inference, after all, that this person has 
more difficulty than most persons in thinking straight or controlling himself . 
Of course, it takes no particular expertise to determine how an actor usually 
behaves . The family, friends, and associates of a person typically know hi s 
behavioral traits well and could describe them to a judge or a jury . 
Mental health professionals, however, are constantly concerned with 
observing behavioral processes. They may be especially able to identify 
efficiently and precisely thought processes such as suspiciousness or reac-
tion patterns that seem related to legally relevant behavior. Thus , experts 
may help determine the ways in which the person does not think straight, or 
they might help the factfinder receive a fuller impression of the actor's 
response to his urges. There seems little reason to exclude expert evidence 
that efficiently identifies and describes relevant behavior processes or pat-
terns. Here again, experts can function as acute observers of behavior. They 
can help the factfinder understand an actor by describing in commonsense 
language his reasoning and control processes . 
Another helpful contribution of experts would be to provide probability 
data that would assist the factfinder's determination of whether the actor's 
choices were too hard to ascribe responsibility to him or her. 190 For exam-
I R8. See notes 58-1 12 and accompany ing text supra. 
189. See te xt at p. 578 supra. 
190. Rather than being used to make a prediction , this data is on ly mea nt to provide a sense 
of the strength of the fac tors disposing persons to the legally relevant behavior in question. It is 
sometimes argued that group probability data should not be applied to individual cases. To 
• 
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pie , there may be data linking causal variables operating o n the actor to the 
ac tor's type of c razi ness. If so, it would be useful to know what percentage 
of persons subject to those vari ables behave crazily and what percentage of 
persons behaving similarly crazily are subject to those variables. Or, if a 
crazy person behaves vio lentl y, it would be useful to know what percentage 
of simi larl y crazy persons engage in this type of violence and what per-
centage of similarly violent persons are crazy . Such data can shed some 
light on the uncontro llability of the actor' s craziness or on the strength of 
craziness as a predisposing cause of legally relevant behavior , but it cannot 
be di spositi ve of the moral and legal questions involved. Society can resolve 
only on nonscientific grounds the question of how strongly predispos ing a 
cause must be in order to negate moral and legal responsibility. 
The use of probability data poses difficulties, however. First , there is 
limited data linking various variables to craziness and even less data linking 
craziness to consequent legally relevant behavior. Second , the law may not 
be willing to consider probability data relevant. For example, in instances 
not involving craziness where there is much stronger evidence of a link 
between other pred isposing causes and legally relevant behavior (e .g. , 
poverty and criminality), the law does not consider the probability data 
relevant. 
Still, if the law continues to believe that craziness is relevant to 
responsibility , hard and methodologically reliable probability data bearing 
on the difficulty of the actor's choice should be heard when it is available . 19 1 
Of course, the data should be direct! y applicable to the specific case at 
hand. 192 For instance , if the person in question is a depressed , middle-class 
woman in her twenties who has shoplifted, the data should be about 
depressed, middle-class women in their twenties. Speculations by experts 
about individual cases should be avoided. If there are no reasonable proba-
bility data, experts should not be allowed to offer either theoretical views 
about why the actor behaved as he did or opinions concerning the difficulty 
resolve this extremely co mplex point is beyond the scope of thi s Arti c le, but the weight of 
informed opi nion support s the appropriat eness of appl y ing group probab ility data to indi vidual 
members of the group. P. MEEHL, supra note 126 , at 19-23; P . MEEHL , supra note 28 , a t 234-35; 
Movahedi & Ogles, Prediction and Inferen ce in Criminology, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 177 (1976). See 
generally Sarbin , The Logic of Prediction in Psychology , 51 P SYCHOLOGICAL REv. 210 (1944). 
191 . Ava ilable probability data doe s not support the inferences th a t craziness is it se lf 
unc ontrollable or that legally relevant behav ior relat ed to craziness is a n inevitable result of 
craziness. See text accompanying notes 24 , 27-28, 72-94 , 98 supra. In the future , however. 
uncontrollable and strongl y predispos ing causes of crazi ness may be di scove red or it may be 
discovered that partic ul ar types of craziness a re stro ngly dis posing to legall y relevant be hav ior. 
Wha te ver the data demonstrate , they ought to be heard. 
192. The form in which such evidence should be pre se nted is discussed in text accompany-
ing no te 202 infra. 
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of the actor's choice. 193 Of course, to the extent that otherwise hard quan-
titative data relies on questionably reliable and valid diagnoses, this weak-
ness in the data should be made known to the decisionmaker. 
Even though expert data may help a judge or jury decide if it would be 
too hard for the actor to reason or control himself within normal limits, 
experts should not draw conclusions. Whether an actor could have behaved 
otherwise and is legally and morally responsible for his legally relevant 
behavior cannot be determined scientifically. No diagnosis gives the answer 
to these questions, and there are no scientific tests to measure the strength of 
crazy urges or the strength of the actor's self-control. Nor are there tests to 
distinguish the person who cannot think straight or control himself from the 
person who will not think straight or control himself. Whether a person 
cannot or will not think straight or control himself is a moral and com-
monsense judgment that should be made by the legal decisionmaker. 
Let us take an example to examine how experts might help or hinder 
legal decisions about responsibility. In a famous homicide case, 194 clinicians 
testified that the defendant killed the victim in order to avoid psychic 
disintegration and insanity. If this formulation is correct, the defendant was 
faced with a very hard choice indeed-kill or psychically disintegrate- and 
the defendant would hardly seem as responsible as most criminal homicide 
defendants, or perhaps, responsible at all. Some clarifying questions, how-
ever, should be asked: (1) Are there hard data behind the theorizing that the 
killing was the inexorable or nearly inexorable result of threatened ego-
disintegration?; and (2) What percentage of persons with such fears kill? 
193. See note 158 and accompanying text supra. 
A special case is presented where an objectively identifiable physical variable such as a 
brain tumor is clearly causally related to the actor's craziness and legally relevant behavior. In 
principle, such a cause should be treated like any other. The trier of fact should know what 
percentage of persons with such a tumor behave as the actor did. Although the expert may have 
some sense of the probabilities , unfortunately, hard data rarely is available. The danger here is 
that most persons in our society arc conditioned to believe that when a physical variable is 
causally related to behavior, the behavior is uncontrollable. Thus, judges and juries will 
overweigh the uncontrollability of physical causes, even though they should not necessarily do 
so. Still the data is relevant. To avoid prejudice, the expert should not tell the court that the 
tumor was the cause of the legally relevant behavior. Rather, the expert should simply describe 
the usual course of the disease and its peripheral effects. Further, he might describe the 
temporal coincidences between the presence or absence of the tumor and observable behavior. 
If the expert is honest. he also will admit that few, if any, physical disorders commonly produce 
legally relevant behavior. Although judges and juries will probably continue to overv.'eigh the 
uncontrollability of physical variables. where such variables are objecti vely verifiable and 
clearly causally related to the legally relevant behavior, the trier of fact should hav e the data 
about them. See also note 83 supra. 
i 94. People v. Gorshen, 5 I Cal. 2d 716, 722, 336 P.2d 492, 495-96 (I 959). See also St<ite v. 
Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965) 
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The answer to question (l) is " no, " and the answer to question (2) is that 
the data are unavailable although the actual percentage is probably quite 
low. Such fears are not a proven necessary or sufficient cause of homicidal 
behavior. In this case, as in all cases, the expert's assertion that the person 
could not have acted otherwise is rea lly a morai guess and not a scientific 
fact. Justice would be better served if the expert drew no conclusions and 
simply described in ordinary language the cognitive and affective state of 
the defendant without intruding terms and theories of unproven accurac y 
and usefulness. 195 
In sum, experts should be very careful not to present hypothetical 
physical, psychological, o r sociai causal variables as necessary and suffi-
cient because there are no data on \vhich to bottom such assertions. Nor 
should they inject insufficiently tes ted theory or propound commonsense 
factual or moral judgments as scientific ones. They should simply present 
descriptive data that would otherwise be unknown and hard , relevant proba-
bility data. 196 Then, taking into account the events in question and all other 
available and relevant data about the actor's behavior , the judge or jury must 
make the moral and legal judgment about whether the actor could have 
behaved otherwise. 
3. Expertise and Prediction of Behavior 
This Article has already described the difficulties attending accurate predic-
195. Of course, an expert who tries to describe the person's past mental state faces grave 
difficulties. This probably cannot be done with substantial accuracy unless the expert had 
occasion to know or examine the actor at the past time in question. Thus, experts probably 
should never testify about an actor"s mental state at a time when the expert had no direct 
knowledge of it. Still , descriptions of a present mental state may help a factfinder draw 
inferences about a past mental state provided that the time in question is not too remote and that 
there is some direct evidence of the actor's behavior at the past time. 
196. The presentation of scientifically acceptable probability data should not present 
significant hearsay problems. It is not necessary for the testifying expert to have collected the 
statistics himself; it is sufficient if the expert has a comprehensive knowledge of the data and is 
able to discuss its methodology. Experts should be allowed to rely on reasonably performed 
scientific studies in their field so long as they are able to discuss, if necessary, the deficiencies 
of the studies and the implications of those deficiencies. Of course, this argument applies also 
to expert testimony about prediction data. See text accompanying notes 197-204 infra. 
To the extent that only hard, methodologically sound quantitative data is deemed relevant, 
there is a danger that the trial will turn into an academic dispute over the scientific adequacy of 
data introduced into evidence or the relative scientific respectability of opposing experts. Of 
course, such an outcome will not be llelpful. One can only rely first, on the discretion of trial 
judges to limit testimony on these points and second, on the common sense of the decisionmak-
er to determine which studies or experts seem nonreliable. If it should result that assessing 
scientific adequacy is an impossible task for a court, this author·s preference would be to 
exclude all such testimony rather than to accept as sufficiently scientific all expert testimony 
that is offered by a "credentialed" witness. 
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tion of human behavior. 197 It has also noted that for some legally relevant 
behaviors such as dangerousness or treatment outcome, there are data 
available, although the predictive accuracy is not likely to be very high or 
precise. When predictions are necessary, though, such data should be 
available to the legal decisionmaker. 
Before turning to the form in which data should be provided, it is 
necessary briefly to delineate some cautions. If there is no data bearing 
directly on the prediction in question, experts should not be allowed to 
hazard a prediction. Without hard, methodologically sound quantitative 
data, the guess of an expert is unlikely to be better than the guess of 
laypersons. An expert without data directly relevant to the prediction at hand 
is not an expert for purposes of that prediction, and guesses based on 
generally inaccurate clinical wisdom should be disallowed. There are some 
occasions when clinical hunches are more trustworthy than a prediction 
table, but such occasions cannot be specified at present, 198 and the clinical 
hunches of laypersons are likely to be as accurate as those of experts. 
When data is offered to the decisionmaker, it should be quite precisely 
relevant to the case at hand. Behavioral science is far too imprecise to allow 
legal rights to hinge on generalizing from a sample population unlike the 
case in point. For instance, suicide prediction studies performed on older 
adults should not be used in order to predict the suicidal potential of an 
adolescent. For another example, diagnoses per se do not lead to accurate 
predictions. 199 In sum, prediction expertise must rest on the professional's 
thorough and precise knowledge of the empirical data (or lack of it) bearing 
on the type of prediction in question. He must be able to describe to the legal 
decisionmaker not only the specific data of a study or studies, but also the 
methodological rigor of the studies on which he is relying. 
197. See text accompanying notes 116-144 supra. 
!98. P. MEEHL, supra note 28, at 234-35; see id. at 81-89, 168-73. Although it may be 
impossible to specify in advance the proper occasions for clinical prediction, an incredible 
instance presented itself recently. David Berkowitz, known as "Son of Sam," who has since 
pleaded guilty to the ambush slayings of six persons in the year prior to his arrest, was 
recommended for release on his own recognizance (ROR) by a pretrial service agency. The 
reason for the recommendation was that Berkowitz's characteristics (e.g., lack of previous 
arrests) matched an actuarially developed profile of arrestees who were good ROR risks. The 
judge used his good sense and held Berkowitz without bail. L.A. Times, Aug. 19, 1977, pt. I, at 
I, col. I. The recommendation for ROR is an example of the use of the actuarial approach 
without a shred of common sense. Still, it is nearly impossible to identify accurately those cases 
in which the actuarial approach should be abandoned. It should be noted that in the Berkowitz 
case the decision to use the clinical approach and the clinical prediction itself was not based on 
theoretical speculation or strained inferences. The prediction was sensibly based on a course of 
recent behavior that the accused threatened to continue. Predicting that violence was highly 
likely seems powerfully justified in such a case. 
!99. See notes 131, 134 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 174-77 and accom-
panying text supra. 
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As discussed above, 200 the law usu ally asks for predictions by putting 
questions in vague, general forms. For instance, such questions might be : 
"How likely is it, Doctor, that this person will improve if he is given 
'Thorazine' or is placed in a token economy? " or "Is there a substantial 
likelihood that thi s person will commit suicide if he is no t hospitalized ?" 
This Article has argued that such general questions do not contain specific 
quantitative standards. Rather, they set legal standards that all ovl the de-
cisionmaker some moral and social flexibility. 20 1 Still, decisions based on 
predictions rely to some extent on empirical estimates that can be provided 
by experts when data are available. Thu s, experts should testify with all the 
quantitative precision they possess and should leave the interpreta tion of 
legal terms such as "likely" or "improve" to the legal decisionmaker. 
For example, the expert should not test ify: " If we give this schi zophre-
nic patient 'Thorazine ,' he's likely to improve, all right; most schizophre-
nics do." Instead the expert should testify in the following form: "When 
given 'Thorazine,' X % of people who behave as this person does , change in 
n specific ways, within time period T. " 202 Or, rather than unhelpfully 
testifying: "There's a very good chance that this depressed man will commit 
suicide if you leave him free," the expert should testify as follow s: "People 
who behave as this person does are X times more likely than the average 
person to attempt suicide, but only Y% of persons like him do in fact 
attempt suicide." Given the numbers, the judge or jury can decide if those 
numbers satisfy legal tests such as "likely improvement" or "likely 
suicide" that are applied for social and legal purposes such as deciding 
whether to detain and treat the person involuntarily. 
This approach may seem mechanical , but a uniform finding of behav-
ioral science is that statistical-actuarial prediction of human behavior is 
more accurate than clinical judgment. 203 When important rights turn on a 
prediction, the law should require that the best technique be used . 204 If no 
200. See notes 114-15 and accompanying text supra. 
201. See text accompanying notes 114-15 supra. 
202. Contrary to the suggestion in the text, it is often believed th at diagnoses are use ful for 
choosing particul ar trea tment s or predic ting response to them. Much resea rch , ho wever, shows 
that treatment prescription based on specific behav ioral manifestations is more useful than 
prescription based on diagnosis. G. FRANK, supra note 25, at 57-62; R. KENDEL L, supra note 
25 , at 40-44 ; Banni ste r, Salmon , & Leiberman, Diagnosis-Trea tment Relationship in Psych iatry: 
A Statistica l Analysis, 110 BRIT. J. PSYCHI ATR Y 726 ( 1964); Goldberg , Frosc h, Drossman , 
Schooler, & Johnso n, Prediction of Response to Phenothiazines in S chizophrenia: A Cros s-
Validation Study , 26 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 367 (1972); Overall, Henry, & Wood-
ward , Decisions About Drug Therapy- V. Models Den"ved from Diagnostic Frequency Pat-
terns, 13 J. PS YCHIATRIC RESEARC H 77 (1976) . 
203. See note 128 and accompanying text supra. 
204. Cf. Shah , supra note 125 , at 230 (s tatistical-ac tuar ial prediction would yield greater 
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actuari a l data is avai lable, the law need not ask the op inion of experts and 
may safely rely on predictions made by judges or juries; accuracy would not 
be lost, prejudice would be avoided, and efficiency would be gained. 
In sum. , \vhe;1 predicti ons are necessary, ex pe rts should be allowed to 
testi2y c;nly if the ir testin1ony is based on data and presented in a for n1 that 
lea -.;es the legal issues to be decided by the judge or jury . 
4. 1,\l iw is an Expert ? 
Th e profe: ;;; sional d iscipline primarily and traditionally involved in menta l 
health law decis ionmaking is medicine, especially the speciality branch of 
psychiatry. Iv!ore recent ly , psychologists, too, have become increasingly 
involved :J.S courts and legis latures have qualified them as expert witnes-
ses 205 To assess the role that these d isciplines and others might play in 
mental health law decisionmaking , the fra mework of the three questions 
adjudi cated by mental health law will be used once again. Indeed, it should 
be recogni zed that an expert may not be an expert on all three questions, but 
o nl y on a subse t of ihem. Sometimes, th ree di ffe rent experts might be 
needed to obtain tru ly expert opinions on all three q uestions , and at other 
times no expertise may be available or needed. 
In determinations of normality, almost any person with extensive 
clinical experience with crazy persons should qualify as an expert. The 
ab ility to be attuned to crazy behavior is not primarily a function of the 
discipline in which the clinician was trained ; rather , it is dependent on the 
clinician 's clinical training and sensitivity. Professionals without extensive, 
recent , and relevant mental health clinical experience, whatever their formal 
co nsistency and uniformity as we ll a s equity). If a proceed ing is no nadve rsarial , the Aescula-
pian auth o rity of the clinic a l predictor will tend to carry prejudic ia l weig ht , eve n if the expert is 
vigorously cross-examined in an a ttempt to cast doubt on the accuracy of clinical prediction. Of 
course , the presence of opposing expe rt s will tend to lesse n thi s effect. 
On moral grounds, the state shou ld not be allowed to use su spect da ta when the depri vat io n 
of s ign ifi ca nt righ ts is threatened. The bes t approach probably is to disqua lify clinical prediction 
as a matter o f expertise on the grounds tha t there is little ev ide nce tha t cl ini cal predictions by 
e xpe rts a re better tha n predictions by laype rsons. See CAL. E v JD. CODE § SO I(a) (Wes t !966) 
(e xpert opi nion limited to su bjects sufficie ntl y beyond com mo n ex pe ri e nces so th a t expe rt 
o pini o n will assist trie r of fact). Clinical prediction by experts shou ld be allowed only if hard 
emp irical ev id ence demonstrates that s uch prediction on the quest ion a t issue is considera bly 
more acc urate than ac tu aria l pred iction or !ay prediction. 
205. Ennis & Litwak, supra note 25, at 738; Lev ine, The Psychologist as an Expert 
Witness in "Psychiatric" Questions, 20 CLE V. ST. L. R EV . 379 ( 1971 ); Pacht, Kuehn, Basset, & 
Na sh , The Current Status of the Psychologist as an Expert Witn ess, 4 PROFESSIONAl. PSYCHOLO-
GY 409 ( 1973). Psychi a tri c soc ial workers have training and e xper ie nce in many aspec ts of 
me ntal health sc ien ce and pract ice and may be qualified as expert s in some jurisdictions , but 
the y rar t: ly arc. See Berns te in , Th e So cial Worker as An Expert Witness , 58 Soc. CA SEWORK 
4 12 ( 1977). Ps ych ia tric nu rses a nd me nta l health paraprofess io nals a re not qualified as expert 
w itne sses even though th e y ma y ha ve intensi ve practical clin ica l experie nce . 
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tra ining , should not be qu a lified as experts. 206 Conversely, a paraprofess ion-
a l who has worked in a c linic for ten years is like ly to be a very acute 
observer o f craziness. The ability to unearth crazy behavior is not limited to 
any professional discipline, and all ex perie nced clinical men tal health work-
ers should qualify as experts. Of co urse , if there is a ques ti o n of physical 
illness in vo lved, o nly a re levantly trained physician should be allowed to 
test ify . 207 
On the question of responsibi lity, expert testimony may be useful for 
demonstrating the re lations hip between craziness and lega ll y relevant be-
havior and for prod ucing probability data concerning the ac tor's behavior. 
Again, any experienced clinician ought to be qualified as an ex pert concern-
ing the ac tor's craz iness , regardless of hi s or her professional di scipline . 
Further , any expert with ha rd probability data , including those from non-
men tal health disciplines such as sociology , should be allowed to testify 
about such data. 
Let us take an example. Suppose the actor has been reliably identified 
as epileptic or as hearing voices; the question is whether his assaultive 
behavior was the product of epilepsy or of the voices. A relevant questi on 
would be: "What percentage of epileptics of this type or of people who hear 
voices of this type engage in random assaultive behavior or similar behav-
206. T hi s group includes mo s t physicians, a gro up th at tends to have liul e tra ining , 
inte rest, or expe rtise in mental he a lth matle r s . Of course , the preva iling law is that phys icians in 
ge neral are qua lified to be experts on me nta l disorder. 31 AM. J uR. 2d Expert and Opinion 
Evidence §§ 87 , 90 ( 1967). It is su bmitted , howeve r , .that the law is entire ly irratio na l o n thi s 
point. 
At present, howeve r , increas ing numbers of me nta l health la ws requ ire that tes tifying 
expe rts be speciali sts , usually psychiatrists a nd ps ychologists. See, e.g., CAL. W ELF. & INST. 
CODE §§ 6307-6309 (We s t Supp. 1978) (mentally disordered sex offender commitment exa mina -
tions). Al so, so me statutes prov ide for appointme nt of psychia trists or psychologists with 
fore nsic skill s. See, e.g., id. § 5303.1 (postcertificatio n for dange rousnes s commitment exami-
na tio ns). 
Psyc hia tr y a nd psyc hology a re prese n tly co ns idering c reating boa rd s fo r ce rti f ica tion o f 
fore nsic spec ia list s . Because mental hea lth law cases tend to ra ise similar que st ions, such 
cer tificati on m ight be useful for co urts and c lient s if those cer tified were to ha ve th e re levant 
knowledge a nd sk ill s s uggested b y thi s Article. On the o ther ha nd , the thesi s of thi s Art ic le is 
tha t the que s ti o ns th a t should be as ked of profess io na ls are no t "lega l,., a nd the ex perti se 
professiona ls o ught to co ntribute requires little or no knowledge of or experie nce with the law. 
Consequent ly , a n e xpert w ith legal experience would not necessar il y be more use ful than an 
ex pert w ith o ut lega l ex pe rienc e w ho is e qua ll y co mpe te nt to provide the no nlegal data and 
observa ti on s t ha t th e law needs. In sum, the a uth or has no major o bject io n to certi fi ca tion of 
forensic mental hea lth professionals if it is recognized first, th at ce rtifica ti o n mean s o nly that 
thos e cert ified possess know ledge and sk ill s rele va nt to th e law's ne ed s, and second. that 
noncertificd profess io na ls . inc luding tho se from no n-me nta l hea lth di sc ipline s . ma y a lso pos-
ses s that knllwledge and skil l. 
207. If a questi o n of hrain damage or neurologic a l pathol ogy is rais ed, ex pert s o th e r than 
ph ys icia ns w ho a rc trai ned in neuropsycho log ica l a sse ssmen t techniqu es (usuall y psyc ho lo -
gists) should a lso be qualified as ex perts o n thi s ques tion. SeeM. LEZAK , NEU ROPSYCHOLOGi-
CAL ASS ESSME NT T ECHNIQUES ( 1976). 
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ior')" It is qu ite poss ible that a ve ry competent clinical neurolog ist or 
psychologist would have no hard da ta on these questions w hereas a 
sociologis t might have made carefu l studies of them. Accordingly, for these 
ques ti ons the sociologist is more expert than the neurolog ist or psycho logis t, 
even though the soc iologist may have little experti se in recognizing epilepsy 
per se or in unearthing auditory halluci natio ns. 
Concerning predictions of future behavior, an expe rt from any field 
who possesses dat a relevant to the spec ifi c prediction in issue is competent 
to be qualified. Questions abo ut dange rousness, for example, are stu died by 
sociolog ists and lawyers as well as by mental health profess ional s. 
Thus, this Article suggests a very functional approach to qualifying 
experts. The ques ti ons rai sed by mental hea lth laws call for many different 
types of ex perti se, and there is no reason to believe that any one expert is 
able to answer all of them in a given case. Further, the relevant experti se 
may come from many disciplines, including non-mental health di sciplines. 
Mental health professionals may have more information generally on most 
mental health-related questions , but they do not have a monopoly . 
To date, the mental health legal system has been both too re str icti ve 
and too lenient in qualifying experts. By qualifying only psychiatrists and 
sometimes psycholog ists as experts, the courts have los t the services of 
other professionals who may be of use. 208 Such restriction has promoted the 
mistaken view that crazy behavior and its consequences are uniquely medi-
cal or quasi-medical matters. Conversely , courts have been too lenient in 
aiiowing mental health professionals to testify about matters that are broadly 
within their discipline but about which given professionals are not particu-
larly expert. 
The suggested functional approach matches the true expertise of the 
professional, from whatever discipline, to the precise question being asked. 
Compared to present practice, thi s approach is a far more rigorous means of 
employing expertise in answering legal questions. This scheme would be 
fairly expensive to implement , but in an area where expertise is so limited 
and where fundamental rights are often involved, the law should strive to 
make the optimum use of experts. Thus , true expertise should be heard , and 
false expertise should be excluded because it is not he lpful and ofte n 
is prejudicial. 
208. Psychiatri sts now represent on ly 23% of me ntal health profess ionals. Further, they 
are makli stributed demographically. B. BROWN, THE FEDERA L GO VERNM ENT AND PSYC HI ATR IC 
EDUCATION: PROGR ESS, PRORLEMS, AND PROSPECTS 11 -14, 26 (Fi g. 2) (1977). In some areas the re 
are very few, if any, psychiatrists or psychologists, whereas other professionals may be 
avail able. Further, eve n where all profess ional s are available, qu ali ty will be increased by 
enlarging the size of the pool from which experts may be drawn. 
I -. 
I. 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
Mental health expe rts should be limited to tes tifying about those ma tte rs in 
which they are more skilled than laypersons . This Article has sugges ted that 
expe rt s may be useful in two spec ific ways : ( I ) as acute and efficient fir st-
hand observers of crazy behav io r : and (2) as sources of scie ntificall y 
rigorous data. Fu rther, descriptions and data should be presented in a 
commonsense and ordinary language fashi on. If experts are so limited , their 
tes tim ony will tend to be far more useful th an it is at prese nt. They should 
not , however, be a ll owed to d raw conclusio ns about a ny iss ue to be dec ided 
by me ntal health law . These are moral and legal iss ues that should be 
decided by legal decisionmakers . 
In addition to suggesting the type of ex pe rt testimo ny that o ught to be 
cons ide red and the form in which it should be offered , some furth e r sugges-
tions flow from the analysis of ex pe rtise. F irs t , psychiatri c experts cannot be 
value-neutral scientists and should properly function as advocates . In pro-
ceedings such as c ivil commitment where liberty is at stake, defendants 
should be entitled as a matter of due process to an advocate expert of their 
choice paid for by the state. 209 It is almost impossible to defend oneself 
against or to prove mental health allegations without the assistance of an 
advocate expert. Even though the battles of the experts may be confusing, it 
is submitted that if expert testimony is limited in the manner proposed in this 
Article, confusion will be reduced enormously because legal factfinders will 
not be led to believe that there are scientific " answers" to the questions 
being presented. Moreover, disputes over the precision of observational data 
or over the soundness of probability statistics reflect the uncertainties and 
ambiguities in the field, and there is no reason for juries and judges not to be 
aware of the level of uncertainty of mental health science. 
Second, in those cases where an advocate expert is not required by due 
process or is not available for any other reason, the court should attempt to 
ensure that the jury recognize that the sole expert is not impartial. The court 
should also ensure that the expert is fully cross-examined. Judges should 
know and juries should be instructed first, that unopposed testimony should 
be assessed cautiously , and second, that unopposed testimony may be 
disregarded. Finally, it is suggested that an appellate or trial court should 
never overturn as a matter of law a judge or jury's decision, even if the 
decis ion clearly disregards unanimous psychiatric expertise to the contrary. 
Mental health law decisions involve too little science and too much social 
209. See Farrell , supra no te 156. 
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~:md moral judgment to allow a fac tfinder's deci sion to be o ve rridden 
because it opposes the weight of "expe rt " testimon y. 
Res tri cting the use of experts as suggested heretofore is opposed to the 
long- term trend in evidence law that suggests that it is a m is take to limit the 
info rm ati on w itnesses can supply 2 10 Still , an exception should be made for 
me ntal health pro fess ionals , primaril y because the ir ex perti se is limited o n 
most issues and the ir unrestric ted testimony tends to obscure the moral and 
soci al na ture of the questions be ing asked. Competent cross-examinati on 
and jury instructions may be partial antidotes to the medi cali za ti on of 
mora ls , but they cannot be comple te. Many of the cases are not trul y 
ad versa ri a l; too few attorneys are skilled at cross-exam ining psychi atr is ts , 
layperso ns overwe igh the testimony of experts, and, in any case, unrestrict-
ed use of experts promotes the incorrect view that the quest io ns are primar i-
ly sc ienti fic . There is , however , no antidote fo r the major diffi culty with 
me ntal health "experts"-that they simpl y are not ex perts except in the 
areas delineated. In realms beyond their true expertise, the law has little 
special to learn from them ; too often their testimony is inefficient and 
wasteful and , at worst , it is pre judicial. 
B. THINKING ABOUT ME!\TT AL HEALTH L AW 
This secti on will di scuss, in light of the foregoing parts of this Article, the 
foll owing exemplary substantive areas of mental health law: involuntary 
c ivil commitment and treatment , the insanity defense , and various aspects of 
civil law such as competence to contract and craziness as a ground for 
recovery. The purpose of this section is not to recreate and resolve the 
complex debates in each of these areas. Many important aspects of those 
debates will not be addressed . Rather , the purpose here is only to explore 
briefl y those rationales for special legal treatment of mentally disordered 
persons that are affected by the argument of thi s Article . 211 An argument is 
offered that contends that many of the rationales for special legal treatment 
are undermined by the analysis of this Article. It is also suggested tha t some 
of those laws might be replaced by more explicit and fun ctional standards 
that all ow legal regulation, but that do not treat crazy persons as a special 
class. 212 
2 10. See F ED . R . Evm. 402 ; 29 AM. JuR . 2d E vidence§ 251 ( 1967). 
2 11 . For ex ampl e, the fo llo wing subsec tion s w ill no t a na lyze in de ta il a ll the compl ex 
substanti ve a nd proced ura l arguments pro a nd con for aboli shing or limiti ng involuntary c ivil 
com mitme nt or the in san it y de fen se . Some of the se a rgument s will be add re ssed brie fl y in 
passing , bu t the ma jor goal o f thi s sectio n is the more lim ited tas k of appl ying the thesis of thi s 
Artic le to the subs ta nti ve ra tio na les a ffec ted by the thes is . 
212. E ve n now. many co mpe te ncy laws a re operat io nalized a nd incl ude a more ge neral 
ca usa l f<tctor lik e " un sou nd mi nd" ra th er tha n me nt a l ill ness or di sorder. In p racti ce, howeve r, 
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The core of the argument throughout this section is that for legal 
purposes there is little persuasive scientific evidence that crazy people 
should be treated differently from noncrazy people. Crazy people have a 
great deal of control over the ir behavior and their future behav ior is not more 
pred ictable than that o f normals. Craziness is only a predispos ing cause of 
other legally re le vant behavior. If the law is unwilling to consider the 
relevance of other pred ispos ing causes, such as poverty, to iegal questions 
such as dangerousness or criminal responsibility, it is d iff icu lt to ma intain a 
com pelling argumem th at craziness is di fferent and therefo re shou ld be 
re levant. As we shall see , the consistently offered rationale for spec ial legal 
treatment of crazy persons is that they cannot control their behav ior. But thi s 
rationale can be su pported only by intuitive hunch, albeit a powe rful one in 
some cases , and not by scientific evidence . A similar argume nt appli es to 
the pred ictab ility iss ue. K nowledge that a person is crazy or suffe rs fro m a 
specific mental di sorder does not usually increase significantly the accuracy 
of predictions of iegally relevant behavior. 
In sum, crazy persons should be treated like normals. Crazy persons 
should not be treated differently on the grounds that they alone cannot 
behave otherwise or that their future behavior is uniquely predic table . 
1. Involuntary Civil Commitment213 and Treatment 
Civil commitment and treatment aim to prevent or ameliorate social and 
personal harms by protecting society from dangerous persons or by protect-
the causal fac tor is interpre ted 10 mea n some form of mental disorder and these laws a re us uall y 
appli e d only to those wh o may be labeled mentally disordered. Another write r s ugge s ts that the 
be havorial component s of mental health laws should be maintained, but that the ment a l illness 
criterion should be dropped. Hardisty , supra note 13. Many of this writer's views are s imilar to 
tho se of the a uthor. 
213. Th e most complete revi e w of the total range of substa ntive and procedura l as pects 
of civil commitment is Developments, supra note 6. The sources cited therein are a near-
exh aus ti ve collec tion of those then a vailable . An historical review is Dershowit z , The Origins of 
Preventive Confinement in Anglo-American Law, Part[: The English Experience & Part II: The 
American Experience, 43 CIN. L. REv. I, 781 (1974). 
Recent e mpirical s tudies of th e commitment process include Wa rren , Jnvolufltary Commit-
ment for Mental Disorder: The Application of California's Lanterman-Petris-Short A ct. II L AW 
& Soc 'y R Ev. 631 ( 1977) ; Zander, supra note 16; Comment, The Gates of Cerberus: Involuntary 
Civil Commitment in Philadelphia , 49 TEMP. L.Q. 323 (1976). 
Other rece nt write rs who have debated the propriety of civil commitme nt are K . MILLER , 
supra note II; M. PESZKE , INVOL UNTARY TREATMENT OF THE M ENTALLY ILL (1975); A. STONE, 
supra note 10, a t 43-82. Dr. Stone a lso has provided the most sensible and balanced background 
a na lys is of the mental hea lth lega l system. A. STONE , supra note 10, at 8-1 9 . He describe s the 
int e rre lationship of the me ntal health syste m, the welfa re system , the law e nfo rce ment system , 
a nd the famil y . All write rs on mental hea lth law owe him a debt for sens ibl y placing mental 
hea lth law in its instituti o nal context. 
A useful categori za tio n of the reasons mental illness justifies civil commitment is Shapiro, 
supra note 57, a t 767-8 1. 
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ing persons from themse lves. 214 Our society does not autho rize involuntary 
civil con fi neme nt and treatme nt , however , even where the h arm seems 
c lear, unl ess the actor is crazy. For example , predictably dangerous people 
m ay not be incarcerated and rehabi litated unl ess they transgress the criminal 
law; physically ill people generall y may not be invo luntarily hospitali zed 
unless, for example , they are unconscious2 15 or suffe r from certai n danger-
ous, infectious diseases. Me ntally ill pe rsons, however, m ay be committed 
and treated on the basis of predicted dangerousness or the need for treat-
men t. 
Before cont inuing, it is necessary to consider th e three primary behav-
ior components of commitment laws : danger to others , danger to self , and 
the need for care or treatment. The major substantive issues rai sed by the 
dangerousness criter ia are the like lihood of danger required and how se ri ous 
the danger must be . Threshold le ve ls are rarely specified, but it seems clear 
that they must be substantial. 216 For example, s imply disturbing or annoy ing 
behavior is not sufficiently dangerous. 217 The definition and like lihood of 
danger required , however , a re not primarily mental health issues and they 
are not defined in psychiatric terms. By contras t the " need for treatment " or 
" hospitalization" criterion is expressed in mental health terms .218 Here one 
must consider the extent to which mental health standards should be incor-
porated into the law . Even if treatment is available, a pure "need for 
treatment " criterion based on psychiatric standards alone should not jus tify 
involuntary state intervention and certai nly not involuntary incarceration . 
Those who need treatment according to psychiatric standards are a much 
214. Justifications , supra note 36; Developments , supra note 6, a t 1207-12 , 1223-28. 
Commi tme nt has bee n justified on both police power and parens patriae grou nd s . The United 
States Supreme Court has made it c lear that it is unco nstituti o nal to co mmit persons e ither ( I) to 
give the m c us tod ia l ca re wit ho ut more when they could ma nage to li ve in the comm unit y w ith 
th e help of family or fri ends or (2) to remove them from the com muni ty because th ey are 
deviant or disturbing , although o th erw ise harmle ss O 'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563. 573-
76 ( !975). 
21 S. Eve n if they are in su ch conditi o n, th e care provided doe s not invo lve long- term 
inv ol untary incarceratio n . nor is the assistance prov id ed o t'ten refused o nce the person is 
co nscious. These cases are argu ably not trul y vol untary. 
216. See O'Con nor v. Do nald so n, 422 U.S. 563, 573-76 (1975); Lessard v. S chmidt , 349 F. 
S upp . 1078 (E. D . Wis. 1972) , vaca ted and remanded on procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 , new 
judgment entered , 379 F. Su pp. 1376 (E. D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded , 42 1 U.S. 957 
(1975) (for recon sidera ti on in light o f Huffman v. Pu rsu e, Ltd., 420 U.S . 592 (1975)), reaff'd, 
4 13 F. Supp . 1318 (E. D . W is . 1976) ; In re Hatley, 29 1 N.C. 693,23 1 S.E.2d. 633 ( 1977) 
217. O'Co nn or v. Donaldson. 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975). 
218. S ee, e.g. , O HIO REv . CODE A NN. § 5122.0 1(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1976). See also C.u .. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250 (West 1972) (auth orizing commitme nt for "grave di sableme nt ," 
d efi ned as a n inabi lit y , at a n un spec ified le vel, to prov id e for basic food , c lothing, a nd shel ter 
needs. Jd. § 5008(h)( 1) (West Supp. 1978)). It ha s a lso been suggested th a t "suffering " sho uld 
be a co mm itme nt cri terio n . A. STON E, supra no te 10, a t 67, 69. Of course, a ll " need for 
treatment" criteria are "da nger to se lf" criteria in the broadest se nse. 
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larger class of persons than those who are so di sabled or e ndangered that 
deprivation of their 1 iberty seems soc ially and morall y necessary. Libert y 
and legal goals in general should not depend on psychiatric criteria that 
reflect the social values of the defining group and that were not created for 
legal purposes 219 
According to mental health standards, vast numbers of persons "need" 
some form of intervention although the large majority of them are not 
dangerous to themse lves or significantly disabled unless one accepts an 
enormously stretched conception of danger or disablement . 220 Interve nti o n 
in such cases attempts to force the recipient to li ve or behave in the "right" 
way, whether or not he is significantly harming himself o r wishes to be 
changed or helped. 
To protect liberty and di gnity , the law must define for itself the 
normative iss ue of how much danger of harm to others or self is necessary to 
justify commitment. Surely the requisite degree of danger and its likelihood 
should be quite substantial. Civil commitment represents a major depriva-
tion of liberty and autonomy;221 our society should therefore balance this 
deprivation very carefully against the goals that might be achieved by 
commitment. 222 
219 . See United States v. Blocker , 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. C ir. 1959); note s 38, 43 , 161-64 a nd 
accompan ying tex t supra. 
220. See note 38 and accompanying text supra. People who suffer from mental disorders 
need treatment, at least in the sense that the y are not in an optimum state of "health" and might 
benefit from it according to so me standard s . 
221. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) ; In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 667, 6o9 
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt , 349 F. Supp. 1078 , 1084-91 (E.D. Wi s. 1972), vacated and 
remanded on procedural grounds , 414 U .S. 473 , new judgment entered, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E. D. 
Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 ( 1975) (for reconsideration in light of Huffma n 
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)). reaff'd, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). 
222. !ndeed , man y cases and statutes now authorize commitment only if it is the least 
restrictive a lte rnative to achieve the goals of involuntary state intervention in the crazy 
perso n' s life. See Lak e v. Camero n , 364 F .2d 657 (D.C. Cir. \966) ; Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. 
Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975); Lessard v. Schmidt , 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 1972) , 
vacated and remanded on procedural groun ds, 414 U.S. 473, new judgment entered, 379 F. 
Supp. 1376 (E. D. Wis. 1974) , vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975) (for reconsideration in 
light of Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)) , reaff'd, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wi s . 
(1976) ; Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally lll: Practical Guides and 
Constitutional Imperati ves , 70 MIC H. L. REv. 1107, 1112-68 ( 1972). See generally Hoffma n & 
Foust , Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally Ill : A Doctn'ne in Search of Its Senses , 14 
SAN DI EGO L. REv. 1100 (1977). Th e Supreme Court has strongly implied that the least 
restrictive alternative doctrine should apply in the civil commitment context. See O'Connor v. 
Donaldso n, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975). 
Even if intervention appears warranted by the actor's dangerousness to se lf or others , it is 
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The primary rationale for prohibiting the civil confinement of normal 
persons is the belief that they are responsible for their behavior. In a society 
that values liberty and autonomy, preventive detention genera lly is not 
justified, even for humane and other worthy ends. By contrast, the standard 
primary rationale for authorizing civil commitment of crazy persons is that 
they are not responsible for their behavior-it is assumed that crazy persons 
are sick and cannot control their harmful behavior. Consequently, civil 
commitment of crazy persons does not appear to be an unjustified depriva-
tion of liberty, autonomy, and dignity. 223 
Let us take some examples. First, consider the differential treatment of 
persons who are dangerous to others. There may be a high probability that a 
normal dangerous person will violate the criminal law, but it is believed that 
this individual can always choose not to engage in illegal conduct. More-
over, a dangerous normal person arguably can be affected by the criminal 
law and its sanctions. To preserve the normal actor's autonomy and dignity, 
society and the law allow him to remain at liberty unless he chooses to 
tran:;gress the criminal law. Conversely, it is believed that crazy persons 
who are dangerous cannot control their antisocial behavior and cannot 
consider rationally the law's sanctions as part of a freely chosen decision. If 
the crazy person is not responsible, confining him does not infringe on his 
autonomy, as he has little autonomy to begin with, and the confinement 
still necessary to ask if involuntary incarceration is required. Do all mentally disordered people 
who are dangerous to themselves or others need to be hospitalized? Intervention can take two 
forms: First, physical restraint or care for those who are directly physically dangerous to 
themselves or others, or who alone simply cannot protect themselves in freedom; second, 
treatment aimed at changing dangerous behavior. Hospitals are not always needed for either 
purpose, however. For those persons who are dangerous to others, hospitals do serve an 
incapacitative function, but they are less necessary for this purpose than is often supposed. The 
criminal justice system is arguably the more appropriate means for dealing with such persons. 
See note 136 and accompanying text supra; notes 245, 257 and accompanying text infra . 
Hospitalization is rarely needed for those who are dangerous to themselves unless the 
person is imminently suicidal or utterly incompetent to protect himself in the community and 
other methods of protection such as nursing visits are unavai!atJle. Treatment usually does not 
require hospitalization. The primary exception is those cases where the actor refuses treatment 
and must be kept under supervision and restraint in order to force treatment on him. In sum, 
hospitalization seems justified only if it is the sole means, first, to protect others or to protect a 
person from himself, and second , to force treatment in those cases where involuntary treatment 
as well as protection is justified. Involuntary treatment will be discussed in detail in notes 228-
34 and accompanying text infra. It is sufficient to note here that even if a person is utterly 
dangerous to himself and refuses treatment, treatment should be forced on the person only if 
the treatment refusal itself is deemed incompetent. 
223. It is assumed for purposes of discussion that a rational legislator or judge would be 
persuaded by the considerable evidence demonstrating that crazy persons are not considerably 
more dangerous than noncrazy persons. Thus, the older policy rationale that preventive 
detention is authorized because crazy persons are especially dangerous is certainly no longer 
easily acceptable. See Developments, supra note 6, at 1230-31; notes 24, 98 and accompanying 
text supra. 
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does protect society from supposedly uncontro ll ab le depredations. 22-i 
Now consider the case of a person whose beh av ior is enormously se lf-
end angering because he has a history of heart disease but who continues to 
overeat, smokes excessively, and refuses to take hi s medication. Although 
forcibly hospitalizing such a person might seem humane in one respect (i.e., 
it may save hi s life), it seems an undue infrin gement o n autonom y and 
dignity va lues to force hosp italization on a perso n who chooses free ly to 
end a nge r himse lf. On the o ther hand , it is believed that self-endanger ing 
crazy perso ns are not free ly choosing to endanger the mse lves and that they 
cannot rationally weigh the costs and benefits of the ir behav ior. Hospitaliza-
tion of a crazy self-endangering person, therefore, docs not seem to infringe 
unduly on that person' s autonomy and, thus, is a humane and just response 
to unfreely irrational behavior. 225 
As we have seen, however, crazy people are not particularl y dangerous 
as a class . 226 Moreover , no way exists to determine whethe r or not they are 
inca pable o f controlling the ir dangerous behavior . It is not claimed, of 
course , that no crazy person is dangerous to others or himself. It is asserted , 
however, that crazy persons are not conside rab ly more dangerous than 
normal persons and that little scientific evidence ex ists to demonstrate that 
crazy persons' legally relevant behavior is beyond their control. Because 
soc iety has a strong general presumption against preventive detention and 
because civil commitment is not allowed for dangerousness, incompetence, 
or irrationality per se, there is little reason to authorize civil commitment on 
grounds of lack of free choice only for the mentally ill. A hunch about non-
responsibility or incapacity is a weak foundation for a superstructure of 
involuntary confinement that deprives citizens of libe rty, dignity, and auton-
omy. 227 Commitment of only the mentally ill is an unfair and unsuccessful 
224. Developments, supra note 6, a t 1211 n.65, 1232-~3; Note, Civil Commitment of th e 
lvfentally fll: Theories and Pro cedures , 79 HARV. L. Rr: v. 1288, 1290 ( 1%6). 
225. See Developments , supra note 6, at 1212-19, 1223-28. In volu nta ry treatment is di s-
cussed in greater detail in te xt acco mpanying notes 228-34 infra . See also text accompanying 
notes 104-06 supra . 
226. See notes 24 , 98 a nd accompanying text supra. Indeed , menta ll y di sordered perso ns 
a re probably not more dangerou s tha n the general population , a nd they are clearly less 
da ngerous tha n other identifi able s ubgroups in the populatio n suc h as young males, who account 
for o ne quarter of all perso ns a rrested and nearly one-ha lf of a ll those ar rested for "index 
crimes." See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 , 666 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bola nd & Wilson, Age, Crime, 
and Punishment, PUB. INTEREST, Spring, 1978, at 22, 23. 
'227. Soc iety might dec id e to in s titute a scheme for pre ve ntiv e de te ntion for all citi ze ns. 
c razy a nd normal. based on a co nst itutional balancing of soc ie tal rrot l!Ct io n against individu a l 
liberty a nd autonomy. Assuming th a t th e system accurate ly iu e nti f il!s da ngerous persons, suc h 
a sc heme might very will be co nstitutional. See Developments , supra note 6, at 1228-29. Suc h a 
sys te m would not need to re ly o n s tigmati z ing a nd un p rovable as sumptio ns a bout th e no nre-
s ponsib ilit y of c razy perso ns o r a nyo ne e lse . Moreo ver , it would be fa r more effect ive than 
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means for achi evi ng th e primary goals of preventive detention- to protect 
soc ie ty fro m dangerous pe rsons and to protect se lf-endangering pe rsons 
from themse lves. The vas t majority of persons who are dangero us to others 
or se lf are not mentally ill , and little evidence demonstrates th at normal 
dangerous persons are mo re free ly choosing to behave dangerou s ly . 
A :;econd rat ional e for civil commitment and consequent treatment, 
based on a parens patri ae theory, assumes that some crazy perso ns are 
incompr~tent to make rationa l deci s ions abou t whether to ente r the protective 
environment of the hospita l or to accept further treatmen t that may be 
offered. 22 :-: Enormous numbers of people refu se mental health treat men t 
whe n it is suggested or offered . As a ge ne ral rul e, persons are e ntitled to 
refuse hospitalization and medica l or quasi-medical tre atme nt, but crazy 
persons are o fte n hospitalized and treated despite thei r express re fusal. 
C learly , substitution of judgment rai ses substanti al problems of intrus ion on 
au ton omy and di gn ity. 229 Is it correct to consider only crazy persons inca-
pable of ration a l judgments and thus to ove rride only their judgments? What 
ts incompetence and the re levance of craziness to it? 
At iss ue in deciding whether to respect a person 's hospitali zat ion and 
treatment refusal is his decisionmaking competence, that is, the pe rson 's 
ability, within reasonable, culturally determined limits, to attend to and 
we igh data re levant to the deci s ion whether to accept or reject hospitali za-
limiting pr.:ve ntive detention o nly to th e mentally ill. See generally Dershowit z , Preventive 
Confin emen t: A Sugges ted Framework for Constitutional Analysis , 51 T Ex. L. RE v . 1277 
( 1973). See also no te 244 and acco mpan y ing text infra (di scuss io n of invo luntary treatment of 
dangerou s persons, whether or not the y are crazy). 
228. A. STO~E, supra note 10 , at 68-70; Developments , supra note 6, a t 1207-1 9. In some 
cases th e person's hospi tali zation and treatment decisions may be separable. A crazy person 
may be c razy in regard to some ma tters but a ble to be ha ve perfectly reasona bl y in re la tion to 
others. Thus, some persons may be unable to decide ra tionally about hosp ita lization but may be 
ab le to decide rationally about further treatme nt. Consider the case of a gravely di sabled person 
who see ms una ble to dec ide ra ti o nall y w he ther to e nter the protective e n v ironment o f the 
hospital. Society may w ish to ho s pita lize this person o n both parens patr iae a nd police power 
grounds. O nce in the hospital, howeve r, the person may be ab le to decide rati ona lly abou t 
further trea tment. H e may pre fer extended incarcerat ion to behavior changes. Overriding th e 
re fu sal o f treatment under these conditio ns would have to be justified o n grounds o th er tha n 
pare ns patriae. Conversely, the person may be quite a ble to weigh ratio nall y the costs a nd 
benefits of hospitalization, but may refuse hospitaliza tion. The n , society might hosp italize him 
under a po li ce power theory . Onc e hospita li zed, the person may seem unab le to weigh rational-
ly the dec ision to acce pt treatme nt. In tha t case , hi s trea tme nt refu sal decision might b·~ 
over ridd en o n a pare ns patriae th e ory. 
22lJ. The importance of the iss ue of the right to refu se treatment ha s lead to in c reasing 
corn me nra ry and new law. Knec ht v . G illma n , 488 F.2d 11 36 (8t h Cir . 1973): Ma c ke y v . 
Proc un icr, 477 F .2d 877 (9t h Cir. 1973); \\'inters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir .) , cer1. denied , 
404 U. S. 985 (1971); Ade n v. Younger, 57 Ca l. App . 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr 5:1 5 (llJ7fi); Price v . 
Sheppard , 307 Minn . 250, 239 N.W.2cl 905 (1976); CAL. W ELF. & INST. CODE§§ 5325, 5326. 2 , 
5326.6, 5326.7 , 5326.85 (West Supp . 1977) ; A. STONE, supra note 10, at 97- 108; Murp h y, Total 
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tion ancl treatmen t230 Thi s type of determination focuses on the person ·s 
abi lity to perform the process of deciding rather than on the final decision. 
Focusing on this process avoids the log ical fallacy of assuming that because 
a deci sion seems inexplicable, disturbing, or irrational in a given instance or 
series of instances, 231 it mu st be true that the decisionmaker is incapable of 
rational decisionmaking. After all , many noncrazy people have bad judg-
ment and make terribl e decis ions. Moreover, concentrating on decisionmak-
In stitutions an d the Possibility of Consen t to Organic Therapies, 5 J. H UM A:--1 RIGHTS 25 ( 1975) ; 
Schwan z, In !he Nome of Treatment: Autonomy. Civil Commitment, and Right to Refuse 
Treatment, 50 NoTRe: 0."-\lf'. LAw. 808 ( 1975); Shapiro, Legislating the Conrrol of Behavior 
Control: Autonomv and the Coerci1·e Use of Orga nic Theorapies, 47 S. C\L L. REv. 237 ( 1974); 
Singer, Co nsent of the Unfree: Medical Experim entation and Behavior Modification in the 
Closed lnstitutinn . Par1 f . 1 L o\w & H u~L-\N BEH.WIOR 1 ( 1977); Wade, Th e Right to Refuse 
Treatm ent : Mental Patients and the Law, 1976 DET. C.L RE V. 53; Note, Conditioning and 
Other Technologies Used to "Trea t ?" " Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and ,vfen tol 
Patients , 45 S. C\L. L REv . 6 16 ( 1972) ; Note, Informed Consent and the Mental Patient: 
Ca lifornia Recognizes a t'vfental Patient 's Right to Refuse Psychosurgery and S hock Trea tment , 
15 SANTA CLAR."- LAw. 725 ( 1975) ; Note, Advances in Mental Health: A Case for the Right to 
Refuse Treatm ent, 48 TEMP. LQ. 354 (1975) . The righ t to refuse treatment is a lso applicabl e to 
pri so ne rs. Gobert, Psychosurgery, Conditioning, and the Prisoner's Right to Refuse " Rehabili-
tation, " 61 VA. L REv . 155 (1975). 
A full apprec iation of the parens pat riae rat ionale for ove rriding treat ment refusal necess i-
tat es further ana lysis of the nature of menta l health trea tment s and their 3ppli ca tion to invol un-
tary ment al patients . The ce ntral iss ue ra ised by in voluntary mental treatment is under what 
condi tions socie ty is justified in forcibl y changi ng a pe rson 's be ha vior. Mental hea lth trea t-
ments ope rat e by at tem pting to change be havi or, not by curing obj ectiv ely id en tifiable und erly-
ing pathology. See no tes 134-36 and accompanying text supra. (Of course, so me treatments 
change some craziness, such as crazy thinking , that leads to other disabilities such as general 
socia l incom petence.) 
The anal ys is of this Article suggests that forcing behavioral change may be just ified , but 
not pri m<:lr il y because the actor' s legall y re le vant behavi or is the product of an illness he wi she s 
to have cured . Moreover, crazy persons often do not wish to be freed of their co nditi on. See, 
e.g., Van Putten, Crumpton, & Yale, Drug Refusal-Schi zophrenia and the Wish to Be Cra zy, 
33 ARCHI VES OF G ENE RAL PSYCH IATR Y 1443 (1976) (some patients preferred de lusions of 
grandeur to "grayness" of ordinary life caused by drug treatment). Society may wish to change 
behavior forcib ly, but it should recognize honestl y tha t doing so is no t the same as curing a 
physical illness. As we have seen, the exi stence of curable, underlying illnesses is unproven and 
scientific evidence does not demonstrate persuas ively that, in general , crazy persons as a class 
are any less respons ib le or more treatable for the ir lega lly relevant behavior than normal 
persons. See notes 58-112 and accompanying tex t supra ; note 243 and accompanying tex t infra. 
Further , on utilitarian grounds there is as mu ch or more reaso n to change identifiably dangerous 
normal persons involuntaril y as crazy ones because more social harm would be prevented. 
230. See note s 104-12 and acco mpanying text supra. 
2:1 I . Here , one should note the great difficulty in de ciding wh en an ac tion or reaso n is it se lf 
irrationaL See, e.g. , Goldstein , On the Right of " Institutionalized Mentally Infirm " to 
Consent to or Refuse to Pnr1icipate as Subjects in Biomedical nnd Behavioral Research. in 
NATI0:--1 .-\L Co~t :-.t iSSI0:--1 FOR THE PROTECTION OF H U.\tA:--1 SUBJECTS OF 8 tO'v1EDICAL AND BEHAV -
IORAL RES EARCH , RESE ARCH INVOLVING THOSE INSTITUTIO NALIZED As MENTA LLY IN FIRM , at 2-1 
app. , 2-13 app. ( 1978) ; Moore , supra note 14, at 1487. See generally Mu rphy , supra note 104. 
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ing ability is respectful of the actor's autonomy and dignity ; freedom to 
decide as one wishes is preserved, so long as the person is capable of 
attending to and weighing data relevant to the decision. 
Deciding that a person is incompetent is difficult, and doing so has 
serious consequences for the actor's liberty and dignity. Indeed, some noted 
commentators have suggested that it is inherently unjust to treat any adult as 
incompetent and that all adults should be conclusively presumed to be 
competent for all purposcs_ :m Society need not go this far in rejecting the 
no tion of incompetence, howeve r . As a moral matter, soc iety may not be 
willing to allow persons to harm themselves , impoverish their families, or 
the like when it is believed on strong intuition that an actor is incapable of 
making sensible decisions. 
Yet what reason is there to believe that decisionmaking incompetence 
is unique to crazy perso ns ') Thi s Article has suggested already that it is 
impossible in nearly all cases to determine when any behavior, including 
reasoning, is the inexorable or near inexorable product of alleged mental 
di sorder .233 Moreover , there is little reason to believe that craziness is the 
232. E.g., Goldstein, supra note 231. 
[T]he competence of the institutionalized mentally infirm to decide must be presumed 
and . . their freedom to exercise their capacity to choose must be safeguarded from 
violation by those in authorit y . 
!d. at 2-12 app. (emphasis in original). 
To empower a group of self-appointed (or politically appointed) wisemen to 
det ermi ne . . whet her an adu lt indi vi dual has the competence to judge what is best 
for himself or herself is a total affront to his or her human dignity. To force upon 
potential subjects a determination of the " rationality" of their processes of decision in 
accord with some philosophical or psychological dogma about what and who is 
rational, is to deny autonomy to all such persons and to affront their dignity even if 
their choices are determined to be " rational " and " informed." To establish such a 
process would defeat it s professed function of safeguarding each person's right to 
consent. Finally, it is beyond the competence of law which is , after a ll , a gross 
instrument for the regulation a nd control of interpersonal relationships , to provide 
guidelines for deciding whether a person's consent or refusal to conse nt is " informed" 
or "rational" or more to the point , whether the person wishes to be restricted to 
"rational " decisions, if there be such, to participate as a subject of non-therapeutic or 
non-beneficial research experiments. 
fd . ;t t :: - D app. 
The burden in law for in co mpet e nce sho uld be very high. No ev idence other than 
;1 showing that the pat ient is comatose should ordinaril y be accepted as proof of 
incom pete nce . 
fd. at 2-26 app. 
Although Professor Goldstein's article deals with consent to participation in research a nd 
not with treatment refusal , the principles adduced would seem to apply in the latter context as 
well. See id. at 2-32 app. to 2-34 app. Professor Goldstein recognizes that the Constitution 
perhaps does not require thi s degree of respect for autonomy, but he urges that decisionmaking 
processes be ado pted that a re " full y se nsiti ve to the sanctity of human beings" rather than 
barely comporting with the Constitution. !d. at 2-10 app. Finally, Professor Goldstein 
suggests that the state's rol e in research participation deci sions should be to ensure that the 
perso n has been given a ll relevant information in a noncoercive atmosphere. Then the person' s 
decision must be re spec ted completely. !d. at 2-19 app. to 2-26 app., 2-34 app. to ::-39 app. 
::33. See notes 95-11:: a nd accompanying tex t s11pra. This is not to say, howe ve r, that a 
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primary or only cause of allegedly mistaken and seemingly irrational deci-
sions. Noncrazy people make such decisions all the time , often with conse-
quences that are perilous to them. One need only consider the many persons 
w ith heart disease who refuse to lose weight or who continue to smoke. 
Indeed , some otherwise normal and apparently rational persons seem 
habitually to make irrational decisions concerning various aspects of their 
lives. 234 If such a person, however, were physically ill and refused treat-
ment when he desperately needed it, the law would not intervene and force 
him to behave in ways that those around him perceived as more rational. 
if, however, a crazy person irrationa lly refuses hospitalization and 
treatment, the law is much more willir..g to intervene because it is assumed 
the person is incapable of refusing rationally. But as we have seen, there is 
little compelling sc ientific evidence to justify d isti nguishing the two cases 
and subst ituting judgment only- in the case of the crazy person. 
Of course , soc iety can make a distinction between crazy and normal 
people, but it must be on the intuitive basis that crazy persons are fundamen-
tally different and cannot behave rationally. The allegedly scientific 
rationale cannot serve as an adequate basis for overriding the deci sions of 
crazy people. There is little empirical reason to believe that the person with 
habitual bad judgment is capable of rational decisionmaking whereas the 
crazy person is not. Substitution of judgment must be decided on a norma-
tive basis after a thorough and commonsensical analysis of the person's 
behavior. 
The third general rationale supporting civil commitment of only men-
tally ill persons is the belief that experts can predict the future behavior of 
crazy persons with special accuracy. This rationale is operative at two 
points in the commitment process: initially, at the commitment decision, 
and later, at the release decision. As we have seen, however, the data does 
not support the rationale; 235 most predictions of future legally relevant 
behavior are far more likely to be wrong than right, and predictions are 
likely to err in the direction of overpredicting legally relevant behavior. 236 
commonsense inference of incapacity cannot be made. If a person constantly behaves in an 
incompetent manner in specific areas of his life, the inference that he is incapable of being 
co mpetent in that area may be warranted. But thi s is a different matter from asserting that the 
incompete nce is the product o f an illne ss. Cf. A. STONE , supra note 10 , a t 68-69 , 104 (claiming 
that a treatme nt refusal deci sion should be ove rridde n if it seems unreaso na ble and based on 
mental disease). See generally note 104 supra. 
234. There is, of co urse, the possibilit y that if a perso n makes enough irrational decision s 
of a craz y so rt he will be co ns idered crazy rather than a norma l person with bad judgment in a 
given area o f his life. 
235 . See text accompa nying notes I 16-44 supra . 
236. See note s 137-40 and accom pa nying text supra . 
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Consequently, many persons are and will be incorrectly incarce rated and 
will be incorrectly kept incarcerated whe n they ought to be released. A 
society that values liberty should be extremely cautiou s when sanc tioning 
civil incarceration based on predictions that are highly inaccurate. 237 
A fourth ge neral rati o na le for civil commitmenr is that once a person is 
hosp italized, treatment will be available to he lp him 238 Moreover, if a least 
2:.7. f\ pos;;ible excep ti on would be presented in a cast: of emergency curnrnitm t: nt where 
th e ind iv id ual was be having in a legall y releva nt manne r at the time or h:td d o ne :;o in the 
immc:d i:rte pa~t. In suc:h a case. pr.:dictio n of future beha vior wou ld be basc· d o n :c· mpll r·:dly 
co nt iguous behavior in the real wor ld . As noted, th e best dat a fnr pr·cdiction is s imi Ltr rast 
behavior; thus, eme rgency predic tions are much more like ly to be accurate than arc predictio ns 
based on long-past behavior or pred ictio ns about real world behavior based on behav ior in 
a ho spital. If this argument ha s ~.::rit , ca lls for the abol ition of commi tment in any form ca nnot 
be predi cated o n the lack of predictabil ity. Monaha n, Prediction Research and the Emergen cy 
Commitment of Dangerous Mentally Ill Persons: A Reconsidera1ion , 135 AM. J . Ps YCHIATRY 
198,200-01 (1978). Bw see Roth , Day ley, & Le rner, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric Reliability and 
Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 400, 416 ( 1973 ). Of co urse , such 
predictability would be true of normal as well as c razy persons, and thus would not co nstitute 
grounds for di stingu is hing the two gro up s . Professor Monahan has a lso proposed a resea rch 
strategy for tes ting the accuracy of predictions in the e merge ncy commitme nt context. J. 
Monahan, Strategies for an Empirica l Analysis of the Prediction of Violence in E mergency 
Civil Commitment (July 1977) (Unpublished ms.) (on file with the Southern California Law 
Review ). 
If future re searc h should support Professor Mo nahan's hypothe sis , a naly s is of eme rge ncy 
commitme nt and trea tme nt for only the mentall y ill would ha ve to proceed on the bas is of the 
rationales of nonresponsibility, irra tio na lity, and treatment. Continued lack of support for the 
nonre spo ns ibilit y, irrationality, and treatment rationa les st ill would lead to the concl us ions that 
emerge ncy commitme nt is not justified and that prese ntly dangerous behavior can be handled 
best by the criminal justice system. See A. STONE , supra note 10 , at 36-37. Finall y, if o ne were 
willing to a llow emergency commitment largely because predictability was great, it is worth 
noti ng that only e me rgency commitment would be justified on that a na lys is. 
238. Justifica tions . supra note 36, a t 75 n. I , 83; Developments, supra note 6, a t 1220-2 1. 
Thi s rat ionale is impli c it in "need for treatment" sta nda rds and perhaps is compelled by the 
right to treatment doctrine. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 587-88 (1975) 
(B urger, C.J., concurring) (denying the co nstitutional status of a right to treatment); W yatt v. 
Aderhol t , 503 F.2d 1305, 1312-15 (5t h Cir. 1974) ; Do nald son v. O'Connor , 493 F.2d 507, 52 1-27 
(5 th C ir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Rou se v. Cameron , 373 F.2d 451 , 453-57 (D .C. 
Cir 1966); We lsch v. Likins , 373 F. Supp. 487,491-99 (D. Minn. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney , 325 
F. Supp. 781, 784-85 (M.D. Ala. 1971). The commenta ry on the right to treatme nt has been 
voluminous. See, e.g., THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT (G. Morri s ed. 1970); 
TH E R IGHT TO T REATMENT (D. Burris ed. 1969) ; Birnbaum, The Right to Treatm ent: Some 
Comments on It s Development , in MENTAL H EALTH CARE 97 , 97 -141 (F. Ayd ed. 1974); 
H offm a n & Dunn , Beyond Rou se and Wyatt: An Administrati ve-Law Model for Expanding 
and Implementing the Mental Patient's Right to Treatment, 61 VA. L. REv . 297 ( 1975); Schwitz-
gebel , The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CA LIF. L. R EV. 936 (1974); Schwitzgebel, 
Right to Treatm ent for the Mentally Disabled: Th e N eed for Realistic Standards and Objective 
Criteria, 8 H ARV. C.R. -C.L.L. R EV. 513 (1973); Stone, Overview: Th e Right to Treatment-
Comments on the Law and Its Impact , 132 AM. J. PSYCHI ATRY 11 25 ( 1975). 
Indeed , one noted commentator has rece ntly called for an explicitl y treatme nt-based 
parens patriae standard for commitment. A. STONE, supra note 10 , at 65-70. If the person is 
suffering, needs treatment, gives an irrational reason for refusing treatment, and treatment is 
available, then commitment is justified . Under thi s standard, hospitalization is necessary 
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restrictive alternative limitation on the state's power to commit were adopt-
ed, commitment would be justified if the necessary treatment could be 
provided only by in-patient hospitali zation. 239 The treatment rationale fails 
for a number of reasons, however. First , it assumes th at the inmate initiall y 
was proper ly incarcerated. From the foregoing discussion, 240 it is clear that 
this assumption is theoretically doubtful and factuall y false in many cases. 
Second, the treatment rationale assumes that because society has grounds to 
incarcerate a perso n, the right to force treatment on the inmate necessaril y 
foll ows . As we have seen, however, there is no reason to believe that a 
person who is both crazy and dangerous or crazy and incompetent in some 
respec ts is therefore incompetent with re spect to all deci sions concerning hi s 
life , including the decision to accept or refuse treatment. 241 
Third , the treatment rationale ass umes that crazy people are spec iall y 
treatable . Many crazy persons are not treatable, 242 however, and there is 
mainly in order to force treatment o n the individual. The critical issue s in this sc he me a re 
whether suffering , eve n int ense suffering, ju st ifies involuntary incarce ration in the absence o f 
great danger a nd when a pe rson ' s decision to refuse hospitali zation a nd treatment s hould be 
overridden. See not es 228-34 a nd acco mpanying text supra. 
A point , o nl y peripherally related to the a nalysi s of this Article, but which is most releva nt 
here , is that the treatment ra ti o nale assumes that adequate treatment will be available. In ma ny 
(if not most) public hospitals, however, no adequate treatment is provided even under the 
limited scope of prese nt kno wledge. See, e.g. , Wyatt v. Stickney , 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 
1972); W yatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp . 78 1 (M.D. Ala. 1971 ); R. STUART, supra note 133, a t 28-
34; Birnbaum , supra, at 97-114, 117-19, 125, 138-40 ; Mendel, supra note 133; Rosenhan, supra 
note 50 , at 254-57 
The conditions in public mental hospital s are cons tantly being exposed as disgraceful, even 
in the more "advanced" states . See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1977 , § I, at 5 , col. 1; Gillam, 36 
More Mental Hospital Deaths 'Questionable,' L.A . Times, Nov. 20, 1976, pt. I , at I , col. 1. 
Such conditions are not surprising: public hospital work is not attractive, extensive staffing a nd 
treatment are e normously expensive, the public is not generally sympathetic to the mentally ill, 
and mental pa tients are not a cohes ive and effective political group that is likely to seek 
vindica tion of its ri ghts. Mos t public ho spitals today provide little more than custodial 
services of varying co mfort a nd the presc ription of appropriate psychoactive drugs with 
varying care a nd prec ision. As a result, man y patients recei ve only minimally humane custod y 
in a de persona lized atmosphere and are subject to inappropriate drugging. See, e. g., Mason, 
N ervia no , & De Burger , Patterns of Antipsychotic Drug Use in Four Southeastern State Hospi-
tals, 38 DISEASES N ERVOUS SYS. 541 (1977); sources cited supra. 
239. See note :?.22 supra . 
240. See notes 21fi-:?.7 , 235-37 supra. 
241. See, e.g., Winters v. Miller, 446 F .2d 65 (2d Cir.) , cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (197 1); 
not es 228-34 a nd accompanying text supra. 
242. See O'Connor v. Donaldson , 422 U.S. 563 , 584,588-89 ( 1975) (Burge r , C.J. , conc ur-
ring). See generally K atz, Th e Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Lega l Fiction?, 3(, U . CH I. L. 
RE V. 755, 76fi-fi7 ( 1969); May, Schizophrenia: Overview of Trea tment Methods , in COMPREH EN-
SIVE T EXTBOOK Ol' PSYCHI.-\TRY -11 , supra not e 26 , a t 923, 936 (treatment limited in ma ny cases 
and co mplete remis s io n alm os t unknown). 
The problem of untreatability may be especiall y ac ute for geriatric pati e nts wh o a llegedly 
suffer fr om irre versible brai n deterioration. Such patients supposed ly suffe r fr om athero-
sclerosis, but the di agnosi s is rarely pathologi cally verified a nd mo st treatme nts pred icated o n 
the diagnosis ha ve not proved effi cac iou s . Sandok , Organic Brain Syndromes Associated with 
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good reason to believe that the legally relevant behavior of sane pe rsons is as 
treatable or changeable as the legally relevant behavior of crazy persons. 243 
Further, the disturbing or dangerous legally relevant behaviors of crazy 
people are performed in even greater numbers by sane persons; thus sane 
persons pose a greater problem for society than crazy persons. Special kgal 
treatment of crazy persons, then, cannot be bottomed on the assumption that 
crazy persons are specially treatable by mental health methods or that 
treating only crazy people will substantially ameliorate social harms. 2..w 
Society can and probably will continue to commit and treat involuntari-
ly crazy persons for a variety of reasons, but if it does so it must recognize 
that the fundamental scientific rationales for involuntary commitment and 
treatment are not well supported theoretically or empirically. If involuntary 
civil commitment and treatment were abolished or severely limited 
compared to present practice, society would not be faced with disastrous 
results compared to the present. Society would not be substantially unpro-
tected from dangerous persons nor would the streets be crammed with 
Circulatory Disturbances, in C0\1PREHE:.ISIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY-II, supra note 26, at 
I 065, l 070. Other researchers claim that cerebral atherosclerosis, as a cause for mental 
deterioration in the elderly, is perhaps the most common misdiagnosis in medicine. Hachinski, 
Lassen, & Marshall, Multi-Infarct Dementia: A Cause of Mental Deterioration in the Elderly, 
The Lancet, July 27, 1974, at 207 (multiple infarcts are the cause of vascular disease that 
produces deterioration; rational symptomatic therapy is possible). Finally, substantial evi-
dence shows that much of the mental deterioration of the elderly is a result of social-psychologi-
cal factors. Jarvik, Thoughts on the Psychology of Aging, 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 576 (1975). In 
any case, it is recognized that some proportion of geriatric patients are not true psychiatric 
cases, are untreatable, and need some type of humane custodial care. These cases should be 
handled without resort to psychiatric fictions. 
243. Justifications, supra note 36, at 86. Indeed, more normal persons are generally 
preferred as patients by psychotherapists and are considered better risks for psychotherapy, 
especially if they meet the "Yavis"" syndrome-i.e., they are young, attractive, verbal, intelli-
gent , and successful. See J. FRANK , PERSUASION AND HEALING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
PSYCHOTHERAPY 188-89 (rev. ed. 1973); W. SCHOFIELD, PSYCHOTHERAPY: THE PURCHASE OF 
FRIENDSHIP 128-35 ( 1964). (Of course, some degree of distress is necessary to motivate people to 
begin and continue treatment.) Further, less crazy persons are more likely than more crazy 
persons to remit spontaneously and for longer periods. 
All other things being equal, crazier persons tend to have more problems and dysfunctions 
than do less crazy individuals. Thus, even if the problems are treatable, treatment tends to be 
more difficult for crazier people. 
244. Because there is no reason to believe that socially harmful crazy persons are more 
fixable than similarly harmful noncrazy persons, see note 243 supra, the treatment rationale 
could easily be extended to require the fixing of all disturbing people, crazy or not. For 
instance, society may someday decide that noncrazy dangerous persons, whether they are free 
or in prison, present such a risk to others that society is justified in applying to such persons 
without their consent irresistible and irreversible behavior change techniques. Because these 
persons are so dangerous, their right to be free of intrusion on their personal identity and dignity 
may be considered outweighed by the need for social protection. See generally A. BURGESS, A 
CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1963) (choice of behavior change treatment or lengthy incarceration 
faced by the highly dangerous protagonist); H. WHEELER, BEYOND THE PUNITIVE SOCIETY 
(1973) . Indeed, B.F. Skinner has argued that such techniques should be applied generally in 
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seriously disturbed persons. 245 Further, self-endangering behavior would 
not increase significantly. The slight ancl probably imperceptible rise in 
social disturbance, mostly of a very mile! variety, that probably would result 
from abolition or limitation is hardly a heavy price to pay when compared 
first, with the costs to the hundreds of thousands of persons who are every 
year deprived of their liberty and treated against their wills, and second, 
with the costs of maintaining them in institutions. The community would 
still be required to provide life-support services for some people; indeed, 
full-time custodial care might be needed for some. But those services are 
cheaper and more humane when they are provided voluntarily and in the 
community or in smaller, local residential facilities. Further, money now 
spent for unnecessary and expensive hospitalization could be spent on 
treatment services in the community that are less costly and probably more 
effective. 246 Abolition of or strict limitations on civil commitment perhaps 
·would not guarantee to those persons now committed the benefits they 
currently receive. 247 But, those benefits can be provided largely without 
order to ensure human survival and happiness. Skinner feels no need to balance these laudable 
goals against individual dignity and freedom because he considers the latter to be illusions. See 
B. F. SKINNER, supra note 60. In a sense, then, craziness operates as a limiting principle that 
restricts the state's right to force treatment on persons who are socially harmful and fixable. 
Still, the limitation to crazy persons is not warranted by assumptions that they are ill, specially 
lacking in control, specially treatable, or specially incompetent. 
245. The decarceration movement of the 1960's and 1970's has not led to much violence or 
nuisance on the part of crazy persons. It is certainly true that there is some increase in both, but 
there is no evidence that the increase is intolerable or near that level. especially compared to 
other sources of violence and nuisance in our society. This outcome is not surprising con-
sidering that crazy persons as a class are not especially dangerous and that few fit the 
stereotype of the bothersome raving lunatic. 
It is also true, however, that some persons who otherwise would have been hospitalized are 
now processed through the criminal justice system, perhaps at somewhat greater cost than if 
they had been through the mental health system. See ENKI, THE BuRDEI' OF THE MENTALLY 
DtSORDERED ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ( 1973). The numbers of such persons are evidently not 
large. See Morris, Conservatorship for the "Gravely Disabled": California's Nondeclaration of 
Nonindependence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 201, 206 n.28 (1978); cf. Atkinson, Current and 
Emerging Models of Residential Psychiatric Treatment, with Special Reference to the California 
Situation, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 391, 395 (1975) (paucity of studies; some indicate minimal 
increase). Arguably, the criminal justice system is the appropriate mechanism for dealing with 
persons who violate the law. But see ENKI, supra. Even if the criminal justice system is 
judged inappropriate, it is by no means clear that involuntary hospitalization is the most 
efficacious alternative. See notes 133, 222 and accompanying text supra. See generally A. 
SCULL, DECARCERATION: COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND THE DEVIANT: A RADICAL VIEW 64-94 
(1977); Early & Nicholas, Dissolution of the Mental Hospital: Fifteen Years On, 130 BRIT. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 117 (1977). 
246. See notes 133, 238 supra and 247 infra. 
247. At present , the services being provided to crazy persons in the community are 
probably as disgraceful in general as the services provided in public mental hospitals. Commu-
nity treatment services are not provided and large numbers of persons are institutionalized in 
community board-and-care homes or inner city slums where they live on welfare in residential 
hotels and the like. Indeed, some persons have less food, shelter, and clothing in the community 
than they would have in a mental hospital. See Arnhoff, supra note 133; Kirk & Therrien, 
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invo luntary commitment, and abolition or limitation will provide those now 
committed with a greater measure of freedom. 
2. Th e Insanity Defense 
The usual rationale for the insanit y defense is that moral and legal responsi-
bility for criminal behavior can be ascribed to an actor only if he possesses 
certain capabilities, such as the ability to know or understand the nature of 
his ac tions or to res ist or control his urges to behave criminally. It is 
cons idered unfair , immoral , and nonutilit ari an to blame and retributively 
punish a person who lacks these capacities because such a person is 
alleged ly not able to conform hi s behavior to the law. 248 Mentally ill people 
are treated specially because insanity is thought to destroy these capabilities. 
The insanity defense is a cognitive/volitional incapacity defense that is 
limited only to those whose incapacity is allegedly the result of insanity 249 
Once again the question arises: Is there a scientific basis for differ-
enti ating between crazy and normal people? We do not excuse persons who 
arguably may be unable to appreciate the wrongfulness or criminality of 
their conduct because of subcultural influences, or who may have impaired 
capac ity to conform their conduct to law because of lifelong , habitual 
Community Mental Hea lth Myths and the Fate of Former Hospitali zed Patients, 38 PSYCHIATRY 
209 (1975 ); Wolpert & Wolpert , The Relocation of Released Mental Hospital Patients into 
R esidential Communities, 7 PoL ' y SCI. 31 (1976); Sansweet , Out in the Street, Wall St. J., Aug. 
19 , 1976, a t I, col. I. 
From this appa lling s tate of affa irs it does not follow, howeve r , that the decarceration 
move me nt should be limited or terminated. After all, there are many noncrazy people who are 
incompete nt and inadequately fed, clothed, and sh e ltered in our society; it is not s uggested that 
they be involuntarily inca rce rated a nd treated. The proper respo nse is not to return many crazy 
pe o ple to ex pens ive , ineffi caciou s, a nd perhaps destru c ti ve hospital s , but to e x pe nd reso urces 
fur a t least minimal huma n needs a nd treat ment in the com munity. It see ms c lear that adeq ua te-
ly fund ed community services are as efficacious as a nd c heaper tha n hos pitalization a nd they 
allow persons to remain at liberty. See notes 133,238 supra. 
It s hou ld be recogni ze d, how e ver , that communit y treatment is no t a panacea. S ta te s and 
municipalities appa re ntl y are not willing to expend sufficie nt re so urces e ither for hosp ita ls or 
community treatment to e ns ure the highest proba bilit y of hu:nane care or adapti ve behavioral 
change for each pa tient. Moreover , even if unlimited resources were expende d , massive 
treatmen t success might not follow beca use of limitations in treatm e nt knowledge. 
ln sum, craziness will not be eliminated completely in our society, but much can be done 
w ith out depriving people of their libert y. See generally K. HEL LER & J. MONAHA~, PSYCHOLO-
GY ACID CO~I MUNITY CH ANGE 291-96 (1977); J. RAPPAPORT, COMM Ul\' ITY PSYCHOLOGY : VALUES, 
RE~EARC H, AND ACTION 273-304 (1977) ; Eisenberg , Psychiatric Intervention , 229 Sc i. AM . 117 
(1973). 
248. H. L.A. HA RT , supra note 64, at 28-50, 152; W. LAF:WE & A. SCOTT, supra note 63, at 
269-72 (1972); Morris , Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S . CAL. L. REV. 5 14 , 517-18 
( 1968). 
249. There a re other cognitive defenses such as mi s ta ke and other vo liti o nal defenses such 
as duress, but these are limited defenses that refer to the particular c ircumsta nce s in w hi c h the 
crime occ urred . For ad ults , the insanity defense and the related defe nse of autom ati sm a re the 
only complete defenses that are based totally on the ac tor's characteri s tics rather tha n on an 
int eraction between the actor and the circumstances. 
1 
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characte r traits such as impetuosity, rashness, or even immorality. 250 Sug-
gestions that there should be a nonresponsibility defense that would consider 
factors such as culture or character ,251 however, are often objected to 
because it is believed that these factors do not des troy agency and free 
choice. 252 Yet there is no scientific evidence to demonstrate that persons 
whose criminal behavior is affected by craziness are less able to obey the 
law than persons similarly affected by cultural influences or character 
traits . 253 Indeed , available evidence would point to the opposite conclu-
s iOJ1. ~54 A fairer conclusion would be that nearly all persons are capable of 
obeying the law, even though it may be harder for some to obey than for 
others. 
The most persuasive , least question-begging answer to calls for aboli-
tion of the insanity defense is that societies have always treated crazy 
persons as nonresponsible; moral intuition about such persons is simply too 
entrenched to permit society to abolish the defense and to impose blame. 255 
250 . Cf. N. MORRIS & C. H OWARD, supra note 65, at 93-99 (Aborigine murder defenda nts 
in Aus tra li a were entitled to instruction on provocation that was based on the subcultural trai ts 
of the Aborigines). 
251. Bazelon, supra note 73; see Diamond, From Durham to Brawner, A Futile Journey, 
1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 109, 119-21; Floud, Sociology and the Theory of Responsibility: Social 
Background as an Excuse for Crime, in THE SCIENCE OF SOCIETY AND THE UNITY OF MANKIND 
204-21 (R. Fletcher ed. 1974); Morris, supra note 248, at 520. 
252. Morse, supra note 63. 
253. Indeed , limiting a broad nonresponsibility defen se to cases of insanity is a severe 
re s triction on such a general defense. Compare United Stares v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 , 1240-61 
(D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973) and Bazelon , supra note 
73 with United States v. Moore , 486 F.2d at 1144-48 (Wilkey, J.), 1178-81 (Leventhal, J. , 
concurring) and Morse, supra note 63. 
254. See In re Ballay , 482 F.2d 648, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Morri s, supra note 248, at 520; 
note s 24, 98 and accompanying text supra. See generally notes 58-112 and accompanying text 
supra. In those areas of homicide law where objective standards of mens rea apply, the 
rigorousness of the objective standard is often qualified by consideration of certain factors that 
rendered a person incapable of behaving as an ordinary, reasonable person. These factors a re 
considered only when they are not the result of culpable behavior on the part of the actor. For 
instance, the Model Penal Code allows a murder conviction to be mitigated to manslaughte r if 
the killing occurred as a result of extreme emotional di stre ss for which there was reasonable 
ex pla na tion or excuse. The examples given of such explanations or excuses are traumatic 
injury , blindness, distraction from grief, and an unanticipa ted drug reaction. MODEL PENAL 
CODE§ 201.3, Comments, at 48 (Tent. Draft No.9 , 1959). Even though it is often believed that a 
person is not responsible for character traits that are a product of life-long influences over 
which he had no control, see J. RAWLS, supra note 82, at 103-04 , character traits such as 
excess iv e excitability will not qualify an objective mens rea sta ndard, even if the jurisdiction 
a llows such qualifications for other reasons. The Queen v. McGregor, [1962] N.Z.L.R. 1069, 
1081-82 , quoted inS. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 231-32 (3d ed. 
1975). See generally Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 
1269 (1974). 
255. E.g. , A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 223-25; Dershowi tz, Abolishing the Insanity 
Defense: The .Most Significant Feature of the Administration's Proposed Criminal Code-An 
Essay, 9 CR:M. L. BULL. 434 , 438-39 (1973). This response is the least question-begging because 
it does not entirely depend on the unprovable empirical assumption that the alleged disease is 
642 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:527 
This argument contends that abolition would weaken the criminal law 's 
claim to the moral respect of the community. A closely related argume nt fo r 
maintaining the defense is that it reinforces noncrazy persons' sense of 
responsibility by differentiating those who appear different and nonrespo n-
sible.256 Thus, both arguments claim that craziness must be considered m 
decisions concerning criminal culpability. 
The critics of abolition of the insanity defense correctly asse rt that 
craziness is relevant to culpability. Because craziness is itse lf behavio r , it 
must be relevant to culpability when it is re lated to the criterion be hav io r o f 
criminal culpability. Despite the need to consider craziness when it is 
relevant to criminal behavior, however, the insanity defense in its present 
form might not need to be retained. Craziness can be considered in determi -
nations of criminal respo nsibility by adopting, for example, an "elemen ts" 
approach as suggested by Professors Goldste in and Katz, and M o rri s. 257 
the cause o f lack of capac ity. It recogni zes the probable social cohesion effec ts of ma inta ining a 
defense based on a powerful , common intuition. Some very sophisticated writers apprec ia te 
and rel y on the moral intuiti o n argument fo r maintaining th e defense , but do so in part o n the 
assumed basis that for some reason c razy persons lack the capacity to behave norm a ll y. See, 
e.g. , Fingarette , supra note 39, at 249; Moore , Legal Conceptions of Mental Illness , fo rthco m-
ing in 5 PHILOSOPHY AND M EDICINE (T. Englehardt ed.) . Another argument is that aboliti o n o f 
the insanity defense will ame liorate theoret ical but not prac tical problems . See Kapl a n, The 
Mad and the Bad: An Inquiry into Disposition of the Criminally Insane , 2 J. MED . & 
PHILOSOPHY 244 , 268-69 , 280-83 (1977) . A less persuasive moral view s imply assumes that 
craziness is a symptom of a disease that deprives the person of the capacity to control his 
behavior a nd thus renders him nonculpa ble because he could not do otherwise. See. e.g. , J. 
GLOVER, RESPO NSIBILITY 126-40 (1970); Brady, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-No 1, 8 Hous . 
L. REV. 629 , 640 (1971). 
256. A. GOLDSTEIN , supra note 10 , a t 224; Monahan , Abolish the Insanity Defense 7-Not 
Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. R Ev. 7 19 , 720-25 ( 1973). See also Monahan & H ood , Psychologically 
Disordered and Criminal Offenders: Perceptions of Their Volition and Responsibility. 3 CRI\t. 
JusT. & BEHAV IOR 123, 124 ( 1976) (offende rs perceived as psychologica ll y disord ered are 
generally perceived to have less '" free will' ' and thu s are considered less respon sib le a nd 
blameworth y) . 
257. Goldstein, Th e Brawner Rule-Why ? or No More Nonsense on Non Sense in the 
Criminal Law, Please' , 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 126, 150-52 ; Goldstein & Ka tz, Abolish the 
" Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE. L.J. 853 , 857-58 (1963); Morri s, supra note 248,at 
518-19. The article by Morris also includes a useful appendix at 544-47 , which summarizes most 
of the leading arguments for a bolition of the insanity defense. The writers of the "eleme nts" 
persuasion believe that the criminal justice sys tem should be less concerne d with hypocritica l 
exculpation-persons acquitted by reason of insanity us ua lly are committed to institutio ns for 
the criminally insane tha t a re highly puniti ve in fact. See Bn"ef of Donald McEwan, Petitioner 
Prose , in J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN, & A. D ERS HOWITZ, supra note 18 , a t 700-0!. See generally 
German & Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: Hospitalization of Persons Acquitted by Reason of 
Insanity, 29 RuTGERS L. REv. lOll (1976); Kaplan, supra note 255, a t 269-80. The now 
abandoned § 522 of the proposed Crimina l Ju stice Reform Act of 1975 (known as S.l) incor-
porated the elements a pproach. See SENATE COMM. ON THE J u DICIA RY , 94TH CONG. , 1ST SESS ., 
CRIMIN AL J USTICE REFORM ACT OF 1975, a t 103-1 7 (Comm. Print 1975) . After ex tens ive s tud y o f 
the operation of the insanity de fense in New York, the New York Sta te Depa rtment of Men tal 
Hygiene has recommended that the insa nity defense sho uld be aboli shed a nd replaced by a 
system wherein insanity would be used only to affect the degree of crime for whic h the 
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According to this view, no special defense is necessary; insanity (and other 
factors) would be relevant to the standard determination of whether or not an 
element of the crime such as a specific mens rea was present. Thus, to take 
an old example, a person who sincerely believed that he was squeezing a 
lemon when he really was strangling his wife could not be guilty of criminal 
homicide on an intent to kill theory. 258 
defendant could be convicted. Factors cited were, inter alia, the use of the defense as a guilt 
avoidance mechanism for certain segments of the population, that treatment for acquittees was 
more appropriate in a correctional setting, and that "psychiatric participation in the determina-
tion of legal guilt or innocence is premised upon false assumptions of psychiatric expertise in 
what are essentially legal, moral, and social judgments." The report concluded by noting that 
the insanity defense should be abolished also because in highly publicized cases the defense 
could foster the erroneous impression that all mentally ill persons are dangerous, thus inhibiting 
community acceptance of care and treatment for nondangerous disordered persons. NEw YORK 
STATE DEP'T OF MENTAL HYGIE:--IE, THE lNSAt'-<ITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK 9-11 (1978). 
Another scheme has been proposed by Lady Wootton who suggests that mens rea should 
be eliminated entirely from the definition of crime. B. Woonoc:, CRIME AND CRI~IINAL LAw 32-
85 (1963). According to this scheme, the defendant's mental state would be relevant only to 
disposition. Of course, this proposal goes far beyond replacing the insanity defense with an 
"elements" approach. Indeed, it is in fundamental opposition to the thesis of this Article that 
holds that insufficient weight has been given to the culpability of crazy persons. A thorough 
critique of Lady Wootton's proposal will not be offered here, however, for it has been 
accomplished most ably by others. H.L.A. HART, supra note 64, at 178-80, 195-209; Kadish, 
The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273, 285-90 (1968). 
258. MODEL PENAL CoDE§ 4.01, Comments, 46 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1953). The Model Penal 
Code comments on this hypothetical situation and on the case of a person who kills because 
commanded to by God as follows: "A madman [who believes his wife is a lemon or that God 
has commanded him] ... is plainly beyond reach of the restraining influence of law; he needs 
restraint but condemnation is entirely meaningless and ineffective." !d. (emphasis added). 
A few comments need to be made about the hypothetical and the reaction to it by the Model 
Penal Code. First, it is very unusual for defendants raising the insanity defense to claim that 
they had no idea what they were doing-such hypotheticals do not stimulate sensible debate. 
But see, e.g., People v. Wetmore, 63 Cal. App. 3d 169 [citation is to Cal. Official Rep. Adv. 
Sh.], 133 Cal. Rptr. 529, 530 (1976), hearing granted, Cr. 19738 (Dec. 16, 1976). In this case a 
burglary defendant who had been surprised by the police in the home of another claimed that he 
had believed the home and its possessions belonged to him. When the police arrived he was 
allegedly shocked and embarrassed by their presence and then, allegedly, immediately under-
stood that he had misinterpreted the situation. The defendant had been a mental patient, and as 
is well documented, many patients know very well how to play successfully the mental illness 
game. See notes 88-89 supra. Indeed, based on more than a decade of research with insanity 
acquittees at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, two therapist-researchers have concluded that most are 
playing a game in order to avoid responsibility for their actions and prison. S. YOCHELSON & S. 
SAMENOW, I THE CRIMINAL PERSONALITY 529-30 (1975). Taking a more sympathetic view, 
confusion about the ownership of the apartment is conceivable, albeit unlikely, and such 
immense confusion is rare in insanity defense situations. Belief that a person was a lemon, 
however, would be utterly incredible even for a very crazy person. More often, the defendant 
raising the insanity defense knew what he was doing, at least to some degree, but had a crazy 
reason for doing it or felt that he just could not help himself. 
Second, it is simply assumed that crazy persons cannot control themselves, cannot be 
deterred, and should not be blamed. As we have seen, the systematic empirical evidence 
bearing on this question is hardly persuasive. Even if a person sincerely has a crazy reason for 
his crime, there is little scientific evidence to support the positions that the actor was incapable 
of attending to and weighing alternative data and that he could not control his behavior based on 
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There are, of course, objec tions to various form s of the e lements 
approach ,259 but such an approach does ha ve the virtue of allowing craziness 
to be considered where it seems relevant without simultaneo usly stigmati z-
ing crazy people as a class by prov iding them with a special defense based 
o n their a llegedl y uniqu e incapacities 2 60 fn addition , the increased threat of 
crimin al sanctions might affect c razy persons and e ncourage them to control 
the poss ible criminal consequences of the ir craziness 261 fn other context s, 
crazy people do respond to cost incenti ves .262 Fina ll y, the re is little danger 
that large numbers of dangerous defendants would be acquitted because they 
en tire ly lacked mens re a; the insanity defense is rarely rai sed, 263 and few 
persons who rai se it are entirely lacking in culpability. 264 If the specific 
th ~tt belief. See notes 106-12 and accompanying tt::xt supra. Conce ivably, one cou ld exert 
himse lf to tes t hi s c razy thought s agai ns t real it y, seck he lp , a nd the li ke . 
259. S ee , e.g. , Wa le s, An Analysis of the Proposal co "Aho/ish " ch e ln sanicy Defense in 
S. l: Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. P·\. L. REv. 687,687-7 10 ( 1976). Although discus s ion of the 
many poss ible objections is be yond the scope of thi s Articl e , one objection is relevant to the 
theoretical a na lys is o f this Article. In sanit y nega ti ves mens rea ge nerall y by impairi ng the 
capacity for free choice. !d. at 69 1. See also People v. Poddar , I 0 Cal. 3d 750, 518 P.2d 342, 111 
Cal. Rptr. 9 10 (1974) . Critics of the elements approach admit th a t a crazy defendant may have 
forme d the spec ific mens rea for the crime in question, but argue that the defendant st ill should 
be exculpated because hi s qua lita ti ve capacity for free c hoi ce was substantially impa ired by hi s 
a ll eged illn ess. Assuming th at a general ca pacit y for free choice (general mens rea) is a 
requisite for criminal culpability, cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 541 (1968) (Black, J. , 
conc urring) (voluntariness of behavior not a const ituti onal requ irement for criminal c ulpabil i-
ty), this vie w begs the fundamental question of whether the c razy perso n , compared to most 
defendants, indeed substantia lly does lac k free c hoice. As we have see n, thi s is only a n 
assumpti on and one that can reasonably be dispute d. See Livermore & Meehl, The Virtues of 
M'Naghten, 51 MINN. L REV. 789, 789-800 (1967) . 
260. Not only is the insanity defen se provided uniquely to crazy perso ns, in some juris-
dictions it may be raised sua sponte by the court even over the defendant's objection. United 
States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148 (D.C. C ir. 1974) 
261. Livermore & Meehl , supra note 259, at 793-95. 
262. See notes 92-94 and acco mpanyi ng text supra. 
263. Morris, supra note 248, at 519 (insanity defense rai sed in only 2% of jury trials; in 
Britain, defense raised in only .1% of trials for crimes other than murder); H oME OFFICE, 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOC IAL SECURITY, supra note 21, at 3 16 (in murder trials in 
Britain between 1971 a nd 1973 , only .7% of defendants were gu ilty but insane). Three reasons 
indicate that in the future th e insanity defense may be rai sed more freque ntly in the United 
States: F irs t, the reappearance of the death penalty ; second , the limitation on indeterminate 
conf ineme nts of defendants fo und incompetent to s tand trial; a nd third , the increasi ng statutory 
a nd cons itutional limitations that are being placed o n the conditions for hospital commitment 
and release of those defendants accquited by reason o f insan it y. G. MORRIS, THE INSANITY 
DEFENSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIV E REFORM 7 (1975) ; see German & S inger , supra note 
257, at 1025-35, 1040-74. 
264. Nea rly all defendants pleading in sa nity arguably have a gre at deal of choice in the 
genera l mens rea sen se, a nd very few will be found lacking all specific men s rea. Thu s, very few 
will be acqu itted a nd freed if a n e lement s approach we re adopted. 
Let us take the ex a mple of a person who kills a human being because God told him to do so , 
but who recog nizes the requireme nts of the se cular law. Th e defendant certainly int e nds to kill 
and mu st try to rai se a neces s ity defen se. The nec ess it y defen se , however , is available only if 
the defendant ha s made th e cor rect social we ighing of what is the great e r good to society. The 
defense wo uld not be ava il able in our secula r age . If it is now argued that mental disorder 
• 
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insanity defenses were abolished, the procedural difficulties attending the 
insanity defense would be avoided265 and crazy but culpable criminals 
would be sent deservedly to prison for a term proportionate to their culpabil-
ity. Further, voluntary treatment services can and should be provided in 
pri son for those who desire therapy. 
3. Cra ziness and Civil Law 
In c ivil law , insanity plays two different role s . First , it is a disability that in 
some situations negates the usual significance of a person 's behavior. For 
example, crazy persons may sometimes avo id enforcement of their 
contracts , have a defense to tort liability, or , post mortem, fail to have their 
will s admitted to probate. Second, craziness sometimes seems to be the 
outcome of various stresses and serves as a basis for recovery against the 
stressors or for receiving transfer payments from the government. For 
example , crazy persons may recover money to compensate them for thei r 
craziness if they are disabled by it or if it is the result of work-related injury 
or tortious harms. This section will discuss these two branches of civil 
mental health law. It will be argued that in civil law, mental health rationales 
are not used to restrict the liberty of unwilling persons; rather, they are used 
to authorize various seemingly desirable social outcomes, the achievement 
of which would otherwise violate other important social policies. 
preve nt ed him from reali zing tha t hi s belief was crazy , one can onl y res pond , as always, tha t 
th is is onl y an as sumption. A harder example is presented by a delu sional defend a nt wh o 
commits a crime requiring intent, like burglary . Consider a case where the defendant broke into 
a hou se he believed to be his own . See generally People v . Wetmore, 63 Cal. App. 3d 169 
[cita tio n is to Cal. Official Rep . Adv. Sh .], 133 Cal. Rptr. 529 , 530 (1976) , hearing granted , Cr. 
19738 (Dec. 16, 1976) . If burglary or even breaking and entering requires intent , his un-
reasonable mistake might exculpate him entirely. Or, if the various grades of risk-crea ting 
homicide in a jurisdiction require conscious awareness of the risk of death or serious bodily 
harm, the defendant who mistakenly believes he is squeezing a lemon when he strangles his 
wife would be totally exculpated. Thus, it is conceivable tha t some quite dangerous persons 
might be freed unless they could be civilly committed. Many jurisdictions maintain objective 
criminal negligence standards, however, under which practically all mentally ill defendant s 
could be convicted . In any case, those situations where total exculpation is possible will be very 
fe w a nd are likely to be so incredible that a reasonable jury will and probably should disbelieve 
the defendant. 
265. Administration of the insanity defense rai ses numerous procedural difficulties: e.g., 
who may raise the defense ; the weight of the presumption of sa nity; who has the burde n of 
persuas ion on the issue of insa nity; and the relationship o f the insa nit y defense to th e part ia l 
defe nse of diminished re spo nsibilit y . Further, numerou s proble ms are ra ised if the defend a nt is 
acquitted. For a collection o f cases and materials on these iss ues, see S. Morse, Cases a nd 
Ma terials on the Mental Health Legal System 1588-1654 (t ent. mim eographed ed. 1977). 
A final psychiatric and legal procedural problem is th e dif ficulty in correctly identifying 
truly me ntally ill persons. Even if one believes that there are some truly cnizy and nonrespon-
s ibl e persons , identifying them is rarely easy. Few insanity defense cases are clear. For a 
fasc inating example, see Un ited S tates v . Robertson , 507 F .2d 1148 (D .C . Cir. 1974) , where a n 
infu ria ted black man shot a white person with whom he had no pre vi o us re la tionship or co ntac t. 
The defendan t did no t wish to ra ise the insan ity defen se , c la iming hi s ac t was a produc t of hi s 
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a. Civil competence: In our society persons engage in various private 
and public civil activities that create legal ri ghts and duties or that are 
regulated by law 266 Individuals order their private relations by cont rac t, 
di spose of the ir property at death by will , serve as witnesses or jurors , and 
so on. There is a presumption in all these situations that the acto r is fully 
competent to e ngage in these acti vi ties. Permitting incompetent persons to 
perfo rm such activities, however, would undermine the result s society seeks 
to accomplish by allowing or requiring persons to engage in them. 
Freedom of testat ion, for instance, is fou nded on the poli cy assump-
tions , inter alia , that: ( 1) testators can best prov ide for their ow n des ires and 
needs , and allowing them to do so leads to a maximum utili zation of 
property; and (2) if testators know their property will be di sposed of as they 
wish , their ince nti ve to create and accu mulate wealth is increased. 267 As a 
matter of logic , these policies would be undermined if a testator had little 
idea what he was doing when he made his will. To se rve these po licies, the 
law has developed the foll owing criteria for testamentary capac ity: the 
testator must know and understand three elements: first , the identity of hi s 
heirs ; second, the nature and extent of his property; and third, the dispos i-
tion of his property. 268 In addition, the testator must be able to appreciate the 
foregoing three elements in relation to one another and to form an orderly 
desire as to the disposition of his property. 269 If a testator meets these 
criteria, his property will be disposed of as he wishes. If the crite ria are not 
met, the will is not admitted to probate, and the testator's property is 
disposed of by the laws of intestacy or by private agreement of the heirs. 
The usual reasons for ascriptions of civil incompetence are '' unsound 
mind" or insanity .270 Simply performing the activity badly or unwisely is 
political beliefs. The bl ack trial judge accepted the defe nda nt 's desire. O n appeal , Judge 
Baze lon he ld that the deci s ion not to impose the in sanit y defense " may no t re st so lely on the 
unchal lenged testimony of the government ex perts in th e absence of testimo ny o f th e othe r 
expe rt s." 507 F.2d a t 11 59. The case was remand ed for an ev identi ary heari ng. The defenda nt 
the reafter decided to as sert the insani ty defense. The tria l co urt found an e videnti ary bas is fo r 
the in sa nit y de fe nse; the court of appeals agreed and rema nded for a new trial. 529 F.2d 879 
(D.C. Ci r . 1976) . At the new tria l, the defendant then refused to assert the insa nity defe nse; th e 
court thereafte r fou nd no bas is for ra ising the insa nit y issue sua sponte. 430 F. Supp. 444 , 448 
(D.D.C. 1977). 
266. See generally H. L.A. H ART, supra note 64, at 44-46. 
267. N ote, supra note 10, at 1119-21. Of course, freed om of testation is not absolute, but 
enormous di sc retio n is given to tes tators. Id . at 1121 -24. 
268 . In re Lingenfelter 's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 571 ,582,241 P.2d 990,997 ( 1952); T. ATKINSON, 
H ANDBOOK OF TH E L AW OF WILLS§ 51 (1953); N ote, supra note 10, at 1124-25. On the ro le o f 
in sane delu sions as a ffecting the se c riteri a , see T . ATK INSON, supra. 
269. See sources cited in note 268 supra. 
270. E.g., CA L. Ctv. CODE§ 38 (West 1970) (a person entirel y wit hout understa nding has 
no power to make a contract of any kind); id. § 39 (conveyance o r contrac t of a perso n of 
un sound mind but with some understa nding is subj ect to resc ission if mad e before incapacity is 
judicially determined) ; id. § 4425(c) (marriage voidable if either party was of unsound mind at 
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not sufficien t, although a quite abnormal performance such as drawing an 
"unnatural" will may be take n as evidence of unsound mind or crazinessY 1 
Of course, it would be possible to nullify the legal significance of one's 
act ions simply because they were performed very unwisely or because an 
time of marriage). CAL . f' ROB . Ollll : ~ 20 (W est Surp. 1978) (perso ns of sound mind may 
di spose of their property hy will). 
271. Green, Proof of ;\1enta/ In competency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 Y.-\ LE 
LJ. :271 , 298 -306 ( 194-t) For a clas s ic case, see Cooper v. Livingston, 19 Fl a . 684 ( 1883), where 
the cou rt rcfttsed tll ;~!low r<::covery o n ::1 not e made by decede nt as payment to a perso n hircclto 
cure him of his ills by co njuri ng. After q uot ing Hawk ins· Pleas of the Crown on conj u ri ng , the 
court co nclud ed 
'"conjuring'" over a sick man "lo make h im wel l" is nola va lid consideration for a 
promi sso ry note; a nd no man w ith a healthy mind would vol untarily give a note 
for S250, wilh interest ::lt two per cent a mon th, for the services of a co njurer, who 
proposes to cure a lingering di sease by co nju ring or incantations. 
hi . a t 1)9-1. 
A more recent example that rai ses current ly topical issues is In re Strittma ter' s Estate , 140 
N.J. Eq. 9-1. 53 A.2d 205 ( 19-17). There, decedent' s will was conte sted by some di stant relatives 
with whom she had little con tact. Decedent had been a n ardent feminist , a nd had left a ll her 
money to the National \Vomen 's Party . There was evidence that sometime after the death of he r 
pare nts when s he was in her la te thirties, Ms. S trit tmater had developed a hatred for males a nd 
her parents. A general practitio ner testified that the decedent was insane, a nd there was some 
evidence that she was a torme nted person , but th e evidence al so showed that he r finan cia l 
affairs had always been conducted in a n orderly fash ion and that she was firmly in contact with 
reality. The Master be low had found tha t the proofs demo nstra ted " incontrovertably her 
morbid aversion to men" -a nd "feminism to a neurotic extre me." The court felt these charac-
teri za ti o ns were not st rong e nou gh. And , indeed , Ms. Strittmater was a rad ical a nd furious 
femini st who had ev idently c la imed that she wished for the obliteration of men. (It is not c lear 
whether this was meant as rhetoric , was stated or written in a fury, or was a coolly deliberate 
wish). The court concluded as follows : 
"The question is whethe r Mis s S trittma ter's Will is the product of her insanity. Her 
disease seems to ha ve become well deve loped by 1936. In August of that year she 
w rote , 'It rema in s for fe mini st ic organizations like the Nationa l Women's Party , to 
make expos ure of women's "protectors" and "lovers" for what their vicious and 
co ntemptible se lves are.' She had been a member of the Women's Pa rty for eleven 
years at that time, but the evidence does not show that she had taken a great interest in 
it. I think it was her paranoic cond ition , especi a ll y her insane delu sions about the male, 
that led her to leave her estate to the N a tional Women's Party. The re sult is that the 
probate s hould be set as ide." 
!d. at 95 , 53 A.2 d at 205-06. It s hould be not ed, however, that the o nl y evidence of he r di sease 
was Ms. Strittmater's extreme feminism a nd some indicators of inner torment. Indeed, the 
general practitioner , lhe Ma ster below, and the court mu st have formed the opinion that Ms. 
Strittmater was in sane s impl y because they believed first, that no one in her right mind would 
have held Ms. Strittmater' s attitudes and beliefs , and second, that only such ins a nity would 
cause her to leave her mo ney to the Nationa l Women's Party. 
But see I W. PAGE, ON TH E LAW OF WILLS § 12.37, at 645 (Bowe-Parker eds. 1960) 
(di sc ussing cases in volving eccentric testators). 
Th e fac t 1ha t the lestator was filthy , fo rgetful , a nd eccentric , or that he was 
miserl y and filthy, or tha t he was blasphemous, filthy, believed in witchcraft, a nd had 
clogs cat a l the sa me table with him, or that he was filthy, frequently refused to eat, 
a nd wou ld lie in bed wit h hi s clot hes on for two weeks a t a tim e, or that he would leave 
hi s home on ly at night , and would count and recount hi s money, or th a t he was high 
tempered and violent, or used violent a nd abu s ive language towards hi s son, o r was 
irritabl e a nd profane, or tha t te stator thought that others were plotting agai nst him and 
was afraid to go out in the clark , or that he was ina tte nti ve when s poken to a nd 
mumbled when trying to talk, does not esta blish lack of ca pacity. One who occas io nal-
ly has violent fit s of rage is not necessarily insane, and his will is valid, especially if not 
made in one of such fit s (footnote omitted). 
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unfair or unjust outcome resulted.:m Some policies might then be furthered 
(e.g., protection of heirs from pauperization), but another fundamental legal 
policy would be violated: the presumption that persons should be free, 
within limits, to manage their affairs and should abide by the consequences 
of their decisions. This presumption protects the dignity and autonomy of 
actors even if it sometimes results in unfairness to others such as heirs, or in 
unfortunate consequences to the actor such as tort liability or financial loss 
from a business decision. 
When unfortunate consequences result from craziness , however, the 
law is able to avoid the quandary presented by the confict between allowing 
freedom to actors and protecting them or others from their unwise actions. 
To choose another example, it seems much less unfair to let a foolish 
businessman impoverish himself and his family by a bad deal than to let a 
crazy businessman impoverish himself and his family by the same deal. The 
reason for the difference, of course, is that it is assumed that the crazy 
actor's incompetence was beyond his control and not simply a matter of 
carelessness, lack of wisdom, poor judgment, or the like. When craziness 
seems related to incompetent conduct, this assumption of uncontrollable 
incompetence saves society and the legal system from facing the hard moral 
and social problem of deciding when nullification of an actor's conduct is 
justified. 
It often seems to be the case, however, that an unjust or unwise result 
leads tautologically to the conclusion that the actor was crazy or of unsound 
mind; that is, it is assumed that no one in his right mind would have behaved 
that way. 273 If the assumption of lack of free choice is the foundation for 
nullification, however, then to avoid uncertainty there ought to be both 
independent evidence of craziness and evidence that links the craziness 
directly to the absence of one or more of the criteria for competence. 274 
This Article has already discussed the theoretical and practical difficul-
ties involved in making such determinations .275 It makes little sense, how-
ever, to limit incompetence (by law or by practice) to insanity or related 
conditions (e.g., senility). First, other factors, such as extremely poor 
judgment, rr1ay lead to unjust results. Second and more importantly, there is 
little reason to believe that incompetence caused by craziness is "unfree" 
incompetence whereas incompetence caused by other factors is "free." 
There is no scientific reason to believe, for example, that an actor "over-
!d.; quoted with approval in Simmons First Nat'! Bank v. Luzader, 246 Ark. 302, 310, 438 
S.W.2d 25,30 (1969); Harwell v. Garrett, 239 Ark. 551,559,393 S.W.2d 256,261 (1965). 
272. Green, supra note 271, at 308-1 I. 
273. See id. at 306-10; Note, supra note 10, at 1141-42. 
274. See text accompanying notes 95-97 supra. 
275. See text accompanying notes 26-57, 95-97 supra. 
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come'· by craziness who then behaves tortiou sly276 is less free than a 
simil arl y tortious ac tor who has a lifelong pattern of carelessness or who is 
ove rcome by a careless moment. 
To the extent that the law serves important policies by considering 
va ri ous incompetencies, it should co ntinue to do so . But it should do so 
ge nerally and on the basis of careful application of explicit behavioral 
standards. The law should not create sti gma ti zing and unjustified limitations 
based on unproven assumptions about crazy people. If a crazy person or 
anyo ne else is truly incompetent, then argu ably the law should inter fere. 277 
Tautol og ical conclusions linking cra zi ness and incompetence , however, 
should not be dictated by the desire to reach an apparently more just result. 
The law should interfere and nullify the usual legal significance of a 
person' s ac tions, if at all , only if it is satisfied that the indi vidual was 
inc::tpable, for whatever reason, of meeting the fun cti onal criteria for compe-
tence and full legal responsibility . 
b. Craziness as a ground for recovery: Craz iness serves as a basis for 
compensating crazy persons if it is caused by (Ortious conduct or work-
re lated conditions, or if it disables the person by preventing him from 
working or fulfilling his usual roles. The direct analogy for such recovery is 
clearly to physical harm or disease and their effects . The issue for analysis 
here is whether and to what extent craziness and its alleged effects should be 
compensable. 
The first issue for determination is whether the individual is crazy. As 
we have seen, however, there are no agreed on criteria for craziness other 
than crazy behavior itself. The causes of craziness are largely unknown, 278 
and it is difficult to ascertain what further uncontrollable effects are caused 
by craziness. 279 Proof that the person is truly crazy, or that any particular 
factor was the cause of craziness, or that the craziness is the cause of any 
other disability is quite problematic . There are simply no scientific means to 
?.76. E.g., Breunig v. Ameri can Famil y Ins. Co ., 45 Wis. 2d 536, 173 N.W.2d 619 (1970); 
Bu ckle y & Toronto Trans p. Comm'n v. Smith Tran sp. Ltd., [1946]4 D.L.R. 721. ff the person 
had forewarning of the onset of the craziness, there is a dut y to take ste ps to pre ve nt harm that 
might result from th e craziness. 45 Wis. 2d at 541, 173 N.W.2d at 623. 
277. In the civil law area. inco mpetence will not always lead to invalidation of th e actor's 
performance because strongl y com peting polic ie s may dictat e enforcement even if the actor 
was incompe tent. For instance , the co ntract of an incom petent who cannot co ntrol hi s be hav ior 
may be voi uable if the other pa rt y had reason to know of th e actor 's mental illness . If the 
co ntrac t is fa ir on its face, the ' other party did not kn ow of th e actor's men tal illness, and the 
cD ntract ha s been par tial ly or wholly performed, th e power of avo idance may be limited by 
eq uitable considerations. RESTATEMENT (SECON D) OF CONTRACTS § 18C (Tent. Draft No. I , 
1964) . Furthe r, even total incompetents are liable for the reasonable value of necessitie s 
furnished to them or th eir famili es. See C".l.. Cl v . CoDE§ 38 (Wes t 1954). 
278. See notes 26-30 ,7 1-78 and accompa nying text supra. 
279. See notes 95- 11 ~ and acco mpanying te xt supra. 
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determ ine with reasonable cert a inty what caused a pe rso n 's craziness or 
w he ther, following an experience of seve re stress , th e victi m could have 
''pull ed himself together'' and controlled hi s craziness or its related conse-
quences. Moreover, there is no persuasive ev idence to demonstrate that 
expe rt s can detec t malingering , a poss ibility that prese nts se rious difficulties 
111 recove ry s itu ations. 280 
Despite these difficulties, one may point to cases where a pe rson has 
undergone without fJ.ult on hi s pa rt a severe mental stress a nd now seems 
di sa bled in ways c lea rl y rel ated to th at stress . For ins tance , suppose a 
truckdr iver runs over and fatally injures a good friend. Af terwards , the 
trucker cb ims he is unable to return to work 281 Or, take the case of a worker 
who watches a fri e nd killed by a fall and who narrow ly escapes se rious 
injury himself when th e scaffolding on which they are work ing gives way. 
Suppose he claims that he cannot return to the scaffold eve n thou gh he may 
know rationally th at the particular accident was unusual. 282 If it is clear to 
any reasonable observer that these workers are not fakin g (e.g ., the scaffold 
worker faints when he climbs a scaffold), the se situations present a sym-
patheti c a nd compelling case for compensation, and perhaps the workers 
should be considered disabled . 
The issue, however, is not whether the worker suffers from an alleged 
di sease . Assertions about "traumatic neurosis , " "anxiety neurosis ," or 
"phobic neurosis," do not explain the situation; these labels are used only 
to state conclusions, even if they seem to provide a disease-like reason for 
the di sability and consequently a scientific rationale for recovery . 283 Nor 
does the fact that the claimed disability comports with various theories of 
280. See note s 180-86 supra and 283-85 and accompanying text infra. Contra , Larson, 
Mental and Nervous Injury in Workmen's Compensation, 23 VAND. L. RE v . 1243 (1970). ··rn 
the last ana lysis, th e prl)blem of ma lingering is on e of fact, which must be left to the skill and 
experi e nce of medical a nd psychiatric ex perts, and of compen sat ion ad mini strators, who 
usually manage in time 10 develop co ns iderable facilit y in detecting ma linge rers at th e fa c tfind-
ing leve l.· · Jd . at 1259. Thi s s tateme nt is unsupported and or.e wo nd ers w hat objecti ve ev idence 
separates psyc hiatri c illness from malinge ring in cases where there is no c lear admi ssio n by the 
claima nt or persuasive circumstanti a l ev ide nce that he is faking. 
An additional probl e m is the difficu lty of distinguis hing between normal reaction s to stre ss 
and behavior that perhaps ought properly to be consid e red ill ness. J. Zusrna n , Di as ters a nd 
Mental H ealth: Contradictory Findings (1978) (unpublished ms.) (on file with the Southern 
California Law R eview). Perhaps these two responses should be compensa ted differe ntly , but 
at pre se nt there is no agreed-on dividing line and it is unlikely that scie ntific cons ideratio ns will 
provide soc iety with the cutting po int. 
281. See Todd v. Goostree, 493 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. Ct. of Appeals 1973). 
2B2. See Baile y v. American Gen. In s. Co. , 154 Tex. 430. 279 S.W. 2cl 315 (1955) 
:.~n. T he attempt to base such c laims on med ica l knowledge to e nsure that th ey are " real'" 
e<tn bes t be demonstrated by the fede ral definition of di sability for Sl)C ia l securit y benefits: 
The term "disability·· rneans- [a n] inability to engage in any substantial gainful 
ac tivity by rea son of any medically determinable . . mental impa irment . 
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A) (1970) (emphasis added). 
I 
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behav ior28-l tell us whether the worker in question is truly incapab le or 
simply un willing to return to work. All that is known is that the worker 
claims that he is unable to return to work and there seems to be an explicable 
reason for that feeling 285 In the end, there is no way to determine if the 
worke r can not or will not work; compensation must finally be bottomed on a 
commonsense and humane assessment of the entire situation. The question 
must be whe ther, in light of all the circumstances, the choice to return to 
work is too hard. This question should be decided wi thout resort to comfort-
111 g ficti ons. 
Even if one accepts th at craziness may be both a result of stress and a 
cause of uncontrollable disability, the question of remed iation presents 
add ition al difficulties. For example, persons seeking social security disabili-
ty benefit s or worker's compensation can be compelled to undergo rea-
sonable treatment that may help remedy their disability. 286 Once again, 
" [M]e nt a l impa irmen t" is a n impairment that resu lts from a natomical , ph ys -
iologica l, or psycho logical abnormalities which are demon strable by medically accep-
table c linical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 
!d. § 42~ (d)( I )( ~ ) ( 1970) (e mph as is added ). 
At base , howe ver , the finding of di sability rests on the belief that the worker is not 
sha mming when he c la ims that he feels unable to work and that he in fact is somehow pre vented 
fro m working. 
The medica li zation of such c la ims reaches sublime height s in cases of "compensat io n 
neurosis," wherein the worker' s ne urotic disability is in part influenced by an " unco nsc ious 
de s ire to obtain or prol o ng compensation , .. or by "shee r a nxie ty over the outco me of com pe n-
sation litiga ti on." La rson , supra note 280, at 1256; see Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 
Tex. 522 , 524, 209 S.W.2d 345, 346 (1948) (workman's neuro sis in pa rt influenced by an 
" unconscious desire for compensation , and after termination of .. . litigation he will begin to 
improve ") . Of course, compensation neurosis must be distingui shed from conscious malinger-
ing, although one wonders how thi s is to be done. See Larson , supra note 280, at 1255-59. 
284. The workman's fear in e ither Todd v. Goostree, 493 s, W. 2d 411 (Mo . Cr. of Appea ls 
1973) or Bai ley v. Ame ri can Gen. In s. Co. , 154 Te x. 430, 279 S.W.2d 3 15 ( 1955) could be 
explained we ll by either psychody na mic theory or any of the majo r branches of learning theory. 
Sti ll. one wou ld lik e to know what percentage of worke rs in s imi la r circum stance s c la im th at 
they a re unable to wo rk. Moreover , o ne wonders how co mpe nsa ting such c la ims might affec t 
the wo r-ker s in volve d o r simi lar future disabil it y c laims. Learning theory especia ll y might 
predict that co mpen sation will increase th e likelihood that disability will result from such 
acc ident s (e.g . , by rewa rding subjec ti vely expe rienced inabilit y). 
285. Of co urse , in ma ny cases there wi ll be o the r o bservable evidence that bea rs o n th e 
worker's cond ition. For in sta nce, the worker may brea k out in cold sweats or undergo apparent 
anxiety attac ks wh e n he return s to his place of work or even thinks about it. lf so, on a 
commo nse nse bas is, the cred ibilit y of hi s c la im is increased. Claims about illness wi ll add little 
o f hard scient ific value a nd will onl y serve to obscure the mora l and social determination that 
must be made . 
286. Henry v. Gard ne r , 381 F.2d 191 (6 th Cir. ), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 993 (1967) . 
An impai rme nt tha t ca n be re medied by treatment wi ll not se rve as a bas is for a find ing 
o f di sability. "A n indi vi du a l w ill be dee med no t under a di sability if , wi th rea so nable 
effort and safety to himself , the impairment can be dimini shed to the extent tha t the 
individua l will not be preve nted by th e impairment from e ngaging in any substantial 
ga infu l ac ti vit y." 
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of protecting society and caring for disabled people that do not stigmatize 
crazy persons and deprive them of rights . 
If any class of crazy persons is to be treated differently , every attempt 
should be made to ensure that only the tiny fracti on of crazy persons who 
seem clearly and totally crazy should be singled out. Further , such clear 
cases can be recognized by anyone , laypersons and experts, crazy and no n-
crazy alike. Finall y, no matter what role craziness may pl ay in legal 
deci sion making , it should be recognized that the ultimate deci sions are 
moral and social and that special treatment res ts on strong intuition and 
not on a sc ientific rationale . The role of experts should be limited and lay 
deci sionmakers should as sume full responsib ility for the hard socia l, moral , 
and legal decisions that must be made. 
